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NATHANIEL ALEXANDER DAVIS, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in HISTORICAL 
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TITLE:  HISTORY FROM THE MIDDLE: THE STUDENT INTERPRETERS CORPS AND 
IMAGINED AMERICAN ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM IN CHINA, 1902-1941 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Jonathan Bean  
 
The project of American economic imperialism in China during the first half of the 
twentieth century was first and foremost an imagined enterprise. This dissertation examines the 
role of the Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) in this endeavor. Studying language-trained 
intermediaries, this treatment is a first step towards studying history with an approach that is 
neither top-down nor bottom-up but rather middle-outward. Examining hitherto neglected 
personnel records and State Department correspondence, this study reveals the SIC as part of an 
imagined but unsuccessful program of economic imperialism. Although effective in garnering 
American business interest and support for Foreign Service reform and expansion, efforts to 
entice American merchants and companies to enter Asian markets (particularly in China) failed 
to yield a coherent, successful trade empire. However, the largely unstated goal of increased 
American power was achieved as the result of a bureaucratic imperative for specialization, 
professionalization, and institutional expansion set in motion during the establishment of the 
SIC. Examining the evolving roles and views of SIC-trained intermediaries, this dissertation 
finds that while the imagined trade empire failed to materialize, the SIC contributed to a 
developing American perception of China that envisioned increasingly greater American 
intervention in East Asia. In this millieu, a “Peking” order emerged by the mid-1920s that 
became influential in American East Asia policy towards the eve of Word War II that saw China 
as vital to American interests. Established as precursor of American economic empire in China, 
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the SIC was instrumental in shifting discourse away from economic empire towards an 
interventionist American Orientalism. Trade expansion rhetoric waned and Orientalist language 
solidified as Japanese aggression became more blatant and the ascendance of Communism in 
China ever more certain. Highlighting the bureaucratic intermediaries as new method of studying 
history, this study indicates that the project of American economic imperialism was largely 
imagined, but one that transformed to accommodate evolving visions of expanding American 
power in East Asia. These conclusions offer new challenges to and opportunities for scholars of 
American foreign relations. 
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PREFACE  
 The roots of this dissertation lie in the six years spent as Cryptologic Linguist in the 
United States Army between 2003 and 2009. As part of my military training, I learned 
Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian, achieving a high degree of fluency and gaining enormous 
appreciation for the labor that acquiring such fluency requires. While stationed in Wiesbaden, 
Germany, between 2005 and 2009, I also acquired a conversational level of German. It was 
between 2007 and 2008, as I both designed and participated in a year-long intensive Afghan 
Pashto language training course that I came across study materials and dictionaries produced by 
British Orientalists serving with the East India Company army and (after 1857) the British Army 
during the Anglo-Afghan Wars. During this time I developed a passion for history and began a 
Masters program in history (which I completed in May, 2009). I felt particular affinity with the 
history of interpreters and translators, of which I felt an active part. As a member of a unit 
variously deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan during the age of “Imperial Presidency,”1 I also felt a 
reluctant part of American imperial history, and was fascinated by the role of language training, 
interpreters, and translators in that history. Learning a foreign language entails the devotion of no 
small part of one’s life and energy to attain functional fluency, and necessarily involves at least 
partial appropriation of some cultural attitudes and modes of thinking. 
 Accepted in the History Ph.D. program at Southern Illinois University in August 2009, I 
began studying American Business History, with Dr. Jonathan Bean, Middle Eastern History, 
with Dr. Hale Yılmaz, and the History of American Foreign Relations, with Dr. David Wilson. 
During the first year of my studies I became interested in the Student Interpreters Corps (SIC), 
the first formal language training program of the United States government for Foreign Service 
                                            
1 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), x. 
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officers in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire. This topic proved the ideal intersection of my 
three fields of study, bringing together my interests in business history, American involvement in 
the Middle East, and the role of interpreters in the history of imperialism. Following the 
presentation of my prospectus, I planned to expand my study of the SIC to a comparative study 
of the SIC and the Ottoman Translators Bureau (Tercüme Odası). From 2011 to 2012, I studied 
modern Turkish intensively at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, funded by the 
Illinois Veterans Grant and at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, funded by a Foreign 
Language Area Studies fellowship (FLAS).  
In the summer of 2012, I was awarded a Boren Fellowship to study modern and Ottoman 
Turkish at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul and conduct research in the Ottoman archives, a 
development that was truly life-altering. On completing my studies with a Turkish Ministry of 
Education exam demonstrating fluency, I conducted several months of research in the Ottoman 
Archives, examining the lives and careers of Ottoman Occidentalists who learned French, 
English, and other Europeans during their service to the Ottoman state during the Tanzimat 
period. In August 2014, I moved to Izmir, Turkey to establish an educational advising center at 
the request of the US Embassy in Ankara, in partial fulfillment of the stipulations of the Boren 
Fellowship.  
It was during this time, particularly during a conference presentation of my research at 
Yaşar University, that I came to the reluctant conclusion that a comparative study was proving 
too large and cumbersome to complete in the framework of the doctoral dissertation. I have 
therefore adhered to framework outlined in the prospectus, focusing primarily on the Student 
Interpreters Corps in China and Japan, where the vast majority of the language-trained Foreign 
Service officers served. The research I have conducted on the Ottoman Translation Office, 
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Language School, and Foreign Ministry will be included in future publications, while living in 
Turkey for nearly five years at the time of defense has influenced my outlook and will continue 
to inform and shape my approach to teaching.  
Some of the ideas in this dissertation have appeared in my published work. The 
references in chapters seven and eight to American appropriation of British cultural perceptions 
of Afghanistan grew out of research during my first colloquium-seminar sequence with Dr. Hale 
Yılmaz on Middle East History. Portions of this research were published in 2010 and 2014 
respectively.2 In addition, some of my findings on American Orientalism in chapter eight were 
published in a greatly truncated, more theoretical form in 2014.3  
Working for a State Department-funded program in public diplomacy in Turkey, I have 
come to feel even greater appreciation for these men and their families, who often spent the bulk 
of their careers and much of their lives serving in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire. These 
men were often “invisible” in that their work generally remained unnoticed by the American 
public unless they blundered into controversy or scandal. As will be outlined more fully in the 
introduction, body and conclusion, examining intermediaries such as interpreters and translators 
offers another method of studying history, one that is neither top-down nor bottom-up but rather 
from the middle. The language-trained officers examined in this dissertation played an import 
role in the development of the United States’ approach to China and Japan during the first half of 
the twentieth century. Examining their role in the imagined project of American economic 
                                            
2 Nathaniel A. Davis, “From Colonialism to Neo-colonialism: Nationalism, Islam, and the Cultural Framing of 
Conflicts in Afghanistan,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 3 (Spring 2010), 1-21; ___, 
“Century of Ignorance: The Translation of British Attitudes into American Popular Culture and Perceptions of War 
in Afghanistan, 1880s—1980s,” Muslims in American Popular Culture, Anne Richards and Iraj Omidvar, eds.  
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2014). 
3 Nathaniel A. Davis, “History from the Middle: The Student-Interpreters Corps and the United States’ 
Understanding of Asia, 1902-1941,” The West and Asia/Asia and the West: Essays on Transnational Interactions 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2014). 
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imperialism, their successes and failures in advocating policy, offers an opportunity to ask new 
questions of old issues and revise conclusions about the ways in which the United States has 
approached relations with other countries. Although these approaches have not always produced 
results as enlightened as some Americans—both contemporary and modern—would like to 
believe, this history from the middle emphasizes that the enterprise of seeking to understand and 
engage other cultures and societies has overall been a positive one that can and must continue.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCING HISTORY FROM THE MIDDLE: THE STUDENT INTERPRETERS 
CORPS AND AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO AMERICAN FOREIGN 
RELATIONS 
 
Each generation of historians asks new sets of questions from increasingly varied 
sources, seeking new and ever-more specific conclusions.  In the introduction to a compilation of 
historiographical essays on American foreign relations, Michael J. Hogan has sounded the call 
for diplomatic historians to expanded study of marginal groups, particularly non-state actors and 
interdisciplinary syntheses.4  Addressing the preponderance of top-down studies in this area, 
scholars such as Paul Cohen, Kathleen Lodwick, and Jane Hunter have examined missionary 
activity in nineteenth century China as a component of American foreign relations, reexamining 
the opium trade, anti-foreignism in China, and gender.5   
 These are welcome contributions.  However, these efforts have overlooked the role of 
Foreign Service interpreters in American relations with Asia—particularly China—during the 
early twentieth century.  Historians of Sino-American relations have neglected interpreters 
because of their fixation upon the personalities of senior diplomats and the decisions of a small 
coterie of American politicians and businessmen. Scholars have generally associated American 
                                            
4 Michael J. Hogan, “Introduction,” Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 7.  
5  Paul A. Cohen,  The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Antiforeignism in China, 1860-1870 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), vii-xiv; Kathleen L. Lodwick, Crusaders against Opium: Protestant 
Missionaries in China, 1874-1917 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 1-10; Jane Hunter, Gospel 
of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989).  
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policy with these elites--particularly U.S. State Department officials during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century—without careful analysis of the day-to-day American interactions 
with local people and municipal as well as state officials.  This oversight derives from the 
misconceptualization of government institutions as monolithic, as well as the misguided, 
concomitant association of the drive for expansion of American trade with the beginnings of 
American hegemony and economic imperialism in East Asia at the end of the nineteenth 
century.6 The time is ripe for not only the revision of various narratives within the meta-history 
of American Foreign Relations, but also the methodology with which they have been 
approached.   
 This dissertation examines the development of the Student Interpreters Corps—the first 
U.S. government language training program—as a first step towards studying history with an 
approach that is neither top-down nor bottom-up but rather middle-outward, tracing the roles and 
perspectives of intermediary actors. The Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) and the officers who 
received training in it (particularly in China) offer a fruitful field for such an approach, paving 
the way for a reexamination of the assertions of historians such as Thomas McCormick that the 
US approach to East Asia in the early twentieth century was dominated by an imagined quest for 
economic empire.7 
 Based on State Department correspondence, hitherto un-examined personnel records and 
private papers, this dissertation provides a view from the middle, an examination of diplomacy in 
practice and the efforts to understand, interpret, and locally implement policy that was usually 
articulated at the top. Graduates of the SIC operated “in the middle,” as it were, in several 
                                            
6 Thomas J. McCormick, China Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
1967), 7-10, 21-52.  
7 Ibid. 
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respects. They represented the interests of the United States government to local officials. They 
mediated between local government officials and American businessmen and missionaries. They 
also operated in a community of intermediaries and interlocutors that included they local 
government counterparts, host country nationals foreign consular and diplomatic colleagues, as 
well as foreign nationals. 
 Although this period of American Foreign Relations has been studied extensively from a 
variety of perspectives using similarly variegated methodologies, no such study of language-
trained American Foreign Service officers has yet been attempted. It has been more than four 
decades since Gary May wrote in 1976 that “a scholarly study of the China Service remains to be 
written, and now that most State Department and Pentagon documents pertaining to Chinese-
American relations are now available for research … there are enough primary source materials 
to begin that task.”8 Scholars such as Gary May, E.J. Kahn, and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker began 
the task of examining the American Foreign Service officers who played crucial roles in 
constructing the United States’ understanding of China, but studies have hitherto viewed both the 
officers and their contributions to the US understanding of East Asia without considering the 
evolving structure of the US State Department or its concomitantly developing goals and 
priorities.9 Moreover, they focused almost entirely on the “China Hands” who became embroiled 
in controversies concerning Chinese Communism after World War II, particularly officers such 
as O. Edmund Club., John S. Service, and John Carter Vincent. However, these officers were 
merely the tip of the iceberg, the flashpoints of an otherwise nearly invisible middle of 
                                            
8 Gary May, “The New ‘China Hands’ and the Rape of the China Service” review of E. J. Kahn, The China Hands: 
America’s Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (NY: Viking Press, 1987), Reviews in American History 
4, no. 1 (Mar. 1976), 120-127. 
9 Ibid.; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), passim; E.J. Kahn Jr. The China Hands: America’s Foreign Service 
Officers and What Befell Them (New York: Viking Press, 1975), passim. 
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bureaucrats who spent their lives in government service. Without minimizing the important 
contributions of previous studies that highlighted prominent “China Hands,” this study looks to 
contextualize the institution and individuals within which and among whom they lived and 
worked.  
Similarly, cultural historians such as James Reed and Jane Hunter have exaggerated the 
influence that American missionaries exerted on the formulation and implementation on 
American policy in China, while business historians such as Sherman Cochran have tended to 
examine particular business or companies.10 This dissertation is a first earnest attempt to provide 
a textured picture of the Student Interpreters Corp of the US Foreign Service, from its inception 
as the brainchild of Gaillard Hunt, Wilbur Carr, and Elihu Root. It is an effort to understand 
these officers alongside their colleagues who studied Japanese and (very abortively), Ottoman 
Turkish. It is the beginning of an effort to understand not particular American understandings of 
particular national contexts (although they certainly figure quite prominently here) but of the 
nascent system which State Department administrators began to construct at the turn of the 
century in order to understand and engage those national contexts, and which system continued 
to evolve throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  
Finally, it is the first attempt to use language training as a window through which to 
examine the process—not merely the policies—of the United States’ relations with the rest of the 
world. Following a new methodology and offering unique perspective, this dissertation argues 
that the project in which the SIC prominently figured was not a carefully orchestrated economic 
imperialist project in China, but rather a complex and usually reactive process whereby the 
United States sought to become an influential international player but whose original aim 
                                            
10 James Reed, The Missionary Mind and American East Asia Policy, 1911-1915, Harvard East Asian Monographs; 
104 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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collapsed in the face of Japanese military and economic imperialism in China. As will be 
examined in detail, this latter development not only curtailed tepid efforts to expand American 
trade but also realigned the focus of language-trained American officers from promoting 
American business interests to answering military and diplomatic challenges, thereby obviating 
discussion of American economic empire. 
In the first chapter, the establishment of the SIC is examined within the context of an 
impetus towards trade promotion at the beginning of the twentieth century. It surveys the 
coalition of would-be State Department reformers and American businessmen that emerged on 
the heels of the Spanish-American War. Shepherded by Secretary of State Elihu Root and State 
Department chief Wilbur Carr, this alliance deployed the language of empire to argue for 
reorganization and “Americanization” of the US Consular Service and the institution of language 
training for officers in non-Indo-European countries, particularly China (and shortly thereafter 
the Japanese and Ottoman Empires). The envisioned result was the realization of the presumed 
commercial benefits of empire with few of its military and administrative costs. The process of 
establishment thus clearly articulated trade promotion as the primary mission of the Student 
Interpreters Corps. 
Chapter two examines that mission in detail, highlighting the emphasis placed on trade 
promotion by the architects of the Student Interpreters Corps as well as the understanding of 
officers in China. Particularly in China where the largest number of language students was 
concentrated and the emphasis on trade promotion was strongest, Foreign Service officers 
struggled to huckster for American trade. Their efforts were hampered by Congressional 
parsimony and a lack of buy-in from American business, which failed to pursue such trade 
opportunities as these officers identified. Low budgets for Consular offices meant that pay was 
6	
	
	
comparatively low, particularly given the lifestyle and conduct expectations incumbent upon 
these officers. Financial shortfalls also ensured that Student Interpreters never replaced host 
country citizen employees entirely. At the same time, the apathetic response of American 
exporters to the comparatively meager opportunities in China (relative to domestic  meant that 
very few officers appeared to be accomplishing the primary goal of the reorganized US Consular 
Service and the very raison d’etre of the SIC.  
Chapter three surveys the colorful characters of the Student Interpreters Corps. Although 
established as a language training program for future Foreign Service officers in China and Japan 
as well as the Ottoman Empire, it was China that eventually the vast majority of students and it 
was Chinese officers who became the most influential. The chapter divides the Student 
Interpreter era into two periods. The first is from the establishment of the SIC in 1902 to the 
Rogers Act of 1924, which merged the Diplomatic and Consular Service to form the US Foreign 
Service (hence, “consular officer,” “diplomat,” and “Foreign Service officer” are used 
interchangeably, although some preference is given to the latter). The second period begins in 
1924 and ends in 1941 as US entry into WWII became increasingly unavoidable.  
During the earlier period, the perspectives of “old China hands” such as Nelson T. 
Johnson largely prevailed within the Far East Division of the State Department. They were 
characterized by a generally classical liberal view of economics and social order, a 
predominately non-interventionist view towards bilateral relations, and a paradoxically neutral 
stance on the promotion of specific American business interests while fiercely advocating the 
promotion of American trade in general. The latter period witnessed the continued dominance of 
these older officers’ perspectives, but these met with increasing challenges those of junior 
officers, who matured in the political climate of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Their views 
7	
	
	
became progressively more politically interventionist and less economically liberal (for example, 
they tended to afford greater sympathy for Chinese Communists). While examining these 
developments, this chapter also highlights some of the many personal rivalries and entrenched 
prejudices that plagued this branch of US government service just as they did many others of this 
era. 
Whereas much of the dissertation deals with SIC officers in China, the fourth chapter 
examines them in Japan. This chapter examines the seemingly innocuous bifurcation in the 
approaches to trade promotion between Japanese- and Chinese-trained officers. Partly due to 
their numerical superiority, China hands had a much greater influence on the Inspection Service 
that policed American Consulates following provision in the 1924 Rogers Act. This led to low-
level but continuous friction over the relative importance of trade promotion. As the chapter 
reveals however, Japanese-American trade was nearly indisputably in Japanese hands, largely 
due to the much greater English language abilities of Japanese businessmen. Consequently, as 
knowledge of Japan became increasingly important for political reasons, emphasis shifted 
rapidly away from trade promotion towards political crisis management. Yet even as discourse 
shifted away from ostensible pursuit of economic empire in particular, it swung increasingly in 
favor of greater American interventionism.  
 Part of the impetus for this was personal—a point highlighted in the fifth chapter, which 
highlights the role of women, family, and other aspects in the personal lives of officers from the 
Student Interpreters Corps. Although the SIC was modeled along the same lines as its older 
British counterpart, it lacked the administrative structural support. The purpose of the chapter is 
multifarious. Firstly, examination of women and family’s underscores an important part of the 
story that has often been missing from top-down history. It reveals actors, relationships, and 
8	
	
	
pressures on SIC-trained officers that are obscured in the pages of international political history 
while underscoring some of the ways personal behaviors, habits and ambitions that influenced 
the day to day workings of American consulates in China, Japan, and Ottoman Turkey. 
Highlighting the travails of individual officers by examining their families and personal lives, the 
chapter indicates that the SIC and its Foreign Service graduates were insufficiently funded and 
protected to sufficiently undergird an economic imperialist project in China.   
Chapter six approaches the imperialism question slightly differently. Whereas cultural 
historians such as Jane Hunter and James Reed have portrayed American missionaries as agents 
of cultural imperialism and American economic historians have linked missionaries, consuls, and 
businessmen within an overarching American economic imperialist project, this chapter 
examines the connections between American consular officers and missionaries, primarily in 
China, but to a lesser degree also in Japan and Turkey. The reasons for the comparatively greater 
attention to China are that during much of the period between 1902 and 1941, the United States 
had comparatively few consular offices in Ottoman Turkey and Imperial Japan—and many of 
those in Japan and Turkey were geographically distant from centers of American missionary 
activity.  
The chapter suggests that the relationship between American missionaries and Foreign 
Service officers was more complicated and nuanced than allowed for by pithy epithets such as 
cultural and/or economic imperialism, particularly in the ways that perception of too-close an 
association between officers and missionaries negatively affected their standing in the Foreign 
Service. It highlights the privileging of trade promotion as an institutional goal for the SIC, 
underlines divergent missionary and SIC-officer views towards the Chinese Communists and 
Chinese Government, and emphasizes both the reluctance of missionaries to follow consuls’ 
9	
	
	
advice and the headaches such recalcitrance caused for the latter. Finally, analyzing missionaries 
in the perception of SIC-trained officers in American consulates in China, Japan, Ottoman 
Turkey and the Far East Division, the chapter also indicates that despite a complex mix of 
variously clashing and overlapping interests, missionaries and SIC-trained Foreign Service 
officers both envisioned a more globally interventionist role for the United States government in 
the world. 
The next two chapters underscore this development as precisely the road the creators of 
the SIC wished to embark upon. The foregoing chapters generally regard cultural histories such 
as those of Hunter and Reed, and economic treatments like those of Thomas McCormick, as 
under-contextualized and reductionist accounts that smear the nuances of a complex era with 
unreflective labels including “cultural imperialism,” “economic empire,” and “hegemony.” 
Taking a detour from this theme however, the seventh chapter highlights how State Department 
reformers deliberately aped, mimicked and translated the imperial discourse necessary to achieve 
their desired bureaucratic results. The most immediate of these at the turn of the twentieth 
century was the establishment of the Student Interpreters Corps. The chapter examines the issues 
attending the adoption of such language to push American trade, as well as the political obstacle 
course that individual officers were expected to navigate while simultaneously demonstrating 
their utility in promoting American trade and delivering politically-informed sound economic 
advice. In many cases, doing both was simply impossible. Underscoring the ideological and 
political components of the struggle to construct a coherent bureaucracy, this chapter argues that 
the language and rhetoric deployed to defend the acquisition of economic empire resulted not in 
the attainment of empire but rather built consensus on the necessity of attempting imperial 
projects in the future. 
10	
	
	
The eighth chapter expands on this theme, tracing the evolution of State Department and 
business attitudes towards China and the emergence of a nascent American Orientalism, while 
highlighting the latter’s similarities with and differences from the Orientalist discourse outlined 
by Edward Said.11 The chapter argues that American “Orientalism” underwent a gradual but 
fundamental shift between 1902 and 1941, evolving from the relatively passive ethno-
nationalism of the Open Door to a more overt discourse of power, aimed at presaging American 
exercise of power in East Asia—particularly China and Japan. It further elaborates the United 
States’ conscious emulation of imperial translator training programs as part of the appropriation 
of American appropriation of Orientalism: only properly trained and loyal Americans could 
represent the Orient for the United States. Yet as the Open Door was increasingly obviated by 
Japanese aggression in China transformed in anticipation of an American response: the United 
States simply could not sit idly by.  Driven by political exigencies and belief that the United 
States must eventually take action, the framing of problems in China by SIC-trained officers 
increasingly emphasized the Japanese threat, growing American power, and of the Chinese as 
comparatively weak and backward, and, implicitly, in need of American assistance. Yet while a 
consensus for U.S. action emerged, such agreement fractured over visions of what that action 
should entail. While underscoring the evolution of a uniquely American Orientalism, the chapter 
also indicates how such attitudes could prove a barrier to understanding specific issues even 
while providing a useful rationalization for the eventual exercise of American power. 
The final chapter also highlights this trend of ideological change but re-focuses on the 
dissolution of trade expansion ideology as the impetus for American economic empire in China. 
It examines SIC-trained officers’ perceptions of Chinese Communism and Japanese militarism 
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from the mid-1920s to the eve of US entry into WWII. Political crises forced a shift away from 
trade expansion ideology. To be sure, trade expansion was never far from the minds of SIC-
trained in China and Japan as they regarded the Japan’s naked imperialism in China. Lacking the 
muscle to hold the Open Door open, they turned their energies towards politics, but were 
frustrated to find that their views were often not solicited and were easily ignored. The chapter 
reveals the emergence of differing perceptions of Chinese Communists and Japanese militarism 
in China among Japanese- and Chinese-trained officers and underscores how the emphasis on 
trade promotion collapsed in the face of political crises.   
In this way this dissertation maintains that the putatively economic imperialist project in 
China was an ephemeral phantom, largely confined to the realm of rhetoric, changing according 
to the exigencies of political crisis. By examining the careers of language-trained officers in the 
American Foreign service, this dissertation offers an alternative method of studying history. The 
approach is neither top-down nor bottom up,  revising past narratives and using linguistic 
intermediaries as a lens through which to approach new questions. The conclusion further 
reflects on this methodology of “history from the middle” and presents possibilities for future 
study. Adopting this approach, it argues, will revitalize not only the history of American Foreign 
Relations but also that of international relations, opening new and re-opening old areas of 
discussion and incorporating elements of cultural, economic, and even business history—a 
history of, and about, the often invisible middle. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 “CONSIDERED AS A BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT’: INTRODUCING THE 
STUDENT INTERPRETERS CORPS, 1890-191012 
  
 The United States Foreign Service of the early twentieth century has been wrongly 
portrayed as an expression of rising American economic power in global markets.  Scholars such 
as Thomas McCormick, Richard Hume Werking and Michael Hunt have portrayed the United 
States government as responding to the calls of export-oriented American businesses for a more 
robust consular service and increased protection for their enterprises abroad. Yet while business 
certainly played a significant role in the reconstitution of the American Foreign Service at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, historical accounts of consular reform as well as American 
Foreign relations have largely overlooked the story of a small agency with a growth agenda: the 
United States State Department.  
An examination of the creation and function of the Student Interpreters Corps—the first-
ever foreign language program for American Foreign Service officers—will reveal this story by 
detailing the ways in which the State Department extracted greater authority from Congress 
under the guise of promoting and expanding American overseas trade. Not only did 
establishment of the Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) in 1902 immediately pave the way for 
more comprehensive reform of the Consular Service, it provided for the continual expansion and 
specialization of the State Department throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. The 
creation of the Student Interpreters Corps was part of the transformation of the State Department 
                                            
12 Elihu Root, “Reorganization of the Consular Service,” Committee on Foreign Relations, House Report 2281 (59-
1), 4906.  
13	
	
	
from a minor office, without a building of its own,13 to a bureaucratic leviathan by the end of 
World War II. The theme of bureaucratic creep, has not been entirely overlooked. Thurman 
Arnold, for example has noted that "Institutions once formed have the persistency of all living 
things. They tend to grow and expand. Even when their utility both the public and their own 
members has disappeared, they still survive."14  
However, this trend has been comparatively neglected in the history of American foreign 
relations—an oversight that this examination of the SIC seeks to address. In particular, this 
chapter, and the subsequent one that examines SIC-trained officers’ efforts to expand American 
trade in China, underline a trend of “bureaucratic imperative” identified by scholars such as 
James Buchanan who have identified this impetus as “the motivational structure of the 
governmental bureaucracy as the primary source for that part of governmental growth that does 
not represent response to the demands of citizens for goods and services.”15 
 The United States came late to language training for its representative officials abroad. 
This development was the response to a confluence of factors, including rising American foreign 
trade aspirations, emerging nationalism, and the clash of multiple imperialisms and imperial 
cultures.  As will be discussed in this chapter, the Student Interpreters Corps, its creation, 
development, and role in American foreign relations and trade are intertwined with these trends.  
An examination of the Student Interpreters Corps thus contributes to further comprehension of 
all of these by demonstrating the initiative of the State Department in agitating for and realizing 
the establishment of the first government language training program for American 
representatives abroad. 
                                            
13 Nelson T. Johnson, Reminiscences, 27. 
14 Thurman W. The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937), 355. 
15 James M. Buchanan, "Why Does Government Grow?" chap. 1, Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of 
Government Growth, Ed. Thomas E. Borcherding (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1977), 14-15, 18. 
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 This was first and foremost a political enterprise, part of the larger scheme whereby 
which the United States government sought to expand its markets while portraying itself as the 
equal of empires such as Britain, France, and Japan. From early reform proposals and the 
establishment of Chinese, Japanese, and Turkish language training programs to Congressional 
approval and Executive implementation of Consular reforms, the State Department played the 
leading (albeit not solitary) role. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the diplomatic and consular services of the United 
States lacked interpreters and translators throughout the embassies and consulates in Asia and the 
Middle East. It is worth noting the difference, at that time, between, diplomats and consuls. 
Diplomats lived in foreign capitals, were accredited to and accepted by foreign heads of state, 
and conducted their nation’s foreign business, whereas consuls were accredited to foreign 
ministries and lived in other cities as wells as capitals in order to attend to the needs and/or 
problems of their compatriots.16  Because of this, discussion of the creation and development of 
the Student Interpreters Corps will frequently reference the “Consular Service,” which is also the 
term that appears most frequently in the archival sources from the 1890s to 1924. “Foreign 
Service” will be used to denote the general body of individuals employed by the State 
Department and concerned with American foreign relations from the 1890s to 1946.  
 Foreign Service officers performed a broad range of functions.  Some of these included 
supplying economic and political reports concerning the districts to which they were assigned. 
The purpose of this was to give the State Department as accurate a view as possible of the 
political and economic life of the country.  Depending on the city or region to which they were 
posted, officers also fulfilled a number of supplementary duties, such as certifying incoming and 
                                            
16 Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: the Training, Outlook, and Style of United States 
Foreign Service Officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 5. 
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outgoing cargoes, processing visa and passport applications for Americans and prospective 
immigrants, and maintaining professional relationships with local officials. Officers were also 
expected to establish and maintain contacts with prominent local and foreign businessmen, as 
well as with the representatives of other foreign governments in their particular districts.   
 Although their pay and promotions were determined by Congress, Foreign Service 
Officers were appointed by the President (as will be discussed in greater detail later, the 
American separation of powers inhibited the development of a robust Foreign Service and at 
times hampered its functioning). The system of appointments and promotions was in flux from 
the turn of the twentieth century, where this study begins, to the1924 adoption of the Rogers 
Act.17  Thereafter the system remained relatively unchanged until after World War II. 
 The most powerful impetus for change was political. Victory in the Spanish-American 
War catapulted the United States to greater importance in Asia in 1898, while the wartime 
military experience impelled senators and members of Congress on the Senate and House 
committees on Foreign Relations and Foreign to seek a massive reorganization of the Diplomatic 
and Consular Service.  The centerpiece of this reform was the adoption of merit-based system of 
civil examinations for recruitment, with an emphasis upon performance and efficiency as 
conditions for advancement.  Abandonment of the so-called “spoils system” (whereby consular 
and diplomatic officials were appointed along party lines) aroused fierce opposition, which 
thwarted passage of any major attempt at restructuring for several years.18        
 The enlargement and reorganization of the Consular service was conceived primarily as 
meeting the threat (real or perceived) of European discrimination toward American merchandise 
                                            
17 Richard Hume Werking, The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890-1913 
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 249. 
18 See “Views of the Minority,” House Report 3305 (57th Congress, Session 2), vol. 4414. 
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marketed abroad.  Congressman Robert Adams Jr. (Representative from Pennsylvania and 
erstwhile US Minister to Brazil) in 1898 and thereafter was at the forefront of efforts to refurbish 
and professionalize the Service.  In Adams’ portrayal of the situation, the government had been 
aware of rising hostility toward American products for some time.19  With the Spanish-American 
war in the background, he added a sense of urgency:   
 
“no stronger argument could be offered for the necessity of a reform in the consular 
service than the war with Spain.  Our naval authorities have a right to look to the consuls 
to keep them informed on all matters of interest appertaining to the movements of the 
enemy’s vessels of war . . . how can men . . . gather information from the people or even 
the newspapers thereof, without the aid of interpreters who may be false in their service 
to them?”20 
 
 
 The idea of recruiting young American men and training them “in the difficult oriental 
languages”21 was an early success in the efforts at consular reform.  Compared with the more 
comprehensive overhaul of the Consular Corps, establishing an interpreter-training program was 
easy, probably because the notion gained popularity in many circles simultaneously.  The 
Chinese Minister in the United States in an address at the University of Pennsylvania in 1900 
                                            
19 Robert Adams Jr., House Report 1460 (55-2), 3722.  May 27, 1898. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Richard Hume Werking, The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890-1913 
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suggested that the United States adopt a Chinese language-training program similar to those of 
Britain and France.22   
 As suggested by Congressman Adams’ references to the Spanish American War, one 
reason the notion of obtaining American interpreters became attractive rapidly was that the war 
highlighted the questionable wisdom of trusting non-Americans in situations relating to national 
security.  The Boxer Rebellion may have added urgency to concept as well, for in 1902 Edwin H. 
Conger, the U.S. Minister to China (who had experienced first-hand the Boxers’ siege of the 
foreign legations in 1900) decried the U.S. legation’s dependence on a sole, ex-missionary 
named E. T. Williams for the official interpreting and translating.23 The lack of an interpreter-
training program forced the government to rely upon missionaries and businessmen, an 
arrangement that Conger similarly deplored. Writing to Secretary of State John Hay, he asserted, 
“no one who does not make a specialty of the Mandarin language and of official Chinese life can 
ever fit himself for [diplomatic] work.”24  For Conger, the concerns of commerce and evangelism 
were encumbrances to prospective diplomats—but such obstacles would disappear if an official 
training program were established.25  
 In the minister’s opinion, not only did the lack of American interpreters put the United 
States at a diplomatic and commercial disadvantage in China, it was also an embarrassment to 
national prestige.  He stressed that  
 
                                            
22 Francis Rufus Bellamy, The Outlook 64, no. 9 (March 3, 1900), 471; Robert Adams Jr., “Reorganization of the 
Consular Service,” House Report 562 (56-1) 4023, March 8, 1900.  
23 Edwin H. Conger to John Hay, Peking [Beijing] China, March 29, 1902.  United States Department of State, 
Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to 
Congress December 2, 1902; hereafter [FRUS], (Washington D. C., GPO, 1902), 228-229. 
24 Edward Thomas Williams of Columbus, OH spent years as a missionary in China before serving as Interpreter to 
the Consulate in Shanghai and later as Second Secretary to the American Legation.  See The Register of the 
Department of State (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1918), 149. 
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“everyone of the other Great Powers has two or more interpreters of long experience and 
from three to twenty students being prepared at government expense for future work.  We 
are thus placed at a very great disadvantage before the Chinese and among the other 
legations.  It is largely through the interpreters that the legations are kept in touch with 
the Chinese or are able to secure valuable current information.”26   
 
In terms of language-trained personnel, the United States Diplomatic and Consular Service (the 
official name until the 1924 Rogers Act) was inferior compared to those of Britain, France, 
Germany, and Russia; as of 1894, even Japan had a superior training mechanism, educating 
many of its future officers in Chinese, Russian, Thai, Spanish, and Korean.27  The assertion by 
reform’s opponents that “our [consular] service is, in our opinion, as good as any service in the 
world” flew in the face of these facts.28   
 In fact, Secretary of State John Hay had requested that Congress provide for student 
interpreters in 1900.29  Even those opposed to a larger overhaul of the Consular service agreed on 
the necessity of training interpreters (in 1902 the question of how to retain them had simply 
delayed the appropriation), so by the time Conger’s letter reached Secretary Hay, the Student 
Interpreter Corps (SIC) had been created.30 However, the task of training, standardizing, and 
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professionalizing this cadre was caught up in and overshadowed by the larger battle over 
reorganization of the Consular Service. 
 
Selling to Salesmen: the Campaign for Consular Reorganization, 1890-1906 
 
 Richard Hume Werking has told the story of consular reform in great detail.31  However, 
the primary details bear repeating, as they illustrate the political and institutional within which 
the Student Interpreters Corps was created. The campaign for and resistance to consular service 
reform highlights the leading role of the State Department in winning the support of business 
associations for consular service reform while simultaneously underscoring the American 
political exigencies and economic tensions that continually plagued the Foreign Service and its 
officers throughout the early twentieth century. Even the effort to establish the Student 
Interpreters Corps met stiff opposition from sectional (particularly Southern) interests, wedded to 
the “spoils system” of political appointments to the Consular Service.  
 Because appointments to American diplomatic and consular posts were made by the 
President, these offices experienced heavy turnover following American presidential elections, 
sometimes reaching 90 percent. The president-elect used consular positions to reward political 
loyalty and placate political enemies in the Senate (which, due to the “advice and consent” clause 
of the Constitution, had to confirm presidential appointments).32 So politicized was the U.S. 
Consular Service that even in 1909 Secretary of State Elihu Root described it as a place “to 
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shelve broken down politicians and to take care of failures in American life whose friends were 
looking for some way to support them at Government expense.”33   
 This was not mere political hyperbole. One of the initial inspections of American 
consular offices in China revealed that the Consul-General in Canton had been guilty of “gross 
drunkenness upon a public occasion,” the “issuance of fraudulent Chinese certificates for the 
admission into the United States of Chinese coolie laborers under the guise of merchants, and 
receiving illegal fees,” as well as “extending the protection of his consulate to Chinese subjects 
on the grounds that they were American citizens.”34 
 Although shocking to the American public, such misconduct was hardly uncommon in a 
system within which Congress exerted more oversight and control of the consular service than 
the State Department. Until 1906, there was no system whereby to inspect and supervise 
American consular posts; because such an endeavor required a separate appropriation from 
Congress, more than a century elapsed between the establishment of the Consular service in 
1790 (under Thomas Jefferson) and its first inspection in 1896-1897.35 The reason for such a 
dilatory approach to reform was, as mentioned above, the constitutional problem. Even sincere 
advocates of reform considered it unconstitutional for Congress to dictate to the President how 
and whom he could appoint to foreign posts;36 the opposition was likely reluctant to abandon the 
system of political patronage. 
 
The ‘Spoils System’ Resists, 1898-1906 
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 Acute as were the lack of oversight, systemic malfeasance, complete dearth of training, 
and the nearly random classification, ranking, and pay system, these problems took a backseat to 
the inherent woes of the spoils system. Even if the State Department was fortunate enough to 
attract a few good candidates, by the time they had acquired any experience, they faced the 
prospect of dismissal from service after the succeeding Presidential election.  Michael Hunt has 
observed that turn-of-the century appointees “had no expertise; those who stayed long enough to 
gain it eventually fell victim to party politics or succumbed to the lure of higher pay offered by 
business or the customs service.”37 Moreover, “inadequate staffing, especially of able 
interpreters, was a recurrent and serious deficiency.”38 
 Notwithstanding these glaring issues, it is important to note that prior to the 1890s, there 
was scant enthusiasm existed for ameliorating the bureaucratic quagmire. During the 1880s, 
Secretary of State Thomas Bayard had repeatedly asked Congress to fund Consular inspectors to 
no avail.39 Secretary of State John Hay requested student interpreters in 1900.40 Loyalty to the 
spoils system and misgivings concerning the constitutionality of proposed reform persisted, 
preventing comprehensive reorganization until 1906; however the creation of the Student 
Interpreters Corps in 1902 was the first act in what would be more than two decades of State 
Department-Congressional tussling over presidential privilege vis-à-vis professionalization.     
 Personal friendships were the primary means of mobilizing business associations to 
pressure Congress in favor of reform.  The Student Interpreters Corps was an early success of 
                                            
37 Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 169. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Werking, Master Architects, 8. 
40 Ibid., 116. 
22	
	
	
such collaboration.  The friendship between Gaillard Hunt, a State Department clerk disgruntled 
with the spoils system, and Harry Garfield, the eldest son of the assassinated president, was one 
such avenue.  Werking has noted that the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce had enthusiastically 
greeted early efforts to reform the Consular Service in 1895, partly as a result of their 
association.41  A colorless career bureaucrat, Wilbur Carr, appointed as the head of the Consular 
Bureau in 1902, lacked the business and congressional connections and charisma of his rival 
Hunt.42   
Although Carr was undeniably an able administrator, it appears to be no coincidence that 
the creation of the Student Interpreters Corps occurred in 1902, partly through his efforts, and 
that more complete reform of the Consular Service—Carr’s efforts notwithstanding—did not 
occur until 1906, under Secretary of State Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer who had reorganized 
the War Department following the Spanish-American War.43 As seen in House and Senate 
committee reports and the Congressional Record, lobbying by business associations increased 
steadily. 
 Local chambers of commerce and other business associations supported consular reform 
(including the establishment of interpreter training) in order to reduce the transaction costs of 
import-export trade.  According to political scientist Paul M. Johnson, the primary categories of 
transaction costs are: “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs.”44  Werking has observed that the drive for consular reform was most popular 
“the kinds of businessmen associated in chambers of commerce or boards of trade.  These groups 
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42 Ibid., 65-66; 90-93. 
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attracted the smaller and medium-sized firm which  . . . were more dependent than the major 
corporations upon government information about for information about foreign markets.”45 
 In addition, the expansion and reorganization of the consular service was not expected to 
be a burden on Federal resources: while pushing for consular reform and expansion, Secretary of 
State Elihu Root stressed that financially, the service at the time was nearly self-sufficient; 
proposed increase in consular salaries would be offset by the new revenue in consular fees (in 
most instances at that time these were pocketed by the consul, in whole or in part).46  Therefore 
whether or not they were not dependent upon the government for market intelligence, large and 
small firms alike were interested in expanding and professionalizing the Consular Service (the 
various spokesmen of the respective chambers of commerce did not divulge their identities 
however—probably given the trust-busting tendencies of the McKinley and Roosevelt 
administrations), as they anticipated tangible benefits.  During a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on consular reform in 1900 Charles P. Moser of the Auburn, NY chamber of 
commerce reported,  
 
“our manufacturers and businessmen are interested in this bill. I talked with our largest 
manufacturer Monday morning.  He represents a concern whose pay roll last year 
amounted to nearly a million dollars in labor and he said he most emphatically supports 
this bill. This firm has its agents in foreign countries, so they do not need the work of the 
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consular service so much . . . but the better reports made by the consuls, the better reports 
they would get in the country . . ..”47 
   
Thus, under guidance of reformers such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Adams Jr., Elihu 
Root, Wilbur Carr, and many others, business pressure helped erode opposition to 
reorganization.  By the time Robert Adams of Pennsylvania first proposed an overhaul in 1898,48 
organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), The Cleveland 
Chamber of Commerce, and the National Business League of Chicago had already been calling 
for an overhaul, as well as “Americanization of the [foreign] service.”49  
 The chief motivation behind this goal was economic.  During a committee discussion on 
consular reform, Congressman Adams of Pennsylvania summed up the view that foreigners in 
the service were “as a rule, of no value to in our efforts to build up our export trade, because their 
sympathies and the interests of their local associates are generally opposed to the success of 
those efforts.”50  There was some basis to this assertion.  During this period it was not 
uncommon for a businessmen or consul of one nationality living in a particular area to care for 
the interests of another nation—similar to the way the Swiss Embassy in Tehran represents 
American concerns in Iran today.  Such agents could not be expected to provide information that 
would allow American companies to compete with them or their countrymen—particularly after 
the 1906 reorganization limited salaries for non-U.S. citizens to $1000 or less.51  For example, in 
1914 Inspector Alfred Gottschalk heaped criticism upon Peter William, the German citizen in 
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charge of the United States’ Consular Agency at Samsun, Turkey—even though the officer was 
not even a salaried employee—for failing to report adequately on local business conditions, 
maintain office records, etc.52 The adoption of a merit-based examination system and the 
creation of an interpreter-training program appeared to offer the solution to this problem.  
In 1900, John Ela, the League’s general counsel, made it clear that interpreter training 
was a vital element of any consular reform program, praising the British system of language 
study and on-the-job training as assistants, vice-consuls, and eventually, consuls, urging that the 
Congress institute a similar system.53  Similarly, in a letter to Congressmen Robert R. Hitt 
(Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs), Theodore C. Search (President, NAM) wrote, 
“that we have any efficient men in the service is not due to the system under which the service is 
organized and maintained; the efficient men are there in spite of the system rather than because 
of it.”54   
 As will be discussed further in detail, this observation applied equally to the Foreign 
Service of the succeeding two decades.  Nevertheless, the creation of the Student Interpreter 
Corps in 1902, its extensions in 1906 and 1909,55 and the early efforts to improve and expand the 
consular service were watershed improvements, marking the beginning of a professional 
organization.  The Foreign Service Act of 1924 (commonly known as “the Rogers Act”) further 
consolidated these reforms (especially merit-based promotions and a retirement system), most of 
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which Elihu Root had sought in 1906.56  Conceiving such a service—even legislating it—was 
one thing.  Implementing it however, was quite another. 
 
Part Two: “To Bring about Harmonious Working”57 
 
 It was one thing to call for changes to the Consular Service; putting them into practice 
was quite another. The Student Interpreters Corps was the first challenge. Having coaxed, 
cajoled, and shepherded the much-touted SIC to passage through at best an uninterested 
Congress, the State Department was forced to implement less than a half-measure. During the 
congressional debates over creating the Student Interpreters Corps, American Minister to China 
Edwin Conger forwarded a summary of the regulations for British student interpreters in China 
in the hope that Congress and the State Department would emulate them. They provided for 
passage to China, payment for their Chinese teachers, and government housing.58 Congress 
created the corps but initially left its recruitment and administration to the President. Passed on 
March 22, 1902, the bill only provided salaries of $1000 per year for “ten student interpreters in 
China,” stipulating that they be U.S. citizens between the ages of 18 and 3059 and in good health, 
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and that the selection be “non-partisan.”60  It did nothing else.  Their duties were unspecified; 
neither was there any promise of promotion or an incentive to become proficient in the language.  
 The effective date of individual appointments to the SIC was also unclear, which meant 
that the beginning of their salary was also uncertain.  As no provision was made at first to cover 
the costs of transportation to their posts, the State Department’s initial instructions to student 
interpreters required them to bear the burden, as well as their tuition, and required them to sign a 
ten year service agreement.61  In theory, recruits could spend a decade at the same salary.   As 
will be dealt with later, this bureaucratic torpor produced widespread resentment among SIC 
graduates, often producing the very “stagnation and decay” among consular officials that the 
opponents of reform had feared.62     
 The relative success (or failure) of the student interpreter corps in China, Japan, and 
Turkey varied respectively according to the character of the program implementers, those of the 
students themselves, the personnel needs of consular service, the relationship between the 
consulates and the American embassy or legation; even the timing—and wording—of the 
various appropriations bills played a role.  The size of the legation was one of the most important 
factors, as the SIC created a more specialized body of officers—in comparison to the consular 
service at large as it existed after 1906—who generally spent their entire careers in the country 
where they began as students.  As of 1911 (the first year that Student Interpreters are listed for 
Turkey in the Register of the Department of State), there were 16 posts (including consulates and 
consular agencies) in China, 7 in the Japanese Empire (including offices in Taiwan, Korea, and 
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Manchuria), and 25 in the Ottoman Empire. Of the latter however, only 6 were located in 
Turkish-speaking areas, the other 19 were in Arabic- or Greek-speaking locations, many of 
which were closed to SIC graduates, by local custom if not by law.63 
 In addition, the practice of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire permitted foreigners to 
hire Ottoman subjects as interpreters (“dragomans”). They received special status, including tax 
exemption and trade privileges (the same rights granted to foreign merchants and consuls).64 As 
will be discussed further during treatment of these consular middlemen, the “dragoman” tradition 
in the Ottoman Empire created a very different attitude toward student interpreters, interpreters, 
and foreign staff among American consular and diplomatic officers in the Ottoman Empire, 
compared to those in China and Japan.  
 In China (and Japan, after 1906), students were to “apply themselves exclusively to the 
study of the Chinese language for a period of two years.”65  As part of the consular service 
overhaul, in 1906 these directions were modified slightly, allowing supervisors (the consuls-
general, etc.) to assign a minimal amount of office work and even to transfer students to other 
posts.66 In China and Japan, Hay’s early instructions (issued because Congress refused to provide 
rules in 1902, because of the ongoing dispute concerning executive power connected with 
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consular reform) set a precedent that supervisors generally followed; in the Ottoman Empire, this 
was not the case.     
 Despite the clear instructions that they were to concentrate solely on language study, 
student interpreters in the Ottoman Empire were employed almost immediately in clerical 
work.67  This occurred for several reasons.  First, as pointed out by Elihu Root in 1906, the 
consular service was systemically understaffed, comparing the contemporary workload of most 
consulates to dumping the legal work of big city law practice on a village lawyer’s office.68  This 
was hardly an exaggeration.  Although some posts were no longer relevant, in the 1890s, 
American enterprise exploded into international competition so abruptly that this development 
was described as an “American invasion.”69   
 Yet as will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, this “invasion” did not 
occur in China, Japan, or Turkey, and while language-trained consular officers functioned as 
important interlocutors between American business interests local government, politics.  The 
Student Interpreters Corps in these countries was the exponent of American commercial 
ambitions and its development was retarded by the difficulties in actualizing these goals.  This 
was particularly true of the SIC in the Ottoman Empire, where the growth of American trade was 
slightest, American interest in its expansion was weakest, and international politics (World War I 
and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire) intervened to render expansion of American trade 
and the Student Interpreters Corps there largely superfluous.  Such neglect was exacerbated by 
mismanagement and apathy on the part of those who implemented the program, and the sluggish 
political response to practical problems.  
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69 Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 70 
30	
	
	
 Unlike students in China, who lived in a “student interpreters mess” due to their lower 
numbers (usually no more than three or four in any given year) they lived alone in privately 
rented quarters in İstanbul.70  Poor supervision of students in İstanbul got the program off to a 
bad start, not least by warping the expectations of the junior officers concerning their future in 
the service.  These were outlandishly high.  As Inspector Alfred Gottschalk observed in 1913,  
 
“their general attitude toward life and their work was (with two or three honorable 
exceptions) that of superior young persons in possession of weighty governmental 
secrets, whose future in the diplomatic corps was assured, in contrast with “political 
employees”—the latter being anyone who was not a student dragoman.”71  
 
 Gottschalk next recited a litany of perceived abuses, chief among these being their 
double-duty as clerks in the embassy, decoding telegrams, copying dispatches and being invited 
to official embassy functions.72  Strangely, his proposed remedy was to send student-interpreters 
to various consular posts throughout the Empire (where such office work as they were required 
to do was the same as that of the embassy).73 
 Despite benevolent intentions, Gottschalk’s recommendation, ostensibly for the 
improvement of student-interpreter training, seriously hampered their acquisition of the language.  
Appointees to SIC Turkey between 1913 and 1917 (when the Ottoman Empire severed 
diplomatic relations with the United States) quickly found themselves in cities such as Cairo, 
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Jerusalem, Beirut, or even Tehran, where Turkish (even Ottoman Turkish) was not readily 
spoken and the economic and political life differed dramatically.   
 It might seem intuitive to assume that in creating a Turkish program in İstanbul, State 
Department officials would have learned from the experience of the branch in China.  The first 
appointees there--including Julean Arnold, Frederick Cloud, Percival Heintzelman, Willard Hull 
and Albert Pontius—were able to devote themselves to full-time study. For example, Secretary 
Hay’s first regulations in 1902 required that they “apply themselves exclusively to the study of 
the Chinese language for a period of two years, under the direction of the minister of the United 
States.”74  Trying to balance language study with on-the-job training, The State Department 
regulations for student interpreters fluctuated continually between the establishment of the corps 
in China in 1902 and its expansion to the Ottoman Empire in 1909.     
 During these early years, aside from the minimal oversight of the legation/embassy 
secretary, student interpreters had a remarkable amount of autonomy.  The language teachers 
came to them while both the course content and hours of instruction and study were (initially) 
determined by the students, the amount they could afford to pay their instructors.75  It was 
therefore imperative to attract men of high character and ability to the position. 
 “Getting the right men in”76 was a constant challenge for all three branches of the corps, 
but the Turkey branch labored under unique constraints. American students Istanbul were 
required to learn French as well as Ottoman Turkish (without allowing them additional time for 
preparation), often while working “temporarily” in consulates such as Cairo, Beirut, and 
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Jerusalem (likely the result of Inspector Alfred Gottschalk’s suggestion), where Arabic rather 
than Turkish was important for the day to day interactions with local officials and businessmen.  
Although this was also a problem in China, as previously mentioned, there were many American 
consular districts in which some form of Mandarin was spoken, giving students in China 
comparatively greater opportunities for practice as well as future work upon being promoted into 
the general Consular service.  By accident rather than design, the “China hands” became a 
comparatively favored group. 
 As of 1906, there were a total of 18 interpreters (including those in China, Japan, Turkey 
and Korea) in a consular service of 1,113 persons.77  This number increased rapidly. By 1908, 20 
of the 37 officers listed for China were interpreters or interpreters-in-training.  8 were Student 
Interpreters, two were native Chinese (one of these was for Canton, where Cantonese rather than 
Mandarin was spoken, the other for the Nanking consulate, where none of the American staff 
spoke Mandarin), two were missionary backgrounds (as was one of the Student Interpreters); the 
background of one is not listed.78  As of 1921, 242 men had participated in the Student 
Interpreters training program—a number used by Wilbur Carr to encourage Harvard graduates to 
consider a career in government service.79 
 Despite such recruiting, the Student Interpreters Corps failed to attract enough applicants 
to fill any of the three branches of the SIC to the legislated capacity.  In 1913, Inspector 
Gottschalk considered the program in Turkey to be a complete failure: with only two mediocre 
students that year, he speculated that word of students’ experiences had gotten out and was 
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deterring further applicants.80  More likely, the less-than-tepid interest was due to the fact that 
the examination system, such as it was in the early 1900s, allowed for direct appointment to 
Consul; the examination for Student Interpreter was identical to it in 1908, and still resembled it 
substantially in 1911.81  Consequently, the primary attraction of the Student Interpreters Corps 
was the opportunity of language training, and this opportunity came at the cost of lower pay and 
an uncertain professional future.    
 Notwithstanding the poor pay and conditions, the SIC remained attractive to some. It 
provided the first outlet for professionally inclined Americans interested in their country’s 
positive relations with other states to direct their energies towards diplomacy.  Low pay, poor 
training, and meager opportunities for advancement handicapped the nascent Foreign Service, 
further reinforcing the fact that despite some advancement, American attention-business and 
otherwise—remained fully fixed on politics and development at home. 
 Thus, although reform produced an American consular service in China, Japan, and 
Turkey that by the end of the 1910s was a dramatic improvement over that of the 1890s, it could 
hardly be said to function according to the “gospel of efficiency” as reformers had likely 
envisioned.  This was due to the inherent contradictions within American political system and 
the fact that reformers represented diverse business interests unworthy of the reductionist label of 
“class.”  A bargain-hunting Congress (and the State Department) expected student interpreters to 
emerge from their initial two-year training period fully competent in general consular work as 
well as fluent in the appropriate languages—with no prior knowledge or previous training—and 
to invest themselves fully in the promotion of American trade.    
                                            
80 Alfred Gottschalk, The Correspondence of Inspector A. L. M. Gottschalk, Jan. 1, 1912-Mar. 25, 1914, General 
Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NARA. 
81 The State Department, The Register of the Department of State (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1908) 87; The State 
Department, The Register of the Department of State (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1911), 123 
34	
	
	
 Richard Hume Werking has asserted that “the pre-World War I foreign service “not only 
held the door open for American exports (ensuring protection for American trade), but it 
increasingly attempted to shove American businessmen through the open door (promoting 
foreign trade).”82  As will be seen in another chapter, this is a great exaggeration, as it mistakes 
bark for bite.  To be sure, some middle- and senior ranking officers understood trade promotion 
to be one of the most important goals of the Foreign Service in the early 20th century, and as the 
American consular service developed as an institution, insisting that consular officials stress 
trade promotion became a form of institutional political correctness (most especially in China).  
However, in China, Japan, and Turkey, American consular officers usually lacked effective 
means to protect American property and investments--other than appealing to often corrupt or 
impotent local authorities for the enforcement of bilateral treaties—let alone any tangible ability 
to encourage investment and trade.  As will be discussed in another chapter, their effectiveness in 
this regard varied according to the relative status of the American consular officers in particular 
districts, their individual language abilities, and their respective skills in cultivating local 
friendships—many of which developed during their tenures as student interpreters. 
 The creation of the Student Interpreters Corps can be best understood as the opening 
salvo of a self-interested executive branch to mobilize and exploit American business interests so 
as to expand and strengthen the powers of the President while avoiding the responsibility of 
delivering on the promised benefits of doing so. Mixing imperialistic language with appeals to 
patriotism and vague pronouncements of as-yet-unrealized trade opportunities, the brief 
confluence of business and government interests produced a talented and increasingly 
specialized and self-aware bureaucracy with the vague mission of fostering an American 
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economic empire in Asia and the Middle East. Although consular reform gave the Foreign 
Service the language and uniforms of empire, it failed to give them weapons. As will be seen in 
the following chapter, this deficiency was most glaring in the area of trade promotion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DRAGGING BUSINESS THROUGH THE OPEN DOOR, 1902-1931 
 
Part One: Imparting the Mission 
 
 This chapter will examine the daily routine of the consulates in China, Japan, and Turkey, 
with a view toward identifying the roles of native interpreters and American language students 
and their steadily increasing prominence in trade and diplomacy from the turn of the century to 
the beginning of World War II. It will also consider their legal status, workload, and working 
relationships, and an examination of the relationship between business and the Foreign Service at 
the personal level. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) was created in 
order to provide American interpreters for United States consulates and embassies respectively in 
China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire. The ostensible goal of this and other Foreign Service 
reforms was the extension of American trade in these states. However, this examination of the 
SIC indicates that, although initially successful in garnering American business interest and 
support for Foreign Service reform and expansion, efforts to entice American merchants and 
companies to enter Asian markets (particularly in China) failed to yield large scale results. In 
other words, the goal of trade expansion exerted a greater influence on the growth and 
development of the State Department and language-trained Foreign Service officers, particularly 
in China, than that of the refurbished Foreign Service on the volume of American trade. Despite 
trumpeting potential profits and building potential bureaucracy, the State Department was unable 
to drag American businesses through the Open Door.  
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 Much of this examination of the SIC is concerned with officers in China, and for good 
reason. First established and by far the largest, the SIC branch in China was the most potentially 
influential, situated in Asia’s largest market centers. In addition, there were far fewer American 
consular offices in the Japanese and Ottoman empires.  The Japanese government had instituted 
language-training programs for its consular and diplomatic officers nearly a decade before the 
establishment of the SIC; English-language training at the university level was common for 
trade-oriented Japanese businessmen.83 Japanese businessmen were far better equipped to 
penetrate American markets than vice versa.  
 Similarly, the SIC training program in the Ottoman Empire was interrupted in 1917, 
when the Sublime Porte severed diplomatic relations with the United States. Although groups of 
ones and twos had resumed training again by 1927 (in the Turkish Republic), the disappearance 
of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI drastically reduced the commercial importance the 
American government attached to Turkey. 
 The establishment of specialized language training for United States diplomatic and 
consular post in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire set apart these positions from the rest of 
the American Foreign Service by creating a semi-specialized corps of officers, endowed with a 
specifically conceived mission, whose members spent most of their careers in the 
aforementioned regions.  Although the consular examination system established in 1906 ensured 
that all career consular officers had some facility in a modern European language (Spanish, 
French, or German),84 the SIC endowed officers with language skills that were unparalleled in 
the consular service at the time.  For this reason, although they were the equals of untrained 
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officers in the service at large for purposes of pay and promotion, they rarely served outside of 
China, Japan, or the Ottoman Empire, respectively.85  
 Their long tenure of foreign residence and work in these countries influenced officers’ 
views on politics, foreign relations, and trade in profound and unique ways, so much so that the 
terms “China hands” and “Japan hands” were developed to describe them.86  Between 1902 (the 
establishment of the Student Interpreters Corps87) and 1937 (the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war), 
the number of language-trained officers increased steadily, becoming ever more vital to the daily 
operations of American Foreign Service posts, the workings of Amercan trade, the protection of 
United States citizens, and the perception of Chinese, Japanese, and Turkish cultures.  
 Any discussion of the work and activities of language-trained consuls would be 
incomplete without mentioning the rivalry between the Department of State (particularly the 
Consular Bureau), and the Department of Commerce.  Richard Hume Werking has written 
extensively on this subject, noting that the primary supporters of the creation of the Department 
of Commerce and Labor were the same as those interests that promoted consular reorganization, 
namely “medium-size manufacturing and mercantile concerns.”88  Werking underscored the 
ideological differences between the economic outlooks of Oscar Phelps Austin (Bureau of 
Statistics, under Dept. of Commerce, a protectionist and neo-mercantilist), and Frederic Emory 
(Bureau of Trade Relations, under the State Department), alongside the numerous turf wars that 
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broke out between the rival agencies.89 Among these developments was the creation of special 
commercial agents in 1905, at the behest of the cotton-producing states, whose work overlapped 
with that of the consuls but who had greater freedom to travel.90 Werking has also outlined a 
“snowballing process that resulted in greater attention to specific commodity lines,” whereby 
new agents were frequently added to the department, “sometimes after the solicitation by 
[Commerce and Labor].”91 A parallel process developed in the Consular Service through a 
bureaucratic emphasis on trade reporting—even in regions where trade and investment were 
marginal concerns (compared to missionary-related work, for example). 
 Despite the institutional competition from the Department of Commerce, trade promotion 
remained close to the hearts of senior State Department officials, who desired to instill this 
priority in the minds of junior officers. Consequently, one of the functions of the consular 
inspection system was to interrogate consuls on their efforts to extend American trade and 
provide assistance to U.S. companies operating within their districts.92  Even non-career 
employees, native interpreters, and consular employees were evaluated with a view toward 
maximizing the trade-promotion capabilities of the Consular Service. This often led to tension 
between consuls and inspectors, particularly when language-trained consuls were anything less 
than obsequiously enthusiastic on the subject or when they betrayed even a hint of cautious 
criticism regarding American trade expansion in their districts. 
For example, following his 1923 inspection of the US Consulate in Changsha, China, 
Nelson T. Johnson sternly rebuked the consul, Carl D. Meinhard (like Johnson himself an SIC-
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trained Chinese specialist) for stating that, because American investments in the district were 
meager, trade promotion did not constitute a large portion of the consulate’s work.93 According 
to Johnson, it should be the consul’s “one aim in life to be the best-informed man in his district 
on all questions of this [commercial] kind and to that end he will give all of his waking time to 
the acquiring of the information.”94  
It is worth mentioning that during his inspection Johnson did make an important point to 
Meinhardt: “the fact that the shelves of the stores and shops display articles of foreign 
manufacture is convincing evidence that there is a market in the district for goods manufactured 
abroad.”95 As no representatives of the companies producing the goods in question were present 
in Changsha, finding out how these products traveled to the shelves was an important question to 
Johnson.96 
Although both language-trained and non-language trained consuls alike strove to provide 
accurate reports, those of non-language-trained officers were often more careful to stress the 
importance of trade promotion, and were less frequently castigated for their oversights in this 
area. In the 1907 inspection of Amoy consulate (the first inspection after the establishment of the 
inspection service in 1906), Consul Henry Paddock carefully emphasized, “the subject of trade 
extension will be carefully watched and any point of interest will be immediately reported to the 
Department.”97  
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 There were not many such points in 1907, and consuls like Paddock emphasized this 
often.  In response to the question, “state what openings there are for American trade, industries, 
and other enterprises in your district, Paddock stated, “there are no apparent openings for trade 
other than in lines of necessities, such as kerosene, flour, cotton cloth, etc., in this district.”98  
The most immediate obstacle to American trade expansion the problem was the region’s poverty; 
another was a dilatory Chinese government: “if the Chinese government enacts a suitable mining 
code, there will be good mining opportunities for the investment of American capital, and the 
field for sales of mining machinery will be good.”99  American consular officers repeatedly 
emphasized that the expansion of American trade required the investment of American capital 
and the extension of more liberal credit terms, as well as catalogues in Mandarin, while noting 
that “our merchants must take advantage of the opportunities pointed out to them and send men 
out here to stay and study the wants and needs of the natives. Without an effort of this kind, trade 
will not develop.”100 It should be noted that whereas American business was reluctant to enter 
Chinese markets under these conditions, Japanese merchants were successfully doing so on a 
large scale by 1910, particularly in Manchuria.101 
 Under the system of extraterritoriality in China, American consular officers possessed 
abilities to assist and protect American businessmen (and other US nationals) that they did not 
have in other countries. These included arranging for the physical security of Americans in their 
districts, assisting merchants in securing land, facilities, and building permits for their 
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commercial ventures, protesting and remedying illegal taxation, and in securing payment on 
fulfilled contracts.102  
 Conversely, one important role of consular officers in China became that of dispelling 
inflated conceptions of trade opportunities, a role that intensified as SIC graduates gradually 
filled more and more of the U.S. consular positions in that country.  Their fulfillment of this 
function was hampered by institutional ideology, in the form of the tacitly understood mission to 
promote American trade. Lack of trade promotion activities (reports of trade opportunities, 
efforts to protect or expand American business) counted against an officer’s efficiency.  After all, 
the underlying impetus to train Americans in Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman Turkish had been 
the desire to increase trade. However, an officer could only show the way—he could not drag 
American businessmen to the Open Door, let alone through it. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, most American companies operating or seeking to invest in countries such as China, 
Japan, and the Ottoman Empire did not possess personnel with the requisite language skills, nor 
did they seek to acquire them. Instead, most companies imagined that such great demand for 
their products existed that simply sending catalogues and brochures could substitute physical 
entrance into local markets.  
 This attitude was particularly endemic to small- to mid-sized firms, most especially 
members of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), The Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce, and the National Business League of Chicago, whose support was vital to the 
passage of consular reform and expansion legislation.103  Secretary of State Elihu Root’s touting 
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of the supposed business benefits of consular reorganization in 1906 helped achieve the desired 
reforms but it also led to the adoption of tacit mission to promote American trade aggressively. 
However, the greatest obstacle to American trade expansion in the fabled “China market” was 
not so much the American business community’s ignorance of non-European languages as its 
pervasive unwillingness to correct this deficiency.   
 Language trained consuls such as E. Carleton Baker recognized the need for greater 
personal involvement on the part of American business. In a 1914 commercial report for 
example, Baker noted, “it is easy for Consuls in their reports on China and in their lectures at 
home to deal in glittering generalities and platitudinous statements about the ‘teeming millions in 
China,’ the new republic and growing demand for foreign goods, but America will never enjoy a 
full share of this growing demand unless some definite, concrete and practical means is adopted 
to this end.”104 Observing that American merchants were unable to “go after the business,” Baker 
even proposed to bring leading Chinese merchants from the Chungking district to the United 
States for consultations with American businessmen.105 
 Thus, the dearth of traffic through the Open Door derived from American apathy toward 
the market and antipathy towards learning Chinese. Recalling the turn-of-the-century Anglo-
American mentality in his memoirs, Nelson T. Johnson criticized the general disdain of British 
and American merchants of this toward learning Chinese, and at the same time praised Standard 
Oil and British Asiatic Petroleum for pioneering in this manner.  He explained, “it was 
considered by the British and American merchants to be a little infra dig to learn Chinese . . . the 
only American company that really went out to have its young people learn the Chinese language 
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was the Standard Oil Company.  The Standard Oil Company recruited young people from 
college, sent them to China and had them learn Chinese, and the advancement of these fellows in 
the Standard Oil Company depended upon their ability to learn Chinese and play around with the 
Chinese. So I and my Standard Oil colleagues would very often be together with Chinese where 
other Americans wouldn’t be present, simply because they could talk Chinese.  They could mix 
on terms of social equality.”  “I, as a Chinese-speaking representative of the United States 
Government, used to see a great deal of them here and there.”106 
 Even within companies such as Standard Oil and British-American Tobacco (BAT), the 
vast majority of foreign employees in China spoke no Chinese.107  Nevertheless, the 
comparatively low number of Chinese-speaking BAT and Standard Oil foreign employees 
rivaled (if it did not exceed) that employed as Chinese language officers by the U.S. government. 
For example, during WWI, 80 English BAT nationals returned to Britain for military service; 
many of them served as bilingual interpreters for the Chinese Labor Corps in Europe for the 
duration of the war.108 In comparison, by the same period, the American Student Interpreters 
Corps had trained fewer than 50 Chinese language officers.109 While the total number of 
Chinese-trained Westerners was low and their command of the language was probably 
superficial, it was enough to provide competent middle managers, capable of supervising at 
marketing and distributing centers in China.110 
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 In this vein Nelson T. Johnson’s portrayal of these companies highlights the comparative 
success of the business-oriented language training strategy.  Replying to the National Refining 
Company of Cleveland, OH, Johnson observed that Standard Oil, the Asiatic Petroleum 
Company, and the Vacuum Oil Company “import stocks and sell at wholesale to Chinese 
dealers, who act as their agents.  These dealers they reach through shroffs and sales agents who 
visit the dealers periodically and secure such orders as they require.”111  
 To be sure, Johnson exerted himself considerably for companies such as Singer Sewing 
and Standard Oil—probably no less than their language-trained and foreign staff, as well as 
native employees—but this was expected of American Foreign Service officers.112  In addition to 
lodging formal requests for payment on delinquent accounts, Johnson also strove to maintain and 
improve relations between these companies and the local Chinese.113 Like many of his SIC-
trained colleagues in the Consular Service, Johnson also stressed the importance of sending a 
personal representative; if not one for each district, then at least one for the whole of China—but 
with sufficient funds and authority to visit the various regions as necessary.114 
 Consuls such as Johnson acted as middlemen in a variety of informal ways.  The most 
common of these was simply by placing the appropriate people in contact with each other.  
Johnson’s correspondence with Andersen, Meyer and Co (an American import/export company 
with a branch in Changsha, selling various types of electrical equipment and exporting Chinese 
raw materials to the United States) offers a good example of this.  In this exchange, he sought to 
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put that company into contact with a prospective Chinese mining concern attempting to find a 
buyer for graphite ore.115 
 Language-trained consuls were invaluable in enforcing contracts.  In addition to securing 
payment for Singer’s sewing machines, officers such as Dillard Lasseter, stationed in Antung 
(Manchuria, China), were often requested to follow up on delinquent payments for goods 
shipped on consignment.  In one case, a Chinese agent in Changpaihsien failed to pay for 
$9,200116 of Standard Oil property.117  After failing to collect this debt, the company asked 
Lasseter, the American consul in nearby Antung who then corresponded with the local Chinese 
magistrate until the matter was settled.118 
 The company also requested relief from repeated illegal taxation.  In 1922, the Tax Office 
of the city of Takushan (within the Antung district, about a day’s journey away) on several 
occasions assessed the company with a 10% re-export tax (called a “famine tax,” as the proceeds 
were intended to mitigate the effects of a regional famine).119    The consul duly contacted the 
magistrate.  During his investigation, the Takushan office claimed it could find no record of such 
taxes.  After the company produced receipts, the office provided a series of justifications for the 
tax, refusing to refund the payments.120  Eventually the consul forwarded the matter to the 
American Legation.121  The matter was taken up in coordination with the other Powers, and as 
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Consul Langdon informed the company in October of 1922 (the original complaint was made in 
early May), the objectionable taxes would eventually be resolved.122  
 Michael Hunt has written extensively on the subject of U.S. government relations with 
American companies operating in China, covering both the development of policy and the 
relation of that policy to economic competition.123  He has asserted, for example, that the reason 
American textile exports to China gradually yielded to Japanese products was due to “the 
economic advantages achieved by Japanese competitors who produced cotton textiles of similar 
quality and exported them to the American-dominated part of the China market.”124  He details 
the various ways in which the Japanese gradually achieved superiority in price while maintaining 
high quality by blending different varieties of cotton, making bulk purchases of raw materials, 
etc.125 As will be seen shortly, lower prices were only part of the story; physical presence, 
cultural empathy, and language were important factors as well.  As Hunt has observed, “The 
Japanese, unlike the Americans, carefully cultivated their market in China. They regulated 
supply to meet demand, aggressively marketed their products, eliminated costly middlemen, and 
gladly sold on credit.”126   
 American consular officers recognized these factors as crucial components of success.  
Language inspection reports, replies to trade inquiries, and personal correspondence bear this 
out.  In the main however, American exporters did not follow the Japanese example; preferring, 
presumably, to only conquer markets that yielded without a fight.  For example, in 1917, SIC 
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recruit Norwood Francis Allman stressed, “American trade has rapidly declined in this district 
due to the fact that the Japanese have gone after it and have got it.  Kerosene oil is the only 
American product that has withstood the Japanese competition but this product is feeling the 
effect of the cheap Japanese oils on the market.”127  Through their polite but enlightening replies 
to trade inquiries, language-trained consuls helped prevent overzealous and naïve investments; in 
such instances American businessmen generally were grateful and followed consuls’ advice. 
 In addition to soliciting their opinions via trade letters, American businessmen also 
requested consuls’ participation in and publicization of trade conferences.  For example, urging 
the attendance of the U.S. consul and American businessmen located in Yunnan province, one 
representative of the National Foreign Trade Council emphasized, “we are always keen to 
strengthen our conventions with Americans fresh from abroad; for they come right from the 
trenches.”128  Despite the general enthusiasm for the input of language-trained consuls, when 
these officers offered constructive advice for expanding the market share of existing American 
goods or introducing new products, their business contacts largely ignored their suggestions, 
whether offered in person, through correspondence, or trade opportunity reports.  
 The Standard Oil Company was a notable exception to this trend, an example of business 
done right through its language training program and development of local contractors. Even 
companies such as Singer Sewing, which were able to achieve a measure of business success in 
Russia and China, lacked the language training and/or personnel recruiting tools necessary for 
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full market penetration and brand consolidation. 129 Similarly, few statistics exist regarding the 
details of Standard Oil’s language training programs; future research should illuminate this 
aspect of Sino-American trade relations in greater detail.    
 This bifurcation indicates a far more heterogeneous American “power elite” than scholars 
such as Thomas McCormick have posited,130 and complicates the notion that economic 
expansion in China was a primary goal of American foreign policy during this period.  On the 
contrary, so far as the China market was concerned, trade with Europe and American domestic 
issues were of much greater importance. Far more than for American businessmen, trade 
expansion in China was of enormous significance to politicians and bureaucrats—Chinese as 
well as American.  
 For example, Hunt has stressed Chinese awareness of the American goal of protecting 
U.S. trade that one reviewer humorously commented that they sound as though the Chinese “had 
been reading William Appleman Williams!”131 For example on the issue of Manchuria, Hunt 
notes that commercial privileges in both Manchuria and the rest of China were often of less 
domestic importance than immigration.132  The records of consular inspections from this period 
bear this out.   
 Coinciding with the conclusion of the Gentleman’s Agreement (1907),133 the timing of 
the inspection report on the American consulate at Amoy certainly confirms this point.  Yet 
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racist domestic policies were not the only obstacle to the expansion of American trade in the 
Amoy district.  While highlighting the region’s poverty, Consul Paddock noted,  
 
“being the nearest port to Formosa . . . the Japanese also form an appreciable part  of the 
foreign population, and have large concessions and holdings. Consequently their cheap 
but fairly good quality manufactures hold a great share of the market. The Japanese are 
on the ground to do their own selling, and being Orientals [they]understand Oriental 
needs. European wares also have a good sale as they are cheap and are made especially 
for the people and the climate. These last two considerations are vital and have not been 
considered by American manufacturers.” 134       
 
 Thus, American trade faced several disadvantages.  The proximity of Japanese-governed 
Formosa to Amoy was an important example; the lack of American concessions in China was 
another. Yet another was the attitude of those foreign powers possessing territorial and/or 
railway concessions in China. For example, in 1936 the French refused to allow shipment of 
American airplanes or spare parts via the Yunnan Railway, even if sold via a French company.135 
The French gave preference instead to Japanese products on consignment to French companies, 
scoffing at American consul Arthur Ringwalt’s suggestion that Americans might make more 
reliable partners than the Japanese.136  The United States could do little about these obstacles 
(and had scant desire to attempt to do so), but there was another problem, entirely American-
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made: the production of cheap goods, tailored to local needs and tastes.  To be successful in 
China, an American company had to adapt its product to local conditions, which required 
physical representation for both intelligence-gather and marketing.  Inspector Fleming seems to 
have recognized this, as in his report on Paddock’s commercial work he noted, “reports sent by 
this consulate have completely covered the trade possibilities without giving undue 
encouragement for large trade when such possibilities do not exist.”137  
 Without Americans actually present, willing, and able to do business in China, there was 
little that consuls could do to promote American trade—no matter how good their language skills 
were.  For example, during George L. Murphy’s inspection visit to Chungking in 1913, Consul 
Edward Carleton Baker asserted, “catalogues and other trade literature are handed to merchants 
who are likely to place orders with American firms, and the various features in these publications 
are carefully translated and explained to them.”138  The dubious value of such handouts is 
reinforced by noting that in early twentieth China (and the same goes for Turkey, and to a lesser 
extent, comparatively more westernized Japan) the notion of a “fixed price” for goods—let alone 
catalogues whereby such goods could be purchased—was novel and alien.  As indicated by 
Inspector Fleming Cheshire, this occasionally caused confusion and resentment between 
language-trained American consuls and Chinese employees;139 using catalogues in this era was 
thus a desperate and forlorn marketing attempt at best: Baker himself noted that local merchants 
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rarely consulted them (and this apathy obtained in one of the most prosperous regions of China at 
the time).140   
 According to Baker, a few local merchants did place a few limited orders for some 
American goods as the result of his huckstering, but these isolated, one-time purchases could 
hardly serve as motivation for long-term U.S. investments—especially after he explained local 
market conditions to such American merchants as were brave enough to visit.141  Baker also 
emphasized repeatedly that the local Chinese usually purchased foreign goods, American or 
otherwise, from trade centers such as Shanghai, rather than import them into Chungking 
directly.142  Finally, all things being equal (Chungking was one of the few consular districts in 
China where “Open Door” conditions could theoretically obtain), Baker hit upon one of the 
showstoppers for American trade expansion.  In this comparatively prosperous region, he 
observed, 
 
“there are opportunities to sell American electric and mining machinery and many other 
classes of American products. The field at present however, is very limited and requires 
assiduous cultivation. This can best be accomplished by personal representation and by 
distributing samples among responsible firms. More liberal credits should also be 
extended and goods should be placed on commission with reliable concerns [emphasis 
added].”143 
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Such counsel was not confined to one region.  For example, Perceival Heintzelman 
(among the very first Student Interpreters to be appointed) similarly stressed the importance of 
sending resident Americans to the field to cultivate the China Market: 
 
“More young Americans should be sent here in responsible positions as representatives of 
some of the greater industries and allowed to develop their  particular business in the 
community in which they reside.  The casual drummer with catalogues, figures, and a 
few samples is not in nearly so favorable a position  for securing orders as the resident 
agent who is known to the community and acquainted with the conditions of trade.”144 
 
 This advice mirrored earlier suggestions by officers such as Willard Straight, Charles 
Arnell, and Frederic D. Cloud at Mukden between 1907 and 1909.145  Echoing their 
observations, Inspector Fleming D. Cheshire emphasized, “our merchants and manufacturers 
must take advantage of the opportunities pointed out to them and send men out here to stay and 
study the wants and needs of the natives.  Without an effort of this kind, trade will not 
develop.”146 These suggestions, combined with answering trade letters and inquiries from distant 
American businesses and merchants, were the approximate extent of “trade promotion.”  
Significant as they were, unless companies were prepared to invest the time and money 
necessary to establish networks and deal with locals, “trade promotion” was more a bureaucratic 
emphasis, than an entrepreneurial support service.  
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 In addition to Chinese poverty, there were several reasons why American-manufactured 
goods and equipment failed to gain traction. According to Consul Frederick Cloud while 
stationed in Mukden, Chinese farmers were ignorant of modern farming practices and unable to 
use American farming equipment—although this did not dampen the inquirer’s enthusiasm.147  
According to consuls such Edward Baker previously mentioned, small- to mid-size American 
companies had little appetite for risk, and were generally unwilling to sell on credit.148 Although 
most consulates received and maintained “commercial libraries” containing catalogues of 
American products, they were invariably written in English, rather than Chinese, Japanese, 
Turkish, etc. 
 Despite the commitment of men such as William Howard Taft and Philander C. Knox to 
expanding American trade in Manchuria, China, and throughout Asia, the United States 
Government could not drag American companies through the Open Door—however hard it 
might try.149 When companies did invest in China directly, according the numerous suggestions 
of American consuls, the payoff was often excruciatingly slow.  For example, in 1909 Inspector 
Cheshire stressed the role of Consul Frederick Cloud (an SIC graduate) role in persuading the 
local government to hire an American engineer to overseer an electrical plant in Mukden.150 
Eight years later, Consul Edward Baker (not an SIC graduate) observed a small increase in 
importation of American electrical equipment, noting that this  
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“has largely been sold through an American engineer who located in this district, learned 
the Chinese language, and gradually acquired a position of influence in the community.  
With the strong German and Japanese competition, these results could not have been 
obtained any other way. Similar methods must be adopted on many other lines if business 
on any large scale is to develop.”151 
 
This anecdote provides an example of the accuracy of language-trained officers’ assessments of 
local market conditions and their suggestions to American companies, as well the way in which 
the officers themselves became invisible even when their economic advice bore fruit.  Eight 
years after the fact, few cared (and no one probably remembered) that Cloud’s influence with the 
local government (by recommending the hire of an American engineer) translated into tangible 
profits for Americans. 
 Success stories such as this were fairly rare. Rather than understanding “trade promotion” 
as consular huckstering for American products, in light of the hundreds of trade inquiries by 
diverse American firms—dealing in everything from automobiles to pig bristles—it is equally 
accurate to portray these efforts as providing a caution against overzealous, flawed investments.  
In every case, they sought to answer inquiries frankly and thoroughly, and to offer practical 
suggestions.  The response of Albert W. Pontius to the Kern Commercial Company of New 
York, while posted to Mukden, offers a typical example.  While agreeing to post the company’s 
catalogues in the consulate’s library, Pontius informed his clients, “actual representation and 
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demonstration are the essentials of successful sales in this district.  Foreign catalogues and 
descriptive literature [in English] have little effect.”152 
 This picture is not entirely new. As Michael Hunt has demonstrated, the domestic market 
remained far more important to American businessmen than the mythical China market153—no 
matter how glowingly select spokesmen described it.  Hunt observed, “while the Japanese 
pursued customers abroad far more numerous than those at home, the American industry had 
immediately at hand a market that was large, still growing, and protected by a substantial 
tariff.”154  What is striking however, is how repeatedly, pervasively, and specifically these 
language-trained, comparatively low-ranking officers outlined potential blueprints for success to 
a multitude of American entrepreneurs—and how so very few companies actually followed their 
instructions.   
 In the face of such widespread recalcitrance, the assertion of a “power elite” as fueling 
the drive for Asian markets verges on the ludicrous.155  McCormick argued that “just as some 
contemporary historians, such as Gabriel Kolko, have seen the business-oriented community as 
the prime dynamic for progressive reform at home, so it seems to me . . . that the same elements 
acted as the chief shapers of expansionism in the 1890s—and many for the same ends . . . .”156  
Although this might be the case concerning turn-of-the century efforts to reform the Consular 
Service, beyond this there was neither consensus nor concerted effort.  In the domestic market, 
American companies did not have to face the same regime uncertainty—compounded by foreign 
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competition—that they faced in areas such as China.  Nor did they confront even remotely 
similar linguistic and cultural barriers.   
 Thus, while American businessmen and entrepreneurs forwarded their English-language 
catalogues and brochures, hoping to pique the interest of potential Chinese customers from afar, 
the Japanese assiduously cultivated their would-be clients, aided by greater proximity to their 
manufacturing centers and privileged by their formal territorial concessions.  That American 
concerns refrained from sending representatives after receiving explicit and often-repeated 
instructions on how to compete in markets throughout China—from officers steeped in the belief 
that trade promotion was the highest goal of the Consular Service—demolishes the notion of a 
unified American “power elite” aggressively pursuing economic empire in China.  If such an 
elite existed, in the shadow of its Japanese counterpart it was indifferent, incompetent, and 
impotent. In any case, following the passage of Consular/Foreign Service reforms in Congress in 
1906, American commercial interest in China scarcely budged upward, whereas Japanese 
economic venture and interest both increased steadily.        
 However, when American businesses were active in their districts, American consuls 
exerted themselves to the fullest to assist them. Recalling his early years in the Service as a 
consular officer, former Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson remarked, “the Singer Sewing Machine 
Company sold [their] machines all over China even though they were located in the treaty ports.  
One of my headaches in those days was tracking down those doggoned machines and see that the 
payments were kept up.”157 Obtaining local, provincial, and occasionally national government 
cooperation in the enforcement of contracts was an important function of these language-trained 
consuls. 
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 In China during the early decades of the 20th century, political instability made this task 
particularly vital-for Chinese as well as American businessmen.  For example, in 1927 the 
Chinese Kochiu Tin Trading Company (controlled by the provincial government) wanted to buy 
American mining machinery via Andersen, Meyer, and Co.  Seeking to protect itself against 
price gouging, the Chinese company stipulated that the invoices for the equipment be sent 
through the American consulates in China.158 
 At every stage in the negotiations between the Chinese and American companies, the 
language-trained American consuls played a crucial role in persuading local authorities to select 
an American company, in the face of stiff competition from British, French, and German 
representatives.159  According to Andersen and Meyer’s representative in Shanghai, H. H. Braun, 
Consul Meryl S. Meyers had discovered  
 
“that a new power and mining plant was to be constructed by the Kochiu Tin Trading 
Company (at Kochiu, Yunnan province, China).  He immediately made a careful 
investigation, saw their Chief Engineer, called upon the Chinese Commissioner of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Chinese Managing Director, and after completing his 
investigations and realizing the importance of the project, communicated the information 
to your Consulate General here [Shanghai].”160 
 
                                            
158 H.H. Braun to Joseph E. Jacobs, January 25, 1927, Yunnanfu, China. 610.1. Correspondence, American 
Consulate, Yunnanfu, China.  Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84.  NARA. 
159 H. H. Braun to C. E. Gauss, February 17, 1927. 610.1. Correspondence, American Consulate, Yunnanfu, China.  
Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84.  NARA. 
160 Ibid. 
59	
	
	
Subsequently, Meyers was transferred Joseph E. Jacobs (another SIC-trained consul) took his 
place in Yunnanfu.  Braun further noted that because the negotiations were extremely sensitive, 
“the Chinese authorities would not trust their own interpreters and throughout the negotiations in 
Yunnanfu, Mr. Jacobs, who is unusually proficient in the Chinese language, sat with me, served 
as interpreter, guide, and assistant in every way.”161  It was clear to Mr. Braun that the consuls 
had been indispensable during every stage of the transaction.  He stressed that “as a result of Mr. 
Myers’ and Mr. Jacobs’ work we were enabled to sign a contract for a power and mining plant 
on very advantageous terms . . . without the assistance of Mr. Meyers and Mr. Jacobs, the sale 
would not have been made.”162   
 After signing the original contract, Jacobs apparently maintained his efforts with the 
Yunnan government, as Braun further observed, “through Mr. Jacobs’ assistance in working with 
the provincial authorities . . . another engineering project of considerable magnitude has come to 
us.”163  The total value of the contracted products was more than $300,000, the present-day value 
of which is over $3 million—by even the most conservative estimate.164  Such sales thus 
represented significant achievements, despite falling short of the gargantuan hopes concerning 
the potential of “the China Market.” 
 As mentioned previously, it was the Chinese company that had requested the 
involvement of American consuls, in this instance as added protection against price gouging in a 
cost-plus contract.165  The manner in which subsequent events played out reveals a schizophrenic 
United States trade policy, one which claimed to seek the extension of American trade in every 
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way possible, but flatly refused to provide the most rudimentary accommodation for 
international transactions.  Combined with the explosive political instability in China during the 
1920s, this capricious trade policy presented a powerful disincentive for direct American 
investment in China. 
 The Kotchiu Tin company affair outlines the justification the American business 
preference for domestic and European markets.  The constant ad hoc, often un-sanctioned 
support that officers such as Nelson Johnson, Meryl S. Meyers, and Joseph E. Jacobs provided to 
U.S. companies was important, perhaps even vital, for those companies operating in China 
during the early 20th century.  Indoctrinated with the gospel of trade extension and spurred by 
individual ambition, language-trained consuls were willing to do whatever was necessary to 
advance American trade.  However, the formal reluctance of the State and Commerce 
departments to condone any action other than the compilation and dissemination of market 
information or informal negotiations with local officials cast a shadow over consuls’ 
recommendations concerning direct investments.  
 For example, the crux of the arrangement between the Chinese tin company in 
Kokiuchang and Andersen, Meyer, and Co., Ltd, was that by sending the invoices through 
official channels, the departments of State and Commerce could certify that the prices listed on 
the invoices represented the actual costs of the machinery; Andersen and Meyer would profit by 
commission.166  Both the American consul and the Commercial Attaché forwarded some of these 
invoices as requested, commenting that they showed “the actual net cost of the materials 
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mentioned.167  After the fact however, these field officers were informed that senior officials in 
both the State and Commerce Departments “felt that it was unwise to certify in any way the 
accuracy of these invoices,” and refused to forward any other invoices, much to the 
bewilderment of Arnold and Jacobs.168  To minimize the inconsistency, J. V. A. MacMurray 
instructed the Yunnanfu consulate to forward any additional invoices informally.169  Although 
bewildering to field officers, this bureaucratic hiccup proved to be one of the lesser threats to 
completion of the contract.  
 Regime change in China in China at the national level led to parallel turmoil in Yunnan 
province during 1927. As the local government administered the tin mines, which were its 
primary revenue source, Andersen, Meyer, & Co. was naturally concerned about what the 
political upheaval meant for the mining equipment contract.170 Consul Jacobs kept the company 
abreast of political developments in Yunnan and the resulting shakeup of management of the tin 
company. 171         
 In light of the efforts of officers such as Nelson T. Johnson, Joseph E. Jacobs, and many 
others, the reluctance of the State and Commerce Departments to condone the mere certification 
of invoices might appear anomalous.  However, for all the turn-of-the-century blather about 
extending American foreign trade, the influence of certain classical liberal ideals persisted.  
Chief among these was that there was a limit to the assistance the United States government 
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should extend to American business.  As Richard Werking has observed, reformer Elihu Root, 
despite laying a heavy emphasis upon the role of the State Department in holding “open the door 
for the entrance of American trade and to make its progress and extension easy, I do not believe 
in too much Government.”172  
 The attitude of U.S. policymakers in the State Department appears to have been that if 
American manufacturers and producers simply had the right information, their products could, 
and would penetrate any market. Yet according to officers such as Ernest Price, “the market here 
is not for the asking, it would have to be planned, studied, and then fought for.”173 Only a very 
select few companies were willing to invest such efforts. Scholarship such as that of Sherman 
Cochran has sketched the early efforts of companies such as Standard Oil and British-American 
Tobacco to provide language training to some of their employees in China.174 However, his 
valuable study of encounters between Chinese networks and foreign businesses devotes only a 
few pages to interpreters and language training and its importance to transnational business. 
 In an article discussing American business successes in China, Michael Hunt has 
asserted, “ the experience of [Standard Oil and the British American Tobacco Company] . . . 
suggest that direct government support was marginal to long term success and to the solution of 
daily problems.”175  Hunt also argued, “as the trade expansionists alleged, the American 
diplomatic and consular service was indeed weak. Those few consuls with a knowledge of the 
Chinese language and Chinese commercial conditions could claim better pay and perquisites by 
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going into business.”176   
 Hunt’s article spans over forty years, and it is unclear what years or decades he is 
describing.  During the 1890s and early 1900s, the Consular Service certainly was weak, but it 
was improving.  Reformers such as Elihu Root and Wilbur Carr ensured that. As for language-
training, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI effectively terminated the SIC in 
Turkey, but in Japan and China it remained strong and active, with over 240 graduates by the 
1920s.177  Regulating the supply to meet demand, during the 1930s new appointees to the SIC 
slowed to a trickle, but by the 1920s nearly every consulate in China or Japan that had work for a 
language-trained consular officer had one on its staff.  The same was true of the American 
Legation in Peking and the Embassy in Tokyo, each with a Secretariat staffed by a SIC-trained 
consular officer and subordinates.178 
 As for Hunt’s claim that language-trained consuls could obtain better pay and conditions 
in private business, although it might seem intuitive, this simply did not happen in more a small 
handful of cases, due mostly to the fact that very few American companies were willing to invest 
in permanent local representatives.  The original ten-year service agreement (later reduced to 
five), required by law, further deterred defections from the Foreign Service to private 
enterprise.179  In the rare case these officers left the service before retirement (because of the 
slow promotions and poor pay cited by Hunt), they most often entered academia or practiced 
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law.180  Aside from missionaries, language-trained consuls in China, Japan, and Turkey 
constituted the largest group of language-competent Americans in these countries.  Moreover, it 
was on these individuals that even the largest firms had to rely if they wanted to invoke 
extraterritorial privileges.   
  Thus, however minimal it might seem at first glance, even for companies like Standard 
Oil and British-American Tobacco, support from the language-trained, invisible middle of the 
Consular Service in China was necessary; to the daily operations of many smaller American 
companies operating in China, it was vital.  Such firms included Andersen, Meyer, and Co., 
United States Steel, whose physical presence in China was generally limited to Shanghai.181 
Although the benefits of a language-trained Consular Service accrued unevenly—primarily to 
those few companies like Standard Oil with a large physical presence in China, which arguably 
required the least service—they were crucial in identifying new opportunities, and resolving 
some (not all) trade and taxation disputes.  
 Language-trained consuls acted as middlemen in variety of transactions.  Although their 
most immediate concern (as a result of the Service’s stated priority) was commercial expansion, 
and presumably, a preference for defending American interests, they did not hesitate to transmit 
complaints concerning product quality, service, etc., to U.S.-based companies.  For example, 
when foreign customers made complaints about American goods, they often sent them via the 
U.S. consulates.  For example, when Chinese buyers of American bamboo steel complained 
about cracked and chipped bars of steel and refused to purchase more, the seller (a multilingual 
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Japanese merchant working for a French firm in Yunnanfu province) appealed to the American 
consul (Joseph E. Jacobs) intervene.182 
 Apparently, the cracks developed as part of the quenching process in the production and 
transshipment of the steel and did not affect its quality.183  Nevertheless, the Chinese buyers were 
unconvinced and demanded a discount, threatening the seller (who operated on a consignment 
and cost-plus basis) with steep losses.184  Not wishing to jeopardize a long-term trade 
relationship, the American company requested that Jacobs tactfully represent their interests, 
stressing their wish to accommodate the buyers’ preferences, but without consenting to drastic 
losses.185 
 Business interests were not the only American concerns that consuls worked to protect, 
often relying on their language skills and cultural expertise.  For example, Edwin Stanton 
recounted his experience while stationed in Kalgan, helping arrange a scientific expedition of the 
American Museum of Natural History in 1926. Just before the beginning of the trip, troops under 
the command of Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang confiscated fifty of the expedition’s pack camels.  
Aroused in the middle of the night to handle the crisis, Stanton protested the seizure—over tea 
and cigarettes—to the commanding officer.  In Stanton’s account, the officer observed that his 
superior had ordered him to procure fifty camels for the imminent campaign, telling Stanton,  
“please think of my great difficulty.”  “I am thinking of your great difficulty,” was Stanton’s 
response, “and how much more serious it will be for you tomorrow when I tell your great 
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General Feng that fifty camels of the expedition for which he has issued a protecting permit have 
been seized by his troops.” The camels were released immediately.186 
 Such anecdotes illustrate the dynamic that language training brought to American 
Foreign Service officers in China, Japan, and Turkey.  Although untrained officers like Henry 
Paddock could adequately report on trade conditions, relying on a native interpreter for essential 
interactions with local Chinese, they could not possibly resolve situations such as the one 
Stanton described.  The ability to do so increased rapidly as the Chinese political situation 
deteriorated. 
 This was particularly true in more remote districts (remote from Peking, that is), such as 
the Chungking consulate.  As Inspector Cheshire noted in 1910, the distance from the capital187 
increased the need for the consul to be capable of “original action in the event of certain 
important cases arising without referring the matter to the Legation at Peking for instructions.”188  
According to the inspector, missionary and mercantile protection cases constituted a large part of 
the work of the consulate at the time, further highlighting the frequent necessity of independent 
action and stressing the ability to collaborate closely with Chinese officials.189 Moreover, at this 
post Consul Pontius was not only vital to protection of American interests (chiefly missionaries), 
but also to intelligence gathering on British, French, and German rivalry.190     
 Such inspection reports reveal the various officers, their careers, conduct, and opinions as 
they rotated through American consulates throughout China, Japan, and Turkey.  Particularly in 
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China, officers’ views and trade-related work indicate a thorough grasp of the economic, 
political, and historical challenges that American merchants would have to grapple with while 
attempting to pass through the Open Door. They frequently-emphasized importance of 
Chungking as the proper site for a U.S. consulate suggests officers’ deep appreciation for 
Chinese history, and their understanding that cultural and political change originated not in the 
coastal cities and treaty ports but in the heart of China’s hinterland. Consul E. Carleton Baker 
stridently defended the consulate’s location during one inspection, noting,  
 
“the seaport offices are on the very rim or fringe of China where movements and changes 
of thought or purpose do not begin . . . Chungking is almost 1000 miles further up the 
[Yangtze] river than is Hankow, and it is reached by travelling through narrow mountain 
gorges liberally sprinkled with dangerous rapids and rendered more dangerous by river 
pirates.”191 
 
Baker, like Pontius before him, defended the Chungking location believing that 
Congressional parsimony would never permit establishment of two American consulates within 
the same province so deep inside China’s hinterland.192  If it is permissible to speak of a 
(monolithic?) American “power elite,” as have scholars such as Thomas McCormick,193 it was a 
doubly risk-averse elite, with little stomach for campaigns of economic conquest even when they 
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lay open, unencumbered by the trappings of formal colonialism.  The putatively political elite in 
Congress lacked the will to follow British, German, French, and Japanese initiative in setting up 
higher-ranking consulates in Chengtu, while the ostensible “business elite” could not muster 
entrepreneurial spirit sufficient to send permanent representatives to Chengtu or Chungking to 
hawk their wares. 194 
  In this way an awkward system of trade promotion developed. Trade expansion had been 
both the rasion d’etre of the Student Interpreters Corps and the marketing tool that reformers 
such as Elihu Root and Wilbur Carr had used to push consular reform through Congress in order 
to strengthen and enlarge the United States’ Foreign Service. Yet as the next chapter will 
illuminate in further detail, the largely unstated goal of increased American prestige and power 
was achieved (albeit incompletely and imperfectly, as will be seen) through the allocation of 
funds and the addition of personnel. In terms of American commercial expansion and Foreign 
Service professionalization, both the American business public and Student Interpreter recruits 
were sold a bill of goods.   
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CHAPTER 4 
ODDBALLS AND HARDBALLS: TALENT, BUREAUCRACY, AND PERSONALITY IN 
THE STUDENT INTERPRETERS CORPS, 1902-1945 
 
 The mission of the Student Interpreters Corps demanded the recruitment and retention of 
talented and intelligent individuals possessing unique mindsets and nearly military patriotism. In 
this reformers were successful. However, like those of their contemporary and modern foreign 
and domestic counterparts, their career paths remained wedded to the consular/diplomatic branch 
of their nation’s government. Unlike their non-Western colleagues, American Student 
Interpreters could not easily transfer between departments, inside or outside of foreign relations.  
Unlike those of more specialized services, such as that of Britain, consular positions within 
Asian and Middle Eastern countries were not generally restricted to officers knowing the 
relevant languages.  
 With the emphasis on language during the first two years of appointment gradually 
yielding to crisis management during 1920s, the hodge-podge system quickly evolved from mere 
trade promotion to political reporting, although the institutional preference for the former 
continued to influence officers’ records long after the true emphasis had shifted (in the early 
1920s). Within the Far East Division and among American Foreign Service officers in China, 
Japan, and the Ottoman Empire, a “Peking” order emerged by the mid-1920s that continued to 
influence American policy in East Asia until well after WWII. It included continued ideological 
support for trade expansion (the push for which sharply diminished during the 1920s and ‘30s), 
cautious but firm opposition to Japanese aggression in China, and a growing awareness of and 
concern regarding the rising Communist challenge. This broad consensus fielded challenges 
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from Japanese-trained officers as well as its own junior officers and was the dominant civilian 
influence on American foreign policy in Asia from the 1930s until the end of WWII.  
 As will be outlined in this chapter however, this order was based on personalities and was 
inherently unstable and dependent upon personal relationships, friendships among officers. 
Personal rivalries—particularly junior officers’ animosity toward Stanley Hornbeck later 
fractured the order and complicated a unified voice on US policy in East Asia after WWII. 
Additionally, the transfer of Ambassador Nelson Johnson to Australia in 1941 (likely the result 
of FDR’s personal animosity) severed the head of the China SIC’s paving the way for 
uninformed characters such as Hurley to pursue a massively unpopular (with SIC graduates) 
course correction. The result of these developments was the marginalization of officers who 
could and did influence formulation of US policy in China. However, this group was inherently 
unstable, dependent on the acquiescence of seemingly indomitable benefactors.  
 Shepherded by a few influential China officers, such as Nelson T. Johnson and Stanley 
Hornbeck, American policy as propagated by this order envisioned challenging Japan’s 
dominance in China while downplaying the increasing military and political dangers of doing so. 
Something akin to a “good old boys’ club” combined with the sheer numbers of the China 
service to channel American policy against Japan, even though no such distinctly anti-Japanese 
policy existed. As will be outlined in a later chapter, the China Hands saw Japan as the primary 
threat, whereas the Japan Hands viewed war with Japan as to be avoided at all costs, including 
sacrificing influence and interests in China. 
 The early twentieth century saw the emergence of three distinct groups of language-
trained Foreign Service officers, specializing in Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman Turkish. As 
mentioned elsewhere, the Chinese specialists vastly outnumbered the other two groups 
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combined. After the Ottoman Empire severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 
1917, the Turkish Student Interpreters program was suspended. The dissolution and 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after WWI rendered moot any serious renewal of the 
Turkish language program and the few career officers who remained were released to the general 
service. 
 The China Hands’ prominent role in American China policy was therefore inevitable. 
That they disagreed with Japan Hands more willing to placate Japan in order to avoid war is also 
hardly surprising. The historiography of Sino-American relations is riddled with controversy 
over the persecution of “China Hands” such as John Davies, John Service, and O. Edmund Clubb 
while barely acknowledging the countervailing narratives from “Japan Hands”—unless they 
advocate politically popular positions, such as the un-necessity for the use of atomic bombs at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki—while glossing over more substantive and detailed disagreements 
from the late 1930s.      
 Examination of the middle men of the American Foreign Service in China, Japan, and 
Turkey re-focuses debate upon the details of American policy and its implementation in the Far 
and Middle East and highlights the dearth of pre-formulated imperial ambitions for these regions. 
In fact, this investigation suggests that the curtailed career paths of the language-trained officers 
of the SIC were interwoven with the fractured and contentious politics of Sino-American 
relations from the Pacific War onwards.  
 Most scholars who have studied American relations with Asia and the Middle East during 
the first half of the twentieth century have encountered Student Interpreter Corps graduates. 
Students of Sino-American relations during this period will likely recognize the names of “China 
Hands” such as O. Edmund Clubb, John Carter Vincent, and John Paton Davies. Scholars of 
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Japanese-American relations cannot avoid at least passing reference to Joseph Ballantine (both 
erstwhile subordinates and close associates of U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew). 
 However, scholars who portray “Open Door” policy as a vehicle of informal imperial 
economic expansion fail to identify actual imperial processes at work. As will be examined in 
greater detail in a subsequent chapter, imperial economic expansionist ideology existed, 
particularly at the administrative level in the State Department, but failed to translate into 
concrete steps at the district level—the level at which SIC graduates were most active. 
Identifying actual American imperial policy prior to WWII requires tremendous historical 
telescoping: the closer one approaches purported imperial policy, the further the historian retreats 
from what actually happened.  
 As has been emphasized in the previous chapter, trade expansion ideology functioned as 
an early 20th century form of political correctness. SIC graduates who perceived and acted upon 
this were able to use this reality as a vehicle of career advancement but could not actually drag 
American business through the purportedly “open” door into Chinese markets. As will be seen in 
this chapter, “Open Door” ideology permeated the SIC at the personnel level, but the nascent 
professionalization, personal administration, and parsimonious precluded actual empire building.  
 Much of the chapter focuses on the contradictory, even capricious administration of the 
SIC, including career management of its graduates. Hardly unusual by 19th and early 20th century 
American bureaucratic standards, the SIC and its consular exponents in China, Japan, and 
Turkey were no match for the British, French, and Japanese models, on which the American 
Student Interpreters Corps was ostensibly patterned. Instead (as will be detailed further in a later 
chapter), the American system of interpreter training and employment more closely resembled 
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that of the late Ottoman Empire in its emphasis on personal connections, patronage, and informal 
diplomacy.  
 In this vein, one section of this chapter is devoted to “native” employees of the American 
Foreign Service in China, Japan, and Turkey. Scholars of Sino-American relations have 
repeatedly assumed the existence of an “imperial” relationship without reference to any actual 
references to imperial administration. For example, Eileen P. Scully has asserted, “imperial 
expansion was a process of penetration, transformation, and incorporation that turned on 
transactions between indigenous elites in the target area and those whom they dominated in their 
own society; between those indigenous elites and foreign powers; and between the foreign 
powers and their own domestic constituencies.”195 
 However, examination of the middlemen—native and otherwise—of “Open Door” 
diplomacy suggests that such collaboration was virtually non-existent in every way that could 
have influenced actual American trade. Language-trained American Foreign Service Officers 
strove to pave the way, but American business failed to follow the urgings of their consular 
representatives. Many “native” employees with business connections in local markets could have 
enthusiastically supplied such collaboration, but were viewed with suspicion by the very State 
Department administrators who so ardently espoused trade expansion. In fact, the primary 
contribution of the Foreign Service to American informal imperial expansion during this period 
lay not in the actual perpetration of empire in China, Japan, and Turkey but in changing 
American imperial discourse to support future imperialist endeavors irrespective of political 
affiliation. As will be examined in subsequent chapters, the SIC language-training program 
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accelerated American views inclination to intervention in foreign countries—regardless of 
Democratic or Republican Party affiliation. 
 Despite the prevalence of these middlemen in archival records, they are conspicuously 
absent from historical studies of American Foreign Relations. These have generally focused on 
such senior-ranking officials, including Frank Kellogg, J. V. A. MacMurray, Joseph Grew, and 
the notorious “China Hands” of the late 1940s. Striving to put them in comparative perspective, 
scholars such as Michael Hunt and Akira Iriye have also examined their Chinese and Japanese 
counterparts, yet far more research remains to be done on both sides of the comparison.196  
Richard Hume Werking, a prominent historian of the United States Foreign Service, has likewise 
examined American State Department pioneers such as Elihu Root, bureaucrats such as Wilbur 
Carr, and business advocates such as Harry Garfield, yet without glancing at the field officers 
who comprised the institutional edifice they had envisioned.197  Despite providing important 
perspectives on the overall diplomatic and professional trends, such approaches privilege top-
down analysis. This study adopts a middle-out approach that considers both elite ideology and 
the implementation of that ideology in practical ways. 
 Reviewing the careers and characters of American Foreign Service officers of all ranks in 
China, Japan, and Turkey facilitates an assessment of the State Department’s usage of` the 
economic and political information gathered by its officers in Asia and the Middle East. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, although this study extends geographically to Japan and the 
Ottoman Empire as well as China, the statistics and history of the SIC nudge its focus towards 
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China.  The comparatively small size of Japan and the relatively high competency of Japanese 
businessmen and bureaucrats in English and other foreign languages effectively limited the 
growth of the SIC in Japan.  
 Yet although SIC Japan never grew very large in terms of numbers, a small number of its 
graduates remained attached to the US Embassy and key consulates from 1909 (the beginning of 
the SIC training program in Japan) and these officers remained influential voices on Japan policy 
through WWII and beyond. The SIC in Turkey never grew as large or as influential as its sister 
branches in Japan or China before WWI, was discontinued during the war (as the Ottoman 
Empire severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 1917) and was not renewed after 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (beyond the training of a few individual officers in order 
to staff American consulates in the Turkish Republic). In fact, given the importance of American 
policy in the Middle East, the comparative lack of Turkish and Arabic language training for 
Foreign Service officers stands as a rather conspicuous gap, highlighting the reactionary and ad 
hoc nature of long term American foreign policy.  
 From 1902 to 1941, the U.S. State Department’s attention remained firmly fixed on East 
Asia, particularly China and Japan. This particular chapter highlights the interpersonal and 
departmental context within which bureaucratic perception developed, while illuminating the 
means whereby the State Department continued to emphasize trade expansion in order to bolster 
its power vis-a-vis other agents.  Examining the lives, careers, and characters of SIC-trained 
consuls and diplomats offers an x-ray of the Foreign Service: an inside-out, bottom-up 
institutional analysis.  This analysis reveals a Foreign Service in the process of organization and 
professionalization even while it purported itself to be the equal of its more developed European 
counterparts. Examination of these middlemen in the US Foreign Service highlights the manner 
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in which the US government acted as an agent of its own growth and increasing 
professionalization.  Furthermore, by highlighting the generational and institutional schisms 
within and between the Chinese and Japanese sections of the Student Interpreters Corps, this 
chapter suggests that these differences both reflected conflicting changes in Americans attitudes 
toward government and led to the development of opposing imperial American visions at the end 
of World War II. 
 This approach offers a hybrid of micro history and diplomatic history. Examining the 
people who comprised the American Foreign Service (and in part, the State Department) and 
consular work as a lived experience, this chapter emphasizes the structural ad hoc nature of 
American diplomacy. This chapter receives inspiration from Christine Philliou’s study of 
Stephanos Vogorides, a middle-ranking Ottoman official and her portrayal of Ottoman 
governance.198 However, whereas Philliou seeks to shift discussion away from institutional 
imperial politics via the examination of a single individual,199 this section aims directly at a fuller 
understanding of the Foreign Service as an institution and the agency of the state. In this vein, 
Barbara Brook’s study of imperial Japan’s “China service” has paved the way by examining the 
institutional experience of Chinese-language trained Japanese consuls and diplomats in China.200   
This chapter highlights the development of the Foreign Service in Asia during the first half of the 
twentieth and emphasizes a labyrinth of personal politics, intra-departmental rivalries, 
overlapping—and sometimes competing—policy goals that, precluded the emergence of an 
American imperial project in China.  If such imperialism existed between the turn of the 
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twentieth century and the end of World War II, it was in the realm of political vision and 
imagination. Indeed, as will be argued in later chapters, by the end of WWII, rival imperial 
visions for East Asia had been produced by opposing forces (left, right, Democrat, Republican) 
at opposite ends of the American political spectrum. Neither of these visions was realized but 
both were directly connected to prewar American relations with China and Japan, and both were 
inextricably linked to SIC-trained Foreign Service officers who spent the bulk of their careers in 
these two countries. 
 In this vein it is vital to understand the individuals who observed and interpreted the local 
economies and politics. By examining the talented but unappreciated middle of the Foreign 
Service in Asia and the Middle East, this chapter illuminates the political filters through which 
ideas and information passed before any action could be taken, suggesting that United States 
politics were systemically unable to respond positively to revolution in Asia and the Middle East.  
Manifold, simultaneous political trends complicated American foreign policy during these 
turbulent decades. These were personal, arbitrary, and state-controlled, linked to leadership of 
the State Department.  
 The problem was not lack of information or ideas on the part of language-trained consuls 
and diplomats in China, Japan, or the Ottoman Empire.  Rather, the primary obstacle consisted of 
the United States’ chronic inability to harmonize its espoused ideals with foreign policy 
objectives.  Endemic to republican democracy, national partisan differences precluded foreign 
policy consensus in the early twentieth century. Personal and departmental politics, ignorance, 
and the ad hoc, reactionary character of American foreign relations also exacerbated such 
disagreements.  
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 American domestic politics and culture played important, if somewhat hidden roles in 
foreign policy trends as well, although their influence on the SIC and its graduates is difficult to 
trace. For example, race and class prejudices pervaded the State Department and the Foreign 
Service.  These biases influenced appointments, promotions, transfers, and many other personnel 
actions, in addition to coloring personal interactions between Foreign Service officers, native 
and/or non-American employees, and each other.  Many of the language-trained Foreign Service 
officers developed more progressive opinions of their host nation societies, by virtue of their 
long overseas tenure—and yet this itself sometimes rendered their loyalty dubious: senior 
officials suspected, as had the architects of consular service reform, that lengthy foreign 
residence might make officers go native and “forget their Americanism.”201  Finally, Foreign 
Service bureaucracy during this period was personal and capricious. Ratings and records were 
often whimsical; they were whatever the Personnel Board decided, with some basis in facts. If 
administrators decided an officer’s conduct or performance was unsatisfactory, they could easily 
push that officer out of government service; no protections again political persecution existed 
and despite the putatively (and ideally) apolitical nature of the SIC, none were enacted until after 
the second World War. 
 Within this milieu, a discussion of the characters the Student Interpreters Corps during 
this period (1902-1941) brings several trends to the foreground. First, it was those individuals 
who entered while the program was young (the very first decade of the program) who influenced 
it’s course the most—until the beginning of WWII. Second, the prevailing ideology of new 
entrants shifted, incrementally, in favor of American intervention in the affairs of other countries. 
Following WWII, the primary disagreements between these opposing visions revolved less 
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around whether to interfere in the internal affairs of foreign states than around which forms such 
interventions should assume.  
 
Nelson T. Johnson and the Old China Hands, 1902-1924 
 
 This chapter begins and concludes with Nelson T. Johnson. Although he was neither the 
first, last, or most notorious of SIC graduates, he embodied the Americanism espoused by the 
architects of the United States’ fledging Foreign Service in the early 20th century and is 
exemplary of the Student Interpreter influence on American foreign policy during this period.  
Through his work as a Foreign Service Inspector, American Minister (and subsequently 
Ambassador) to China—to say nothing of his work as a consul—his personality and views had a 
powerful impact on the institutional character and of the “China Service,” Sino-American 
relations,202 and United States foreign policy in Asia.  Scrutiny of Johnson also reveals the 
existence of a “good old boys club” in the “China Service.”  This ephemeral cadre shaped the 
United States’ perception of China, and to a limited extent, influenced policy, although there 
were increasingly frequent challenges from junior officers at the end of WWII.   
 Examining the personnel records of American Foreign Service officers in China will 
complement the parallel examinations of the Japan and Turkey branches in this study, and will 
deepen and extend knowledge of the “China Hands” handled by previous works including E. J. 
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Kahn’s China Hands and Paul Gordon Lauren’s The China Hands’ Legacy: Ethics and 
Diplomacy.203   
 These works are typical of published material in which the “China Hands” appear, 
referring almost exclusively—if perhaps unintentionally—to some of the language-trained 
officers present in China in the late 1930s and early 1940s.  These men included John S. Service, 
Raymond P. Ludden, O. Edmund Clubb, John Carter Vincent, John Hall Paxton, and John Paton 
Davies: these names are thoroughly familiar to American students of U.S. Foreign Relations. The 
historiographical obsession with these later officers overlooks the three decades of service 
numerous but unacknowledged “China Hands” prior to WWII.  Many un-purged officers—as 
well as numerous officers who retired before and during the war—are rarely mentioned.  These 
officers lived and worked in China during extremely turbulent times, yet unlike the (in) famous 
“China Hands” mentioned above, there has been little discussion of officers such Ernest B. Price, 
Carl Meinhardt, Meryl S. Myers, John Ker Davis, Edwin Stanton, and Norman F. Allman. In 
addition, it should be noted that personnel files present only an incomplete picture of the officer 
in question. As will be examined in a subsequent chapter, the role of women (girlfriends, wives, 
mistresses, prostitutes, etc.) is scarcely mentioned in official records. Review of official records, 
even heretofore unexamined, is just one of several important avenues in highlighting the role of 
these language trained middlemen of the American Foreign Service. 
 By beginning with Johnson, this chapter will highlight the elasticity of the Student 
Interpreters Corps and the Foreign Service it enhanced, as well as the skills, composition, 
organization, and cohesion of a pioneering group of Foreign Service officers. For a complete 
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understanding of how the United States approached China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire 
during this period, an examination of the personnel of the Student Interpreters Corps and their 
functions within the Foreign Service administration is indispensible. 
 The overall management of Foreign Service personnel during this period was crude, 
although the system of appointments and promotions was a dramatic improvement over that of 
the 19th century.  Despite the adoption of a putatively merit-based structure in 1906, what 
constituted merit was arbitrary, highly dependent on the views of visiting Inspectors or those of 
men who had no direct personal dealings with overseas consulates at all.  Johnson spent his 
junior years in this capricious system, benefited from it, and through his reliance on informal 
contacts and exacting attitude toward subordinates, Johnson perpetuated it.  Understanding the 
function of the Consular Service in China, the Student Interpreters Corps that provided language 
skills and cultural expertise, and the day to day work and life in U.S. consulates in both China 
and Japan (requires a knowledge of this remarkably complex and (within the “China Service” at 
least) highly influential officer.  According to Russell Buhite, Johnson “read, traveled, explored, 
mixed with the people and came to know China as few natives knew it.”204   
 This task is difficult however, for Buhite’s limited biography of Johnson is remarkably 
uncritical of him.  This is partly because nearly all Johnson’s peers and superiors spoke highly of 
him, praising his keen mind, language skills, work ethic, and close relations with the Chinese.205  
All of these traits he undoubtedly possessed—which has been and will continue to be 
emphasized in this study.  However, Johnson’s character, his attitude toward subordinates, and 
his more than ample ambition have escaped the biographer’s attention.  It is one of the 
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deficiencies of Buhite’s treatment of Johnson that the information from his official personnel file 
does not appear, as it provides an unparalleled glimpse into his life and work.   
 Surprisingly little has been said about Johnson’s shortcomings in any published work.  
He was a prominent architect of American policy toward China from the late 1920s until his 
appointment as Ambassador to Australia in 1941. He has also been important to works such as 
Dorothy Borg’s treatment of the Kuomintang and United States policy, and Paul Varg—as well 
as numerous other scholars of Sino-American relations—used Johnson’s papers in exploring the 
United States’ relationship with China in the 1930s and 1940s.206 Understanding the character 
and experiences of officers like Johnson adds a crucial human dimension to study of United 
States policy in China.    
 Nelson Trusler Johnson was a multifarious individual.  One of the least-educated young 
men to join the Student Interpreters Corps in the early twentieth century, he was the only former 
student interpreter to become Ambassador to China.  His career was as enigmatic as his 
character.  Inspection reports reveal a dimension of this officer clarifies many of his dealings 
with subordinates, peers, and superiors alike.  After reviewing a host of positive references and 
glowing peer reviews, inspector T. M. Wilson observed,  
 
“the contradictions existing in this one human being are disconcerting in the extreme; 
values of him, his ideas and opinions gained on one day are often revised on another 
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occasion . . .  the case is one for the psychoanalyst rather than an Inspector of the Foreign 
Service.”207 
 
According to Wilson, Johnson was quite friendly and genial—at least outwardly, but lacked 
“generosity and he is really possessed of a deep underlying suspicion which definitely has to be 
dealt with and entirely overcome by any who work with him closely and successfully.”208 
 Surmounting such an obstacle was difficult enough for officers who worked with Johnson 
directly, to say nothing of the many consuls and more junior officers whose only contact with 
Johnson was through correspondence or during his inspection tours.  As Inspector Wilson 
observed, “He visits consular offices throughout China on occasion and would perhaps be more 
surprised than anyone in the world to know that they as a rule give more in the way of 
cooperation to the chancery than they receive from it.”209  The difficulty of accommodating his 
personality was undoubtedly compounded by the fact that even among junior officers there was 
an abundance of inflated egos.   
 The picture that emerges from Johnson’s personnel file is thus strikingly different from 
that offered by Buhite.  Johnson was a bureaucratic climber.  Although he certainly was capable 
and gifted, there was an inscrutable, hard, and even unpleasant side to him.  As Wilson noted, 
“He has thought out carefully and applies with some determination a philosophy of life that 
allows himself no personal worry over any topic large or small.”210  Singleness of mind is one 
thing, disregard for coworkers is quite another, and that, in the polite language of Foreign 
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Service correspondence, is what Johnson evinced.  Inspector Wilson observed, “as it is in the 
case of cooperation extended by and from the legation, so it is with the conventions which 
usually rule everyday action—he demands more from others than he himself expects to give,” 
citing the instance of an (at least apparently) inappropriate relationship with a female clerk 
(whom he later married).211  Wilson’s overall assessment of Johnson was that “he is a very 
difficult person to adapt oneself to, and requires constant effort.”212 
 This was not just the opinion of a disgruntled Inspector on tour.  At the end of Johnson’s 
career, when he was gently but firmly forced to retire and senior State Department officials were 
considering offering him post-retirement consultative position, Joseph Ballantine indicated to 
Nathaniel P. Davis (personnel assignments), “many officers in the China Service held the belief 
that Johnson throughout his career had not played as a member of the team but had been inclined 
to look out primarily for his own interests.”213 
 Johnson might be depicted as a likeable bulldozer: affable and confident, friendly until a 
subordinate or peer disagreed with him or got in his way.  Johnson’s administrative failings 
should not obscure his otherwise impressive talents.  He was highly competent in spoken 
Chinese and in his dealings with Chinese officials and acquaintances, and these gifts served him 
as well as they served the United States during this period.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge that his brittle and mercurial disposition affected the cohesion and morale of the 
China Service, as well as relationships with American Foreign Service officers in Japan. 
 Johnson did not appreciate differences of opinion, especially when the opportunity to win 
an argument with a peer or subordinate officer presented an opportunity to advance his 
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reputation or career.  Intense personal rivalry between peers often emerged out of differing 
interpretations of legal matters questions; Johnson developed intense dislike toward those 
officers who disagreed with him openly, and this certainly affected consular service cohesion as 
well as the willingness of subordinate officers to express opinions or analyses contrary the views 
of senior officers such as Johnson.  This was true of political issues including the rise of the 
KMT in the 1920s, Communism in the 1930s and 1940s, and Japanese militarism, as well as 
questions of consular procedure and practice. 
 One such matter involved consular recognition of overseas marriage of American 
citizens—particularly in the case of interracial unions.  During an inspection tour of U.S. 
consulates in Japan in 1924, Johnson took exception to Erle R. Dickover’s recognition of such 
marriages while in charge of a consulate.214  As a result of their differing interpretations, Nelson 
T. Johnson (only a year older than Dickover, but with eight years’ longer service) gave Dickover 
a bad efficiency rating (“fair” was below “average,” and officer’s were not usually recommended 
for promotion unless they had consistent ratings of “average,” “very good,” or “excellent”), 
accusing him of “shallowness of intellectual background which has narrowed his vision and 
rendered him incapable of making the most of his experience,” and recommended that Dickover 
be immediately transferred “out of the Far East and assigned for a time to some European post 
under the supervision of a capable principle officer.”215  Given Johnson’s own lack of formal 
education, and his service record Johnson’s remarks seem mean-spirited and ironic.216 Whatever 
the case, Johnson seems to have changed his tune about these inspections a decade after the fact, 
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when he wrote to Far East Division Chief, Dr. Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck, that “in Dickover the 
Embassy in Tokyo has one of the liveliest reporting officers in the Far East…I know whereof I 
speak . . . because of the fact that I inspected Dickover’s office . . . in 1924 and 1925. Dickover is 
doing for the political situation in Japan what he did for the commercial situation in Kobe. I have 
not got a man on my staff capable of doing what he can do, even myself.”217 
 Exacerbated by the vagaries of personality and position, educational pedigree and class 
were also intertwined with appointments to and the organization of the Foreign Service, and 
despite movement toward a merit-based system of appointments and promotion, this remained 
the case until the 1946 Foreign Service Act.  Like so many other occupations in the United 
States, diplomatic service was in the throes of professionalization in the early twentieth century.  
Despite the promise of poor pay and the certitude of long overseas assignments, becoming a 
Student interpreter in the early twentieth century was a more difficult task than gaining 
admission to a military academy today.  Obtaining an invitation to take the entrance exam 
required careful forethought and planning.  The files of officers like Erle R. Dickover, a typical 
example, reveal that successful SIC applicants usually obtained impeccable commercial and 
political references just to get the opportunity to take the entrance examination (selection of 
examinees was by Presidential designation, and thus remained political, despite claims that the 
examination system made individual merit the basis for appointments and promotion).  While 
applying to take the exam, Dickover obtained endorsements the Santa Barbara Savings and Loan 
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Bank, the president of the University of California, California Representatives Joseph R. 
Knowland, Everis Hayes and Julius Kahn, and Senator George Perkins (CA).218 
 Impressive as this was, John Van Antwerp MacMurray’s dossier glittered even more.  He 
earned his B.A. and M.A. from Princeton in 1902 and 1907, and a law degree from Columbia in 
1906.219  Applying for a position as a diplomatic secretary, in addition to numerous secondary 
references (letters written at the behest of an intermediary), MacMurray received the support of 
Woodrow Wilson in 1905 (while president of Princeton), Senator Redfield Proctor (VT), and 
received continued encouragement from Woodrow Wilson as President.220  By contrast, 
recommendations for Willys R. Peck, the son of American missionaries in Tientstin, appear quite 
modest.  They consisted of a letter from Benjamin Wheeler (president of Berkeley in 1906), and 
a letter from Senator George C. Perkins—written at Wheeler’s request.221  
 Nelson Johnson’s references were distinctly lackluster; the only written one was from the 
principal of Sidwell’s Friends School (incidentally, the same school attended by the daughters of 
President Barack Obama); the other was a personal visit by a Col. Green Clay Goodloe to Wilbur 
J. Carr in August, 1907, a few weeks after his interview with the young Johnson.222  In addition 
to talent and ambition however, he also had a fair amount of luck. In 1921, Johnson was 
appointed “Expert Assistant to the American Commissioners” at the Conference on the 
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Limitation of Armaments in Washington D.C. (commonly known as the Washington 
Conference).223  J.V.A. MacMurray received an appointment as an assistant to the American 
Commissioners at the conference.224 Such opportunities gave Johnson unrivaled occasions to 
impress his superiors and build close relationships with them.  
 The “China Service” of Nelson T. Johnson was highly stratified. Officers such as 
Johnson, Peck, and Arnold rose through the ranks partly by virtue of their enthusiasm for and 
emphasis on American trade expansion in China (regardless of the volume of American business 
interest in such growth). Led by Nelson Johnson, this group of “old” China Hands dominated US 
China policy discussions until 1941, with the outbreak of WWII. The SIC in China continued to 
grow in size until the late l930s (although never at the level prescribed by Congress), but the 
personal nature of the State Department in general and the Far East Division in particular 
prevented the emergence of any serious competitors to the “old” China Hands.  As will be 
discussed in great detail later, these circumstances created a modicum policy consensus within 
the China Affairs section of the Far East Division, giving American policy in East Asia a Sino-
centric tinge. The old guard remained in place until World War II; however, the growth and 
bureaucratization of the SIC meant that sooner or later, a clash was bound to occur. 
 
The Peking Order: Bureaucratization and Administration of the SIC, 1924-1941 
 
 From 1902 (the establishment of the SIC) to 1924 (passage of the Rogers Act), the 
“China Service” grew increasingly large, language-competent, and capable of entirely staffing 
new and existing posts.  As of 1911, only 3 of the 14 posts in China lacked language-trained 
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consular officer at the rank of Interpreter or higher—one of these posts was Canton, where 
Mandarin language training was moot—and there were 9 more student interpreters in training.225  
This was the professional zenith of the Student Interpreters Corps.  As will be in greater detail 
later, there was a generational divide between the officers that entered during these early years, 
and those who entered in the late 1920s and early1930s.  Although the latter officers have most 
often been called “China Hands,” (there was less of distinction in the Japan service, and none 
whatsoever in Turkey), the older officers not only wear the label equally well, but they were 
more numerous, better traveled (in China), and just as well trained. 
 The American Foreign Service as it existed in China, Japan, and Turkey in the early 
twentieth century, was a three-tiered organization.  At the bottom were low-paid clerks, 
messengers, agents, and native interpreters who staffed the offices and performed routine and 
menial work.  In the middle were the career officers, ranking from Interpreter to Consul General, 
who were in charge of the consulates, and consulates-general, and oversaw the work of the hired 
staff and perhaps a few American subordinates.  At the top was the American 
Minister/Ambassador, his close confidantes, and senior State Department officials (including the 
Chief of the Far East Division, the assistant secretaries of State, the Secretary of State, and the 
President).   
 The increasing professionalization and bureaucratization of the Foreign Service in 
general and the SIC (which supplied the talent) in particular, inspired ambitions that could not be 
fulfilled for all but a few.  Nearly all SIC-trained officers expected regular promotion, especially 
when they received average ratings or higher.  The Legation/Embassy was the beginning of 
student-interpreters’ careers; as the site of the American Minister or Ambassador it was also the 
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ideal end.  Nelson T. Johnson, Edwin F. Stanton, U. Alexis Johnson, and Willys R. Peck were a 
few of former student-interpreters who eventually progressed as far as Ambassador.  Of these, 
Nelson T. Johnson and U. Alexis Johnson were the only two to serve as Ambassador in the same 
countries where they began as language students.226   
 Although most Foreign Service officers did not expect to be appointed as Ambassador, 
after reaching their thirties, few were content to remain low-paid consuls—especially since 
nearly all of them had children by that point. The putatively merit-based examination system 
created an overlapping matrix of appointments, usually favoring non-language trained officers 
above those who were proficient.  If they were merely on the same footing as all other consular 
officers, the SIC graduates would have been minimally disgruntled, if not content.  The obstacles 
encountered by officers such Willys R. Peck however, raised serious questions concerning the 
function of the SIC in the evolving Foreign Service.     
 Most scholars who have examined American policy in China in the interwar period (such 
as Michael Schaller and Akira Iriye) would recognize the name Willys Ruggles Peck. His duties 
as Chinese Secretary at the American Legation in Peking (secretary-ships were the few positions 
in China specifically reserved for SIC graduates) offer a glimpse of the important, but often 
invisible, influence of language-trained officers at the Legation.  Peck’s routine tasks included 
maintaining contacts with “influential official and other Chinese,” advising the Minister 
concerning Chinese matters, serving as interpreter when necessary, receiving Chinese visitors, 
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and serving as a member of the multinational “Diplomatic Body,” to consider issues such as the 
Shanghai Mixed Court and coordinate policy.227   
 Directly subordinate to Peck (in 1927) were Assistant Secretaries Paul R. Josselyn, who 
assisted Peck and supervised the language students (W.M. Newhall Jr. and A.S. Chase) and 
drafted most of the Secretariat’s correspondence, and Vice-Consul Flavius J. Chapman, who 
translated (documents) for the legation and performed additional tasks as instructed.228  
Regarding their workload Frazer observed, “it seemed to me that a disproportionate share of the 
constructive work done in the Chancery is accomplished by the Chinese Secretariat, and that a 
tendency exists to refer to it nearly all matters relating even distantly to things Chinese.”229 He 
further emphasized that much of this work could be accomplished by “general service secretaries 
after some months of service in this country.”230  
 More galling than the waste of talent however, was that the position of Secretary was 
technically inferior to that of the Counselor of the Legation, then occupied by Ferdinand L. 
Mayer, who had spent ten years in the Service compared to Peck’s twenty—all of which had 
been China.231  Adding insult to injury, the State Department ruled that although the Counselor 
and Secretary were of equal rank, the Secretary “shall not take charge of the Legation except by 
a special authorization by the Department,” thereby favoring the younger, less-experienced 
man—who spoke no Chinese—but who possessed an education at Harvard and Princeton.232 
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 Despite repeated emphases on about appointments and promotions on the basis of merit 
and ability, social class played a major role in the pecking order of Foreign Service assignments 
in China, causing deep bitterness among these unappreciated China hands. Language-trained 
officers regarded the position of Secretary as a professional dead end, and resisted such 
assignments.  In 1927, Inspector Robert Frazer Jr. noted they “all spoke of the Chinese 
Secretariat as a ‘blind alley,’ leading nowhere and bringing little of either credit or promotion,” 
citing the case of the above-mentioned Peck (who as of 1927 had served in that post for six years 
without advancement),233 whose industrious character, remarkable linguistic talent, and two 
decades of faithful service had led to no more than a secretaryship position.234  Japan service 
officers assigned to the Embassy (such as Eugene H. Dooman) felt equally slighted.  
Ambassador Charles MacVeagh in 1927 wrote to Wilbur Carr, describing “a growing feeling 
among the men in the Japanese service that an assignment to the Embassy, while supposedly 
constituting a recognition of work well done, actually results in retarding promotion of the 
officer . . . .”235 
 Despite such petty—but keenly felt—injustices, SIC-trained officers as well as their 
superiors regarded the “Far East” (at the time the designation for Asia and the Middle East) as 
the proper place for their talents.  Only rarely were they assigned outside of China, Japan, and 
the Middle East, and they complained bitterly about their abilities going to waste when posted to 
locations such as Winnipeg, Canada; most officers preferred “field work (overseas work) to 
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assignments in Washington D.C.236  Even when language-trained officers such as Willys R. Peck 
requested a post within China—Tsingtau, in this instance—, if knowledge of Mandarin was not 
essential, supervisors like Paul Reinsch regarded such assignments of SIC-trained officers as “a 
sheer waste of the material that the interpreter system is designed to furnish.”237 It should also be 
noted that although officers such as William R. Langdon did express preference for language-
appropriate assignments, class chauvinism occasionally emerged on the part of superiors like 
Joseph W. Ballantine, regarding Langdon as unfit for policy work in the Far East Division 
(Washington D.C.), implicitly due to his lack of education (Ballantine had graduated from 
Amherst College).238  
 The career of William R. Langdon shows the fairly typical trajectory of a SIC-trained 
officer.  Beginning as non-career clerk in American Consulate General in İstanbul in 1911, he 
was appointed Student Interpreter to Japan in 1914, and served in the Japan Empire until 4 
December, 1941—spending only a year and a half in Washington D.C and Montreal 
combined.239  His 37-year career ended in 1951, with mandatory retirement.240  Language 
expertise and long residence in country were the hallmarks of SIC participants.  It was these 
aspects of their service that enhanced their utility to the Foreign Service, despite low pay and 
understaffing. 
 A glance at the Inspection Service and the rating system illustrates how easily Foreign 
Service administrators—and State Department policymakers—could dismiss the work of 
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language-trained consuls from a distance—especially if the work was less visible in terms of 
written reports and trade letters. Although the American Consular Service had existed for many 
decades, from the turn of the twentieth century (the Student Interpreters Corps had been 
established in 1902) until 1910, no systematic method for evaluating officers inspecting consular 
offices existed. The 1906 Consular Reorganization Act called for such inspections but failed to 
fund them. After Congress finally did so in 1910, personnel evaluations combined the comments 
of an officer’s immediate supervisor (who often lived and worked far from the officer’s post) 
with those of an inspector, whose visits were often irregular and infrequent despite 
Congressional stipulations.241 Inspection reports consisted of dozens of pages, with questions and 
comments ranging from the physical condition of the officer to his performance in American 
trade extension. This system worked fairly well for junior officers who were direct subordinates 
in large offices, but much less so for those who were vice- and full consuls as chief (and usually 
sole) officers in consulates far from Beijing. 
 
“The Persian Consul,” “Sister Percy," and the Russian Jew 
 
 In addition to maintaining appearances and adhering to political correctness, conforming 
to racial, religious, and sexual prejudices was another potential challenge for language officers. 
For example, Eugene Dooman was the product of a mixed (probably Armenian-American) 
marriage, and his “ethnic” appearance hampered his career.  Like most missionary-children-
turned diplomats, Dooman acquired a peerless level of fluency.  According to Inspector Robert 
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Frazer Jr., Dooman in 1927, “spoke and read Japanese better than any other man in our service 
and no doubt as well as any foreigner in the country.”242 Nevertheless, according to Inspector 
Stuart Fuller, “being the son of a Persian who was naturalized he looks like an East Indian or 
Eurasian and many Americans resent his being in the Consular Service.”243 In addition to the 
overt racism, this statement probably displays the ignorance of the inspector, as well as the 
capricious nature of the nascent inspection system.  For one thing, it is highly implausible that an 
Iranian would have been working in Osaka, Japan as an Episcopalian missionary.  Other 
evaluators’ comments in his personnel record suggest that he looked “Armenian.”244 Regardless, 
Dooman’s General Rating was “Fair,” because of his appearance.  Despite talent in diplomatic 
and commercial work, the rater noted, “it is believed that his non-European blood and 
characteristics make him unsuited for service at most posts.”245 In 1918, inspector Fuller asserted 
that Dooman was “regarded throughout the East as not quite a white man . . . he is often jokingly 
referred to as the Persian Consul.”246 
 Similarly, gender stereotypes also colored perceptions of officers: men were expected to 
be manly and virile. Although “considerably above average” in the Service in terms of “intellect, 
education, and culture, Percival Heintzelman was derogatively referred to as “Lady Percy,” 
“Sister Percy” and, according to an inspector, dressed “in excellent taste, and were it not for a 
certain lack of virility about him his general appearance would be good.”247 According to an 
inspector, “Mr. Heintzelman “has a thin, high pitched voice, effeminate mannerism, and a 
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tendency to talk too much and explain the simplest statement. One is inclined to call him 
‘ladylike.’”248 
 Similarly, the career of Max Kirjassoff, the son of a naturalized Russian Jew, 249 reveals a 
hidden but virulent anti-Jewish prejudice. Like Eugene Dooman, Kirjassoff was a Japanese 
language officer and one of the earliest appointees to the SIC in Japan.250 Although Kirjassoff 
developed a high degree of fluency in Japanese, performed consular duties admirably and had 
been commended by Japanese and foreign businessmen in Japan, one inspector noted of him his  
 
“ability will never secure for him a higher position than that of a good fair  average 
consular officer. He is well educated, 251 and his character also seems unquestionably 
good, but his religion works against him, particularly in combination with the fact that he 
was born in Russia, all of which have been cited several times by persons conversing 
with the Inspector as reasons for which he should not, of all consular officers, be assigned 
to this particular post, Dairen . . ..”252 
 
 Other inspectors snidely noted Kirjassoff’s propensity for “making and saving money,” 
giving advance warning to the Department that any complaints regarding his salary should not be 
taken seriously.253 However, another officer observed to J.V.A. MacMurray, then-chief of the 
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Far East Division, that businessmen had praised Kirjassoff’s knowledge and intelligence and 
criticized the Department for rating an officer “merely through his signature on letters.”254  
 These trends further indicate that the process of bureaucratization in SIC had not 
unfolded as the architects of the Foreign Service desired, that is, a fully merit-based system 
failed to materialize. Although successful in recruiting and training the talented men of the SIC, 
the State Department had difficulty employing, compensating, and evaluating these individuals 
equitably in accordance with the ideals espoused at the SIC’s inception. The resulting 
bureaucracy was incapable of using officers’ analyses of local developments effectively. The 
overwrought emphasis on trade expansion mentioned in the foregoing chapter created a strain of 
political correctness that certain officers—particularly Nelson T. Johnson in China—were able to 
use in consolidating bureaucratic fiefdoms in the 1920s.  
 This bureaucratic consolidation and turf demarcation coincided with changing American 
attitudes towards the role of their government abroad. Americans in China were beginning to 
expect the U.S. government to take a more forceful role in the protection of their lives and 
property.  The coincidence of this change with the aforementioned establishment of Foreign 
Service fiefdoms led to the emergence of a talented (and arrogant) but (initially) marginalized 
group of officers who envisioned an alternate route for American policy in China and East Asia.  
  These were the oddballs of the Far East Division and they clashed with their hardball 
supervisors, who were the ideological and political gatekeepers of these circles of influence.  
One such collision was the acrimony between Nelson Johnson and Ernest Price concerning the 
latter’s views of American policy in China and his tendency to air his opinions among other 
Americans in his consular district.  In a discussion with Price in 1927 concerning both his service 
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record and his views on American policy, Nelson Johnson quoted a portion of one of Price’s own 
dispatches back to him:  
 
“I would be remiss in my duty if I did not also record . . . the practically unanimous belief 
of Americans in this district that their Government has utterly failed in its duty in not 
having adopted, enunciated and carried through a definite policy with respect to 
Americans and their rights and interests in China.  There are those who feel that the 
Government should have protected them.  There are those who feel that it should not 
have protected them.  But there appears to be no disagreement on the principle that the 
Government should either have told  Americans that they should get out of China, and 
assisted them to do so, or should have told them they might stay, and assisted them to do 
so.”255   
 
 Price felt that he had been passed over for promotion because of his alleged tendency to 
be “critical of the Department of this Government’s policies in China.  I [Johnson] said that at 
the time I felt that Mr. Price had not agreed with the Department in what it was trying to do in 
China and that . . . he had allowed his feelings to be expressed in some of his views.”256  Even if 
there was ample justification for doing so, criticism of the Department or U.S. government 
policy to outsiders was inexcusable.  According to Johnson, the Department welcomed internal 
criticism and disagreements over policy, so long as it was meticulously reasoned, professionally 
argued: in 1927 Johnson urged Price to elaborate his suggestions on what American policy 
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should be.  According to Johnson Price declined petulantly, saying “that I would understand that 
had to face now question of making a living and that he expected to get out of these questions the 
means to make his living.”257 
 It was Price’s attitude that held him back.  He was consistently given low ratings in 
“Service Spirit” and “Loyalty.”258  In 1921, Inspector Eberhardt observed presciently that Price 
“may always be a difficult man to handle in the Service, but on the other hand, he has made 
perhaps the best progress in the [Chinese] language of any of the younger men and possibly as 
good as any of the older.”259  Despite being a talented officer with an exceptional command of 
spoken and written Chinese,260 a below-satisfactory rating in personal character sank his overall 
scores into the mid 80s.261  This meant that he was eligible for promotion and ensured that other 
officers would be promoted before him.  
 Following his meeting with Johnson, Price changed his mind concerning his resignation 
repeatedly, in March 1928 he rescinded his resignation (he had submitted his resignation in 
February, 1927), and then in May 1929 he offered his resignation again.262 His waffling further 
reinforced the Personnel Board’s low regard for his manner and ensured that this time his 
resignation was accepted. 263 In light of Price’s behavior (particularly in comparison with the 
other “China Service” officers), the Personnel Board’s assessment of him seems appropriate: 
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“lacks in balance and tact; is impatient and apt to arrive at incorrect conclusions through bias or 
temper; is self-centered.”264  His letters and conversations suggest a tendency for asinine quarrels 
and an irascible attitude towards peers and senior officials. 
 Price’s complaints were typical for American officers in China.265  He simply grumbled 
louder than most.  The record of Clarence Jerome (“Jerry”) Spiker offers a useful basis for 
comparison.  They entered the Foreign Service as Student Interpreters on the same day, April 4, 
1914.266  Price was promoted to Consul Class VI in 1921 and to Class VII 1924; meanwhile, 
Spiker was promoted to Consul Class VI in 1923, Class VII in 1924, and then again in 1925 and 
1927.  Through a bureaucratic error, Spiker had also received paper promotions in May and 
August of 1918, with substantial pay increases.267  It is impossible that institutional prejudice 
could have caused the discrepancy: Price had earned his bachelor’s degree from Rochester 
University, NY, whereas Spiker had graduated from George Washington University.268  Any 
discrimination on this score seems unlikely however, as the inspector for the Far East region in 
1923 (and several subsequent years) was Nelson Johnson, who possessed no college degree at all 
and who criticized Price at least as harshly as other inspectors.269 The most likely reason for 
Price’s comparatively sluggish promotions was criticism from Johnson and other inspectors 
concerning his trade promotion work, as well as the general perception of too intimate a 
connection with the American missionary community.     
                                            
264 Edward J. Norton (Department of State, Office of Foreign Personnel), to Wilbur Carr, November 1, 1927, Ernest 
B. Price, OPF, NPRC, NARA. 
265 J.V.A. MacMurray to Secretary of State via Naval Radio no. 404, May 20, 1929, Ernest B. Price, OPF, NPRC, 
NARA. 
266 “Ernest Batson Price” [untitled service abstract, no date]; “Clarence J. Spiker,” [untitled service abstract, no date] 
OPFs, NPRC, NARA. 
267 Ibid.  
268 Ibid. 
269 Nelson T. Johnson, “Inspector’s Rating of Officer, “Ernest Batson Price, Foochow, China,” April 18, 1923.   See 
also Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson, 6. 
101	
	
	
  
Purging the Old: Presaging the “Persecution” of the Young China Hands, 1930-1941 
 
 Inspections and annual efficiency reports were the determining factors in assigning 
officers’ individual efficiency ratings, whereby they were compared with other officers and 
promoted (or not).  Officers’ personnel files suggest personality, adding color and depth to the 
ratings and efficiency reports and highlighting officers’ agency and voice.  This alone is an 
important contribution.  The Foreign Service personnel system was in the process of 
professionalization throughout the period under review, but old attitudes and practices persisted. 
 One of the most prominent of these was that officers should not criticize their superiors, 
the State Department, or the United States government—especially to outsiders—and that 
officers should refrain from making political statements.  When officers violated these principles, 
there were easy ways of removing them from the Service.  In the case of Ernest Price, this was 
accomplished through dilatory promotion (albeit less intentionally than in other cases, given 
Price’s linguistic talent).  When there was no evidence of insubordination (as previously noted, 
Price gave abundant indications of this), a drummed up charge of drunkenness (or implication of 
it) was enough to force an officer to resign. 
 This had particularly tragic consequences in the case of George C. Hanson, who 
committed suicide rather than be drummed out of the Service. Like Nelson T. Johnson, George 
C. Hanson was one of the hardballs of the young American Foreign Service. He was dynamic, 
gregarious and convivial, an aficionado of languages and connoisseur of cultures with a 
journalist’s affinity for alcohol.270  Before committing suicide, Hanson spent twenty-five years in 
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the Service, the bulk of which he spent in China, Manchuria, and the Soviet Union. He was a 
graduate of Cornell University (Mechanical Engineering)271 appointed as Student Interpreter in 
1909, and was arguably the most linguistically gifted Foreign Service officer ever to emerge 
from its ranks.  Not only did he learn Mandarin through the ordinary Student Interpreter course, 
but he was one of the few students in his age group to complete all of the prescribed exams for 
the Student Interpreters Corps, establishing an exceptional degree of fluency.272  Hanson also 
learned other Chinese “dialects” (actually distinct languages, for example the Foochow dialect), 
paying for lessons at his own expense;273 later in his career he also studied Russian and learned 
to speak it fluently.274  
 Hanson built up an unparalleled popularity (for a relatively minor Foreign Service 
officer) among American journalists.275  Part of the reason for this was that he was stationed as 
consul in Harbin, China, for over ten years—an unusually long time at one post even for a 
“China Service” officer.276  George Sokolsky observed, “in the field, E. S. Cunningham in 
Shanghai, Willys R. Peck in Nanking, and George C. Hanson in Harbin and other various cities 
represent the most efficient consular officers of any service in China.”277  Like many other 
consular officers, whenever Hanson returned to the United States (on leave or official business), 
he met with prominent businessmen in cities such as San Francisco, Seattle, Chicago, and 
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others.278  These meetings were usually arranged in advance, with either the businessmen 
themselves, or the Department of Commerce on their behalf, contacting the State Department 
requesting their attendance.279 
 The accusations against Hanson did not specify being intoxicated but rather cited conduct 
“unbecoming to a gentleman,” at a luncheon held at the American-Russian Chamber of 
Commerce in New York.280  Although this luncheon appears to have been given “in his honor,” 
he arrived obscenely late, as the event was concluding, and gave a candid personal appraisal of 
economic developments in the Soviet Union during his time there.281 
 The charges against Hanson led to an internal State Department investigation which, 
although kept secret, revealed a very colorful underbelly of the Foreign Service. According to 
Samuel Harper’s account, the conduct of certain senior members of the American legation staff 
was notorious in Moscow, that there had been “so much drinking and carousing” that they were 
no longer permitted in the main dining room of the Hotel Metropole.”282  Striving to remain 
impartial, Wilbur Carr noted at the conclusion of his memo (to which these letters were attached) 
that “it should be borne in mind that Harper thinks Bullitt should not have been appointed 
ambassador” [to the Soviet Union].283  
 Taking all this into consideration, it is likely Hanson consumed alcohol on the occasion 
in question, perhaps even liberally.  However, this does not seem to have greatly affected his 
judgment or the impression he made upon most of the attendees.  For example, Henry S. Beal of 
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the Sullivan Machinery Company (Chicago, IL) praised Hanson’s speech and requested that 
Hanson “come to Chicago as I believe there are many manufacturers who have in years past 
done business with Russia, and who hope to do so again, who would appreciate meeting him and 
receiving the latest news from Russia.”284  Beal seems to have been entirely unaware that Hanson 
had been charged with misconduct.     
 Given the circumstances, it is likely that Hanson had been drinking, and, having rubbed 
shoulders with Russians for so long, it is scarcely more of a stretch to believe that he may even 
have done so copiously on this occasion (and others).  However, overindulgence in alcohol does 
not seem to have been the real issue in this case. Moreover, as mentioned above, Professor 
Harper and others had cast similar aspersions of liberal wine bibbing, womanizing, and “anti-
Soviet” sentiment upon William C. Bullitt without prompting any sort of similar furor.285  On the 
contrary, evidence suggests that some of Hanson’s comments angered wealthy businessmen with 
ties to the Roosevelt administration—those who had a vested interest in expanding Soviet-
American trade, regardless of the economic wisdom of such enterprise.   
 P. D. Wagoner of the Underwood-Elliot-Fisher Company (New York) observed to 
Wilbur Carr,  
 
 “it has come to my attention that there has been some adverse criticism of the 
 conduct and remarks of Mr. George C. Hanson, First Secretary of our Embassy in 
 Moscow at a recent small intimate luncheon of the Directors of the American-
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 Russian Chamber of Commerce, at which Mr. Hanson was kind enough to give us 
 some very interesting information as to present conditions in Russia.”286 
 
Wagoner noted further, “it was definitely understood that this was to be a very small luncheon 
and not to be reported in any way, and being as it were, a round table discussion, it is very 
surprising to me that any one should have made any such reports as I understand were made.”287 
 There is no formal record of the charges against George C. Hanson in his personnel file, 
only of an investigation and its aftermath.  In the absence of explicit documentation, the crux of 
these accusations appears to be that Hanson, while intoxicated, made certain, “anti-Soviet” 
statements that offended other attendees.288  According to Wagoner however, the strongest 
statement of Hanson “was that Russia today seemed to be moving in the direction of State 
capitalism . . . in other words, that the State was furnishing the capital for industry, rather than 
private investors.”289 
 After Reeve Schley’s complaint concerning Hanson’s conduct and speech, A. M. 
Hamilton of the American Locomotive Sales Corporation wrote to Hanson, observing that 
although his speech “did not constitute the vaguely pleasant generalities that are usual in large 
public gatherings, there was nothing which I, as a sincere friend and admirer of the U.S.S.R., 
would criticise [sic] you for.”290  Neither did the Russians criticize Hanson.  On the contrary, 
after he had served in Harbin, China, for five years, the Novosti Zhizni (local Russian-language 
newspaper) declared, “there is no doubt but that Mr. Hanson is the most popular of all consuls 
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who have ever worked in North Manchuria.  While jealously guarding the interests of 
Americans, Mr. Hanson has at the same time shown himself to be an impartial and fair judge . . 
..”291 
 In addition, a brief exchange between William C. Bullitt and Samuel N. Harper 
(professor of History at the University of Chicago) suggests that Harper had strongly criticized 
Hanson (implicitly for being anti-Soviet), and possibly Bullitt.  The first U.S. ambassador to the 
Soviet Union noted, “I think it is only fair to you to let you know that various highly critical 
statements with regard to members of the Mission in Moscow are being attributed to you in 
Washington.”292  Harper responded that “when questioned by responsible members of the State 
Department regarding the policies, practices, and personnel of the American Mission in Moscow, 
I gave freely and frankly my views, based on my observations and best judgment.”293 During the 
departmental investigation, while noting that Hanson’s “behavior during convivial evenings” 
was “apt to be indiscreet” and that Hanson was “entirely unable to get to appointments on time,” 
William C. Bullitt strongly opposed Hanson’s expulsion from service. 294 Bullitt’s and dozens of 
other letters were placed in his personnel file, exonerating him from any wrongdoing.  
 Following the State Department hearings stemming from the fracas over the New York 
luncheon, Hanson was assigned to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as Consul General, but for health 
reasons was unable to depart for his post. On August 8th, 1935, the Personnel Board decided to 
separate him from the Foreign Service, before he had had a chance to bring up his efficiency 
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rating, before he had even arrived at his post.295 At that point, he committed suicide.296 After 
Hanson’s suicide, the Department was on the public relations defensive for months, with Foreign 
Service Personnel officials and Secretary of State Cordell Hull insisting repeatedly that the 
critics did not possess all of the facts, alleged “persecution” of Hanson was fictitious, and 
reiterating that Hanson had indeed misbehaved.297   
 An administrative conspiracy to get rid of an officer who had caused embarrassment, 
however unintentionally, was hardly unusual for early 20th century American bureaucracy. 
However, Hanson’s case underscores the difficulties facing a relatively small bureaucracy 
striving for professionalization.  Administration was personal, standards of deportment were high 
(particularly for senior officers such as Hanson), and even the rumor of misconduct could doom 
an officer if he offended the wrong people—particularly businessmen.  
 In Hanson’s case, Wilbur Carr and other Consular Bureau administrators were 
overzealous in their discipline. However, at times they could also be overly lax, allowing 
deficiencies to accumulate until circumstances compelled action. One such instance involved the 
forced retirement of Percival Heintzleman, which, just as in the case of Hanson, resulted in his 
suicide. Like Hanson, Heintzleman had been one of the earliest appointees to the Student 
Interpreters Corps. Unlike dynamic and gregarious hardballs such as Hanson, Johnson, and 
others, Heintzleman was an oddball. He was reclusive in his personal habits and, as mentioned 
above, had a reputation for being effeminate.298 He was not a good mixer: while stationed in 
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Hankow, Heintzleman avoided giving dinner parties and other social events avidly, so much so 
that the business community complained to the State Department about the state of affairs.299  
 Diplomatic customs required that consular officers entertain and be entertained, often at 
significant cost to themselves, as the Department only provided reimbursement for expenses 
deemd actual and necessary. This put great strain on officers like Percival Heintzelman, who, 
unlike his foreign counterparts, did not receive an entertainment allowance.300 Because of this, 
they were often viewed as recluse even though their anti-social tendencies were driven by 
financial worry.301 Unlike Hanson, a single officer, Heintzleman had a family to think about and 
could not afford to entertain as much as an officer with fewer personal obligations.  
  In addition, Heintzleman was not well liked and tended to impugn lower ranking officers 
for the failings of his post, inevitably leading to ill-will between him and his subordinates. 
Officers such as Nelson T. Johnson had used trade expansion as political correctness to protect 
and advance themselves, but Heintzleman had been content to remain a mid-ranking functionary.  
 Unfortunately, despite this being the very stated aim of the SIC, Chinese proficiency and 
familiarity with Chinese politics was insufficient to sustain career officers in the Foreign Service. 
The Far East Division was interested not only in language-trained individuals but also in those 
with leadership abilities. It lacked the institutional capacity to sustain officers whose abilities 
could be best used in intermediary roles. In this milieu, the proliferation of prima donnas was not 
only inevitable; it also led to the ideological schisms that will be examined in later chapters. 
 Heintzleman was the quintessential example of the bureaucratic functionary. He was 
disliked but inspectors (including Nelson T. Johnson) could find nothing but general attitudes to 
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criticize. For example, even while noting that Heintzleman had never been insubordinate, one 
inspector (most likely Johnson) noted that his office had “never radiated service spirit”—and 
then promptly observed that “it cannot be said that he does not give all of his waking time to his 
office and to his conception of the demands of the Department.”302     
 Heintzleman was transferred out of China to Winnipeg, Canada, in 1925.303 Suspecting 
that his assignment to Canada implied that he had performed poorly in China, Heintzleman wrote 
to Wilbur Carr, asking for an explanation.304 Carr’s reply to Heintzleman indicated that 
Heintzleman had been transferred out of China for health reasons.305 However, four years later 
(after Heintzleman contacted his Congressional representative to inquire on his behalf), Carr 
wrote that Heintzleman had been removed from China for failing to make contacts “essential to 
the proper performance of highly responsible duties.”306 
 Some of Heintzleman’s deficiencies appear early in his record, concomitant with Nelson 
T. Johnson beginning his stint as Inspector in the early 1920s. It is obvious from his record that 
Johnson never liked Heintzleman, and it is possible that T.M. Wilson’s animosity towards him in 
the 1930s derived from Heintzleman’s contemptuous treatment of a non-language-trained officer 
in the China service.307 It is impossible to know, however, judging solely from Heintzleman’s 
personnel record, to what degree his eventual forced expulsion from the service derived from his 
occasionally documented deficiencies in the service and to what degree it derived from the fact 
that he was disliked. In any case, SIC administrators had many opportunities to correct 
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Heintzleman’s deficiencies throughout the 1920s, but did not do so. His expulsion may have 
been the result of his nemeses’ confluence of fortunate positions, or it may have merely been a 
long-delayed realization of the inevitable. In either case, his forced exodus heralded the ability of 
the Department to expel officers whose characters and views did not mesh with those of senior 
administrators. 
 It is impossible to state whether the removal of Heintzleman from the China field was the 
result of his incompetence (that certainly seems to have played a role); however, his eventual 
expulsion from the Foreign Service seems to have been the result of an agreement between a 
number of influential individuals within the Far East Division. Stanley K. Hornbeck opposed 
both his reinstatement in the China field and his assignment to the Far East Division in 
Washington D.C.308 
 Finally, although Heintzleman had repeatedly been rated “average,” on December 27, 
1932, he was notified that he had been rated “unsatisfactory.”309 This letter purported that 
Heintzleman’s performance was unsatisfactory, but his personnel file indicates that not only had 
the Personnel Board exaggerated his negative performance at this juncture his service had been 
satisfactory and Heintzleman improved his performance after the “unsatisfactory” rating, as 
required by regulation.  
 Despite this, the Personnel Board maintained the rating—and this after 30 years of 
service.310 Heintzleman’s rating from 1931 through 1933 was “average,” the minimum required 
for promotion to higher grades as positions became available.311 In 1932, the Personnel Division 
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compiled a list of negative comments about Heintzelman drawn from two decades of service.312 
The two chief complaints about him were “lack of force” (chiefly from Nelson T. Johnson) and 
not sufficiently mingling with local Americans.313  The letter of clarification of this rating, 
requested by Heintzleman, stated only that his service had been “adversely affected by defects, 
largely of character and personality,” that had appeared “throughout” his career. The signature 
line of this letter has been smudged out.314  
 It is probably no coincidence that the Personnel Board considered Heintzleman’s fate at 
the same time it considered that of Hanson. From handwritten notes in Heintzleman’s personnel 
file it is apparent that Wilbur Carr, Nathaniel P. Davis, and T.M. Wilson all tried to persuade 
Heintzleman to retire on his own, yet his stubbornness and pride precluded such a measure. It is 
hardly a leap of logic to infer that the Personnel Board simply wished to get rid of Heintzleman, 
yet the manner in which it did so called into question its objectivity and competence, presaging 
the fate of younger officers who would wear the epitaph “China Hands” more ubiquitously (as 
well as the forced retirement of officers such as Johnson and Hornbeck, as will be noted later). 
Like Hanson, Heintzelman seems to have intended to commit suicide upon learning that he was 
being forced out after several decades in the Foreign Service, but did not actually carry out the 
act and died in 1942.315 
 If the records of officers such as John Paton Davies, O. Edmund Clubb, John Hall 
Paxton, John Carter Vincent, Arthur Ringwalt, and Raymond P. Ludden (not to mention others) 
are to be fully understood, they must be understood in the context those of their predecessors 
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such as George Hanson and Percival Heintzleman, not to mention the role of World War II in 
recasting the long term foreign policy outlook of the United States.  True professionalization of 
the Foreign Service did not begin in earnest until after World War II. The development of the 
SIC during the early decades of the 20th provided the bureaucratic contours; within these it was 
not uncommon for officers to be pushed out of the service for various reasons, deserved or 
undeserved. 
In this vein, Stuart Fuller noted that Student interpreters often experienced delays in 
promotions even after fulfilling all the exam requirements, as the State Department based the 
promotion schedule on the date the exam results were mailed to the Department rather than on 
the date exams were passed.316 Similarly, A 1923 rating sheet deprecating Remillard for gaps in 
his knowledge of U.S. law and Consular regulations made such assertions as that he “thought his 
allowance of $5.00 while traveling was averaged;” he wrote the Consulate General to ask if 
drafts drawn for the relief of sailors should be on the Secretary of Treasury; and not long ago 
received a letter of nearly three pages long from the General Accounting Office listing items on 
his travel account “that he should have known better than to charge to the Government.”317 If, as 
one inspector observed in 1921, “it is plainly stated that Remillard was downright lazy.”318 
Remillard’s personnel records read more unfavorably than many of his SIC-China peers. Why, 
then, was he able to escape the administrative chopping block when so of his peers did not?  
Institutional whim was probably the answer, and it could cut both ways. In Remillard’s 
case, it worked in his favor. For Percival Heintzelman, the opposite was true. In the 1930s, the 
Personnel Board  Heintzelman’s performance was unsatisfactory, but his file indicates that not 
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only did the Personnel Board exaggerate his negative traits, he improved his performance 
subsequent to the “unsatisfactory” rating. Despite this, the Personnel Board continued the 
rating—and this after 30 years of service.319 It is hardly a leap of logic to infer that the Personnel 
Board simply wished to get rid of him. Samuel Sokobin observed that American merchants 
should make “greater efforts to reach Chinese markets directly. This is one of the principle 
reasons for Japan’s success in the Chinese market.”320 
 The institutional priority of trade expansion thus pervaded the Foreign Service, from 
Congressional committee postulation to consular secretary implementation.  This priority 
influenced pay, promotions, and personnel transfers, as well as personal relationships within the 
Service.  As will be discussed later, this overwrought emphasis often eclipsed many of the other 
vital (yet sometimes intangible) services that language-trained officers provided to American 
citizens.   
 Examination of these officers’ careers confirms Michael Schaller’s claim that “the 
American response to [Chinese revolution in the 1930s and 1940s] was disjointed, contradictory, 
and almost totally incapable of achieving positive results.”321  However, this chaotic response 
was not due to a lack of accurate information but rather to the abject lack of an imperial plan. 
Whatever plan for informal economic empire that may have existed at the inception of the SIC 
had all but evaporated, maintaining only the most tenuous existence in the minds of senior State 
Department and Foreign Service administrators, who, by the end of the second World War, 
found themselves being pushed out of the Foreign Service in the late 1940s in same way that 
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they had expurgated officers in the 1930s.  In other words, the specific imperial vision of the 
Foreign Service architects had dissipated by the 1930s, but the imperial diplomatic 
administration they had constructed was quickly adopted and turned against them by their 
ideological progeny on both sides of the American political divide, who had been waiting for just 
such an opportunity. Junior-ranking consular officers throughout China forwarded volumes of 
information to their superiors, thereby supplying the basis for the regular reports of American 
Ministers such as Gauss, MacMurray, and Johnson.  Far more than the Minister, it was junior 
Foreign Service officers—most often as language-trained Consuls—who influenced the United 
States view of China during the period under scrutiny.  During the 1940s (partly due to their role 
in  WWII), junior officers had begun to eclipse their institutional forbears in China. 
 It is worth noting that the significance of language-trained officers in the Far East 
Division was not due to elite status.  On the contrary, even the “good old boys” of the “China 
Service” were neither political nor financial elites—at least, not in the sense that “New Left” 
scholars such as Thomas J. McCormick described them, as either “those social elements with the 
most direct power [original emphasis] to influence national decisions and alter events, and/or 
those who controlled property and affected the social relationships that flowed from that 
control.322”  Eileen P. Scully has similarly asserted, “the unwillingness of groups in the United 
States to divert substantial resources to the imperial project forced the government to pursue 
empire ‘on the cheap’ through an alliance with collaborator elites, who themselves struggled to 
gain or retain authority in their own societies.”323  
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 So far as concerns the “China Service,” the connections between economic power and 
political influence were sporadic and incidental at best.  Most frequently, the closest ties between 
businessmen and the exponents of the United States’ China policies were the low-level consular 
field officers described here, those with the very least ability to nudge policy in any particular 
direction whatsoever. The low-ranking “China Hands” were often the whipping boys of the 
Foreign Service.  Unfairly treated through crude administration, inadequate compensation, and 
dilatory promotions, their justified complaints earned them a reputation for being whiners.   
Inundated with directives to advance American trade and search out new opportunities, their 
efforts in this regard were often ignored (from a personnel standpoint) if not rebuked. Paul 
Gordon Lauren has observed that the China Hands “had to deal with the difficult problem of 
what public officials should do when they believe their government is wrong.”324  They also had 
to reconcile differences between government policies and the priorities of local resident 
Americans. 
 This was easier said than done, for officers were expected at once to mingle with and yet 
remain aloof from local American business and missionary circles. Those who remained at 
particular posts for too long or remained in country for many years without returning to the 
United States on leave became suspect. Inspectors believed that long foreign residence meant 
that consular officers gradually lost touch with American economic and political 
developments.325  Similarly, if an officer remained too long in one location, he was suspected of 
“going native.”  This fear was so ingrained in the minds of senior State Department officials that 
officers alluded to it as a weapon in bureaucratic squabbles.  Following the 1923 earthquake in 
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Japan, Nelson T. Johnson described Erle R. Dickover (another officer whom he disliked) as “a 
part of the foreign community in which he is living, and appears to feel that is necessary for him 
to interpret . . . the feelings and desires of that community and to mediate in their behalf.”326   
 By the end of WWII, most senior officers of the China and Japan branches had been 
targeted for retirement, whether mandatory or voluntary. Personnel files indicate that in 1945, 
Foreign Service officers working in either China or the Far East Division in Washington feared 
for their careers.  Already underway in 1941, the “purge” of the China hands was as much a 
voluntary evacuation as a calculated witch-hunt. By 1945, many officers such as George 
Atcheson Jr. had sought transfers out of the China field, posing a dilemma for Foreign Service 
personnel administrators. For example, Nathaniel P. Davis (Chief of the Division of Foreign 
Service Personnel) noted plans to transfer George Atcheson Jr. to the Far East Division, 
commenting, “this is alright with him although he says frankly that if there were not a war on he 
would ask for an assignment as far removed from Chinese affairs as possible.”327  
 Part of the driving impetus in this regard was the hostility of Ambassador Patrick Hurley. 
According to Nathaniel P. Davis of the Personnel Division, George Atcheson urged the 
replacement of all the China officers of his cohort, to protect them from Hurley’s venom, but the 
lack of experienced, Chinese-trained officers made doing so expeditiously impossible.328 
 It was about the lack of transfers such as Atcheson’s that Hurley later blasted: 
 
“I requested the relief of the career men . . . who were opposing the American policy in 
the Chinese Theater of war. These professional diplomats were returned to Washington 
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and placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department as my 
supervisors. Some of these same career men whom I relieved have been assigned as 
supervisors to the Supreme Commander in Asia. In such positions most of them have 
continued to side with the Communist armed party and at times with the imperialist bloc 
against American policy.”329 
   
 Hurley’s venom derived in part, from the telegram that Atcheson sent to the State 
Department on February 28th, 1945, while Hurley had returned to Washington D.C. for 
consultation.  During the firestorm that erupted after Hurley’s resignation, Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 7th, 
1945, which was released to the press as a Department of State Radio Bulletin.  A copy of this 
was placed in Atcheson’s file, probably to prevent future charges of insubordination on the basis 
of this incident.  Byrnes observed, “the phase of that policy [American policy toward China] 
upon which Ambassador Hurley has placed the greatest emphasis is our support of the National 
Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.”330 
Byrnes further noted, “the propriety of Mr. Atcheson’s telegram can be determined only 
against the background of the events in China which preceded it.”  Noting that Atcheson had 
taken charge of the mission in Chungking, Byrnes stated,  
 
“the officer in charge of an American mission in a foreign country bears the 
responsibility for full and accurate reporting of the factors and events which are 
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necessary to the intelligent formulation and execution of United States foreign policy . . . 
if his reports and recommendations are to be useful, it is clear that they must reflect his 
free and honest judgment.  In the case of an Ambassador, these considerations have 
always been taken for granted. They have been equally taken for granted in the case of 
the officer who assumes charge during the absence of the Ambassador.”331 
 
Referring to John S. Service’s memorandum of October 10th, 1944, Byrnes stressed, “at the time 
this memorandum was prepared by Mr. Service, he was not attached to the Embassy at 
Chungking . . . he was attached to the staff of General Stilwell as a political observer in 
Yenan.”332  Furthermore, Byrnes emphasized, Hurley was not yet the United States Ambassador 
to China; he was a special envoy of the President, with the diplomatic rank of Ambassador.  A 
fine point perhaps.  Nevertheless, Byrnes emphasized, “under these circumstances, it cannot be 
said that anything Mr. Service wrote constituted insubordination to Ambassador Hurley.”333 
 The possibility of disloyalty still existed however.  Byrnes observed, “the other complaint 
of Ambassador Hurley is that some official or employee did not merely express a different view 
to his superior officer, but advised someone associated with the Communist forces that the 
Ambassador did not accurately represent United States policy [emphasis added].  For such 
action there would be no excuse.  I would be the first to condemn it and to dismiss the person 
guilty of it.  But Ambassador Hurley has not furnished me, nor do I understand that he has 
                                            
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid. 
119	
	
	
furnished this Committee, any evidence to prove that any employee was guilty of such 
conduct.”334    
 The Amerasia case underscores that when officers were willing to defy superiors and 
regulations alike, and this aroused the ire of fellow officers.  Initially, Joseph Ballantine (a 
graduate of the SIC in Japan who spent most of his career in the Japanese Empire and 
Manchuria), observed in his reminiscences the “fellows stationed as Stilwell’s advisors . . . were 
young people, very little experienced in political affairs, they couldn’t see the whole picture as 
we, in the Department of State, saw it.”335  As Ballantine understood it, these officers were duty-
bound to report the situation in Communist-occupied territories as they saw it, but “when they 
found they were overruled in their ideas, instead of saying either ‘aye aye sir, at your orders, or 
resigning, they started to build a fire under their superior officer by going outside.”336  
 Meanwhile, Ballantine and his colleague Eugene Dooman opposed efforts to force the 
Japanese to transpose an American university system “into every prefecture,” as well as the 
pressure to get rid of the Emperor.337  Ballantine eventually resigned because of his differences 
with senior State Department officials, particularly Dean Acheson, Willard Thorpe, and 
Archibald McLeish, believing that his views no longer received any currency.338 
 The personal as well as political views of a superior had a profound influence on the 
careers of many officers in both the China and Japan services. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of 
the Far Eastern Division, said of Dooman in 1934 (while assigned to the State Department in 
1933), “he is of that school whose members make or endeavor to make a clear-cut distinction 
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between a man’s rights and obligations as an officer of the Government and his rights and 
obligations as a private individual.”339 Unless specifically requested to do so, while stationed in 
Washington, Dooman did not bring work home or work overtime.340 
 That had not been the case nine years earlier, while serving in Tokyo as Assistant 
Japanese Secretary.  According to Ambassador Charles MacVeagh, for six months in 1926, “Mr. 
Dooman was the only officer of any kind who could read and speak Japanese, and necessarily he 
was constantly called upon by myself, the Counselor and the two Secretaries to translate, 
interpret, advise and explain about things Japanese which came before us for immediate 
decision.”341 
 It is within this context that the “China Hands” and their observations of Chinese politics 
must be understood.  Early and late, language-trained middlemen accurately outlined political 
and economic conditions in China.  Ernest B. Price, for example, asserted in 1929 that “it is hard 
to avoid the suspicion that there is no hard-and-fast line dividing the Communist Party and a very 
considerable though still indeterminate element in the Left Wing of the Kuomintang . . . on 
practically all sides and by men of judgment and ability it is expressed the fear that the 
Communist Party is not dead”342  
 Furthermore, according to Price, in 1929, “the great bulk of the Radical Opposition are 
not staking everything, in fact are counting little, on gaining control of the government by legal 
means through obtaining a majority in the Third National Congress; for it is by now reasonably 
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clear that the Government has already arranged to ‘pack’ the Congress with Moderates and 
supporters of the Government.”343 
 Having already submitted his resignation, Price observed of the Communist-Kuomintang 
tensions: “that a test of serious proportions is bound to come is admitted by all sides, but the 
Government seems, on the whole, surprisingly sanguine of the outcome.”344 However accurate 
his prognostications, it must be remembered that Price had an unparalleled reputation as a 
whiner.  When assessing the efficiency of Meryl. S. Myers for example, an anonymous 
administrator asserted, “except for V.C. Price, there does not seem to be an officer in China with 
so badly disjointed a nose or with so persistent and loud a wail, and criticism of the Department 
and its methods.”345  Despite the justice of many of their complaints senior officials came to 
view them through this unfortunate lens. The predictions of Price, on the way out the door as it 
were, were to be taken with a grain of salt. 
 Thus, by the mid-1930s, a solid, functioning bureaucracy had developed, within which 
the Far East Division (to which the China, Japan, Ottoman Empire/Turkey/Middle East missions 
were subordinate) was just one cog among many. Within the Far East Division, two clusters of 
influence emerged, one in Beijing, the other in Tokyo. During and after WWII, some tensions 
developed between members of the China and Japan services, but these appear to have been 
personal, rather than purely policy-related, and were just as common as were personal grudges 
within the various divisions of the Foreign Service.  In 1943, according to his personnel file 
Dooman was fed up with the Far East Division.  According to an untitled memorandum stamped, 
“G. Howland Shaw,” [Dooman] said that he knew “more about Japan than any other person in 
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this country and that he could not see where his knowledge could be utilized in the State 
Department.  FE [Far East Division], he says, is out of the question.”346  The reason for this was 
his “strong antipathy to serving in the Far Eastern Division under the former Office Director, Mr. 
Hornbeck . . ..”347   
 A few months later, Nathaniel P. Davis noted that Dooman was reluctant to take another 
assignment under Joseph Grew, mentioning that he “said he had given the best in him for Mr. 
Grew who got all the credit and he wasn’t keen to resume that status.  I told him he had better 
take the present assignment and let the future take care of itself.”348 The position of Minister to 
Thailand was open in July, 1945, and several senior officers from both the China and Japan 
services were nominated, Willys R. Peck and Joseph W. Ballantine were among those 
considered.  According to Nathaniel P. Davis, “Ballantine indicated pretty plainly that he had 
misgivings as to the soundness of Peck’s judgment, particularly under pressure.  He said his own 
preferences, if Peck cannot go, are Stanton or Dooman . . . I then said I thought he himself would 
be a good candidate; to which he replied . . . he was ready to serve wherever the Department 
could best use him.”349 The appointment went to Peck.350 
 
Plate Glass over the Open Door: Informal Empire on the Eve of the Pacific War 
 
 By the time the United States entered the Pacific War, trade expansion ideology had 
gradually withered as a form of political correctness, and several other issues were vying for 
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prominence. Language officers in the Far East division (China and Japan, primarily) clustered 
ideologically in several groups. Among the “China Hands,” one group included Nelson T. 
Johnson, Willys Peck, Julean Arnold, and other officers of the same generational cohort.  As 
Russell Buhite has observed, by the 1930s, Johnson believed that the United States needed a 
stronger policy toward Japan, which put him at odds with the Roosevelt administration.  Because 
of this, Johnson tended to express his opinions more often in private correspondence, as opposed 
to official dispatches.351  
  China officers within or connected to Johnson’s sphere of influence advocated a stronger 
US position against Japan (opposing Japanese expansion in China), anticipated the Communist 
threat to Chiang Kai-shek’s government, and were ambivalent towards the Kuomintang. They 
might easily be called the “old China Hands,” as they were a generation older than officers such 
as Edmund Clubb and John Service, who became much more notorious “China Hands” than their 
predecessors.  
 The young “China Hands” entered the Foreign Service as language officers in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, during a sea change in American attitudes toward the role of government 
in society. They had lower estimations of their obligations to the government than the elder 
China Hands and greater expectations of the government. Like their elder colleagues, they held 
mixed but overall ambivalent views of Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Their views toward the 
Communists were also mixed but in contrast to the Old China Hands, whichever side they 
supported, they advocated that the US government take a more active, direct role to aid that side.   
 Among the Japanese language officers, a similar grouping had developed as well, roughly 
consisting of Joseph Ballantine, Eugene Dooman, Erle R. Dickover, and several others, all linked 
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Ambassador Joseph Grew. Like their “old China Hands” peers, they had entered the SIC during 
the first decade of its existence in Japan (SIC Japan was established in1909), and were fiscally 
conservative. They were wary of a war with Japan—more so than the China Hands—and favored 
coming to an understanding with Japan regarding China. Smaller in number than the China 
Hands, the younger language officers in Japan did not clash with their elder colleagues as 
strongly, nor did they have the opportunities to develop and advocate their own policies as did 
the younger China Hands during the Pacific War.  These generational and ideological differences 
will be examined more closely in later chapters. Emphasis on trade expansion functioned as a 
form of political correctness from the establishment of the SIC until the mid 1930s. This had a 
more pronounced effect on the SIC and language officers in China than those in Japan. 
 As will be discussed in a later chapter, these differences eventually coalesced into 
differing, overt imperial policies. However, by the beginning of the 1940s, several salient 
features of the SIC and its graduates in China, Japan, and Turkey had emerged. First and 
foremost, trade expansion ideology had faded, functioning only as a limited form of political 
correctness with only a shadow of its former potency. Second, the bureaucracy that had emerged 
was personnel, whimsical, and capricious, simultaneously capable of harsh supervision and lax 
oversight and incapable of implementing any coherent imperial program. Bureaucratic suspicion 
of native employees further precluded American government collaboration with local 
commercial elites. Moreover, State Department and more importantly, Congressional apathy 
toward providing Consular entertainment and travel budgets diplomatic niceties hamstrung 
language officers’ ability to compete on an equal footing with their British, French, and Japanese 
rivals in building relationships with local elites—relationships that both students of imperialism 
and Sino-American relations scholars have repeatedly asserted are so vital to “informal 
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imperialism.”352 All of these factors together combined to plaster a thick layer of plate glass over 
the “Open Door,” temporarily frustrating American imperial ambitions and channeling them in 
other directions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OF “LITTLE VALUE IN THE EXPANSION OF AMERICAN TRADE” 353: SIC JAPAN, 
1906-1941 
 
The SIC in Japan was established in 1906, four years after that in China, and a year after 
the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Although not covered in this study, this 
language training program for American consular officers was soon followed by a parallel one 
for military officers, initiated in 1908 for Japanese language students and eventually expanded to 
China in 1919.354  These, as well as the SIC students and, upon graduation, consular officers 
became acquainted with an ascending, increasingly assertive and ambitious Japan. As will be 
seen in this chapter, these officers developed a unique understanding of Japan, its economy, 
foreign relations, and objectives in Asia. Like their counterparts in China, Japanese language 
officers became increasingly interventionist.  
As will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter, the influence of various SIC-Japan 
officers varied according to the contingencies of where they were posted and the particular 
expertise they developed, the perceptions of inspectors who visited the posts to which they were 
assigned, and their relationships to the officers who had the greatest degree of control over the 
flow of information to Washington D.C. The result was an SIC-Japan that was institutionally and 
culturally almost identical to SIC-China, but within which trade expansion received less de facto 
emphasis. Further removed from the fabled China market and under less pressure to advance 
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American trade in Japan than their colleagues were in the Chinese context, these officers tended 
to see an economically stable Japan as a higher priority than holding open the door for American 
trade in China. The differences between and among these groups of language-trained officers 
were primarily personal and generational. The ideological differences that became pronounced 
and eventually controversial involved postwar American policy for Japan and China.  
However, these will not be examined in detail. Rather, highlighting the historical 
contingencies that produced these differences, this chapter reinforces the argument that despite 
Open Door ideology, the United States had no plan for economic empire (or otherwise) in China, 
Japan, Japan, or Turkey during this period. Underscoring the ad hoc manner in which particular 
officers built up informational fiefdoms, this chapter also builds a case against the existence of a 
putative “foreign policy elite” intent on constructing such an empire. Modest as these assertions 
are, viewed through the even more humble lens of these American middlemen who never sought 
public approbation, these conclusions demand detailed and empirically-conscientious revision of 
such expansive claims as those of historians such as Walter LaFeber, who asserts in his Bancroft-
award winning monograph, “American society had become so fluid and disorderly after 1873 
that it also became imperialistic abroad to restore order at home.”355  
This dissertation suggests that in the case of China and Japan, historians such as William 
Appleman Williams, Thomas McCormick, and Walter LaFeber have placed too much emphasis 
on pronouncements by public figures and too little on the context—historical and economic—of 
such statements. The context provided by SIC-Japan officers reinforces the picture highlighted 
by their SIC-China colleagues: namely that despite US complicity in several different imperialist 
projects in China, American economic empire in China was a pathetic flop. As will be argued 
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later in greater detail, the SIC project itself can be best understood as one aspect of Elihu Root 
and Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to institutionalize and strengthen various components of the 
US federal government.  
However, the same contingencies that led to differing emphases in the Foreign Service 
also paved the way for rival imperialisms associated with what could be crudely described as the 
political left and right of American politics, alternate varieties of a uniquely American species of 
project-based imperialism offered as substitutes for the more traditional types that existed in 
Japan, China, the Ottoman Empire, and elsewhere. These alternate imperial blueprints were 
patterned according to the historically contingent understandings of China and Japan constructed 
over decades by SIC-trained officers. 
Examination of consular post inspection reports, post correspondence, personnel records 
and memoirs highlights a portrayal of Japan constructed more on the basis of contacts with 
Japanese diplomats than that developed by officers in China. Similar to their colleagues in China 
however, Japanese language officers who entered early in the program were generally those who 
rose the furthest in terms of rank, privilege, and influence. Scholars of American-Japanese 
relations will likely recognize Joseph Ballantine, Eugene Dooman, and Erle Dickover; less 
recognizable might be Max Kirjassoff, Edwin Neville, and John Caldwell, but even a cursory 
scan of State Department reports on Japan between 1910 and 1940 could hardly fail to produce 
an account written by one of these men, and it was from these men that the State Department—
and ultimately the office of the President—received a complex and nuanced picture of Japan’s 
economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. 
Like their counterparts in China, SIC officers in Japan were generally well-educated. As 
will be discussed briefly in individual cases, nearly all of them possessed bachelor degrees; a few 
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were children of missionaries, but the number was comparatively smaller than in China. Relative 
to the “China Service,” the US consular footprint in Japan was fairly small between 1909 and 
1941; the body of Student Interpreters there was similarly slight. For example, in 1922 there 
were seven student interpreters in China and three in Japan, and equal numbers were promoted 
(respectively) from Student Interpreter to Interpreter.356 In addition to these, in China, there were 
42 consular officers of the rank of Interpreter or higher; in Japan there were 18.357 Of these, 
seven began their careers as student interpreters in Japan compared to seventeen in China.358 It 
should be noted that from the turn of the century through the 1920s, Japan was a preferred 
posting to that of China. Nelson T. Johnson had hoped for Japan but received China.359 
Due to the presidential appointment system, student interpreter were listed as Diplomatic 
Officers until the 1924 Rogers Act; in addition to these formal students, the “China Service” 
contained three SIC-trained secretaries; the Japan service had two.360 In the same year there were 
seven American consular offices outside of Tokyo, three of which were outside of Japan proper 
(Dairen, Manchuria, Seoul, Korea, and Taibeku, Taiwan), compared to eighteen for China (not 
including Peking).361 Of the American consular offices in Japan, only two, Kobe and Yokohama, 
possessed more than two American consular officers, whereas in China, the offices of Shanghai, 
Tientsin, Chungking, Harbin, and Changsha had three or more consular officers (Shanghai had 
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nine, Tientsin six; Harbin, Changsha, and Chungking each had three), and many others had at 
least two, usually consisting a consul and vice-consul.362  
As in China, SIC students in Japan completed their prescribed two years of study in the 
capital (Tokyo for Japan, Beijing for China), but although the law provided for ten students in 
China, Japan, and Turkey, positions were filled based on vice-consul and consul vacancies. 
Consequently, more students were inducted into service as these vacancies became a available 
and the graduate Interpreters were promoted to vice consul, consul, etc. In Japan there were 
rarely more than two students at any given time (in Turkey there even less), whereas in China 
there would most often be five to seven from 1902 through the end of the 1920s. 
 These numbers highlight important realities that confronted actual and prospective 
Student Interpreters in China. First of all, as the Student Interpreters Corps had been created with 
a view to providing consular posts with language-trained Americans, greater potential for 
advancement necessarily existed for Chinese-trained officers than their Japanese-trained 
compatriots. Secondly, a large number of consular posts in China existed far away from Peking, 
whereas those in Japan were comparatively close to Tokyo. This reality afforded officers in 
China a greater degree of de facto autonomy in the performance of their duties in comparison to 
their SIC-Japan counterparts. The comparatively low number of language-trained US consular 
officers in Japan and the similarly low number of potential posts at which they could serve made 
the task of distinguishing themselves from non-language trained (or Chinese-trained) officers 
simpler. The smaller number and closer geographical and personal proximity of Japanese 
language students to the ambassador (for much of the time considered here it was Joseph C. 
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Grew) also meant that some individual Japanese language officers had greater potential influence 
in terms of policy than did their Chinese language counterparts.  
 This influence was concentrated at the top of the professional career path of the SIC. This 
will be discussed in greater detail below when examining the differences between SIC-trained 
officers in Japan and China. However, the majority of this section will focus on the “middle” 
officers of the SIC: those of vice-consul rank and higher, who served in provincial cities and 
constituted the backbone of the Foreign Service in China and Japan. One representative example 
of this type of officer in Japan is Erle R. Dickover. 
  Erle Dickover was born in Santa Barbara California in 1888, and is an excellent example 
of the talented but unappreciated middle of the language-trained Foreign Service officers in 
China, Japan, and Turkey.  He entered service in 1914 with a Bachelor’s degree from the 
University of California, and served over twenty of his thirty-five years (until his mandatory 
retirement in 1949) in Japan.363 Dickover’s personnel file shows that in addition to academic 
references, he received both commercial and political recommendations just to get the 
opportunity to take the examination (selection of examinees was by presidential designation, and 
remained political, despite claims that the examination system made individual merit the basis 
for appointments and promotion).  While seeking permission to take the exam, Dickover 
obtained endorsements the Santa Barbara Savings and Loan Bank, the president of the University 
of California, California Representatives Joseph R. Knowland, Everis Hayes and Julius Kahn, 
and Senator George Perkins.364 As with SIC-China, bureaucracy as well as politics obstructed the 
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path to appointments and advancements.  After passing the written examination, to his 
astonishment, Dickover failed the physical exam although, as he put it, he had “never been ill for 
a day in my life, with the exception of the usual diseases of childhood.” The reason he failed the 
physical is unclear, but he underwent it again with a different doctor and passed.365  
As with their counterparts in China, SIC-trained officers based in Japan were often 
reviewed by superiors who had scant contact with, or knowledge of their skills, abilities, and 
attitudes. Absent adverse action or personal prejudices, this meant that superiors tended to 
recommend that officers continue to serve in or return to service in the country where they had 
received language training. This meant that by the 1930s, American consular offices in Japan 
were primarily staffed by SIC-Japan trained American officers and host country nationals. As in 
China, the American officers in Japan who gained the greatest influence were those who won the 
most approbation from their superiors and State Department benefactors. 
 In this way SIC-Japan was nearly indistinguishable from SIC-China in terms of structure 
and administration. However, one important difference was that due to the comparatively small 
number of Japanese-trained officers and the greater number of consulates in China, State 
Department inspectors tended to be more familiar with and sympathetic to the priorities of SIC-
China. Whereas Nelson T. Johnson and Charles Eberhardt had many years of experience in 
China and inspectors such as Fleming Cheshire and Alfred Gottschalk traveled widely, visiting 
American consulates in China, Japan, and Turkey (as well as elsewhere), virtually no inspectors 
during the1910s, ‘20s, or ‘30s had a service background in Japan—although officers such as 
Edwin Neville, Joseph Ballantine, and Eugene Dooman did eventually hold positions of 
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significant responsibility, both in the US Embassy in Japan and later in the Far East Division at 
the State Department.  
However, this trend produced tensions between SIC-China and SIC-Japan. In the 1920s, 
these manifested themselves primarily as personality differences and banal disputes concerning 
the relative importance of trade expansion, commercial reporting, and other minor issues. Such 
rivalry often emerged out of differing interpretations of seemingly innocuous (to present readers) 
regulatory and legal matters, such as the matter of certifying shipping invoices.  Another such 
issue was the proper procedure for documenting the overseas marriages of American citizens.366  
As banal and trivial as such issues might seem to the casual reader, in many cases they were the 
exponents of issues existing between the “oddballs and hardballs” among these two groups of 
officers. As will be discussed later, SIC officers such as Nelson Johnson and Willys R. Peck 
maintained close personal friendships with each other as well as Stanley Hornbeck (an influential 
director of the Far East Division), whereas officers such as Joseph Ballantine, Eugene Dooman, 
and Edwin Neville were correspondingly close relationships. In some cases, these ties were 
closer than the bonds of blood: Joseph Ballantine assumed custody of SIC-Japan officer Max 
Kirjassoff’s children when the latter and his wife were killed in the aftermath of a Tokyo 
earthquake despite requests for custody from relatives (both officers were Jewish but Kirjassoff’s 
wife and relationships were not).367  
 For this reason, even banal and trivial differences between officials during this period are 
significant, as they provide context for the more significant post-war policy proposals that will 
mentioned again in later chapters, such as the use of the atomic bomb, retention of the Japanese 
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Emperor, and the issue of Communism in China. Consequently, when Stanley Hornbeck 
commented about John Caldwell’s assignment to the State Department in 1928 that “his 
principal shortcomings are that he has allowed himself to become habituated to ‘statutory hours 
of labor’ and, probably unconsciously, to a conception of automatic or mechanistic determination 
of events and progress in politics and in the career service,” more was at stake than mere 
performance of duties.368  
However, unlike the vast majority of the (in)famous “China Hands,” many of the 
influential and senior SIC-Japan officers—such as John Caldwell and Eugene Dooman were 
interned by the Japanese in 1941 after Pearl Harbor.369 As will be discussed in a later chapter, 
this complicated criticism of these officers’ character and loyalty, making censuring of their duty 
performance and reference to past criticisms the easiest way to mitigate their policy proposals. 
Moreover, while masked by the official language common to post inspection reports and 
personnel efficiency reviews, personality clashes were common between SIC-Japan and SIC-
China officers—although they were less pronounced as those among SIC-China officers 
themselves. For example, in 1924 Inspector Nelson T. Johnson (only a year older than Dickover, 
but with eight years’ seniority) gave Dickover a low efficiency rating (“fair” was below 
“average,” and officers were not usually recommended for promotion unless they had consistent 
ratings of “average,” “very good,” or “excellent”), for no apparent concrete reason other than 
“shallowness of intellectual background which has narrowed his vision and rendered him 
incapable of making the most of his experience,” and recommended that Dickover be 
immediately transferred “out of the Far East and assigned for a time to some European post 
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under the supervision of a capable principle officer.”370  This was ironic given Johnson’s lack of 
formal education, but underscores the reality that for SIC-trained officers in Japan (just as in 
China), personal relationships and connections—both between officers and between them and 
members of the local bureaucracies and business communities.371  
As was typical of Johnson, his report on Dickover repeatedly highlighted ways in which 
the latter could (and should) improve in the area of trade expansion.372 Johnson had been an SIC-
China student and his rise through the ranks of the Foreign Service in China had been 
concomitant with his whole-hearted devotion to trade expansion as an institutional priority. 
While it might be going too far to characterize Johnson’s emphasis on trade expansion and 
related criticism on that subject to lower-ranking officers as self-serving, he never served in 
Japan for an extended period of time and was primarily concerned with enforcing and 
institutionalizing the bureaucratic priorities that he best understood—particularly that of trade 
expansion.  
As will be further emphasized below, actual political and economic conditions in Japan 
habituated SIC-Japan officers away from emphasizing trade expansion. However, they remained 
acutely aware of Japan’s economic priorities. In fact, awareness of those priorities undergirded 
most of their political reporting as well. For example, even while testifying to a Japan “in a much 
stronger industrial condition than ever before,” in 1917 then-consul at Nagasaki Edwin Neville 
noted that Japan was increasingly importing its iron ore from China and Korea, warning that it 
                                            
370 Erle R. Dickover, Question #85 on untitled rating sheet signed Nelson Trusler Johnson, 1924.  Dickover OPF; 
Nelson T. Johnson to Secretary of State, Washington D. C., 14 March 1924. Dickover OPF.  
371 Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy toward China, 1925-1941 (East Lansing, MI: 
Michigan State University Press, 1968), 6-7.   
372 Nelson T. Johnson to Erle R. Dickover, Kobe, Japan, February 25, 1924, Dickover OPF; Nelson T. Johnson to 
Secretary of State, Washington D. C., 14 March 1924. Dickover OPF. 
136	
	
	
was not mined anywhere in Japan and that domestic business opinion was that “Japan ought not 
to be dependent on the goodwill of the iron-owning peoples.”373 
This economic nationalist rhetoric had a practical side in terms of bilateral trade. Whereas 
American businessmen were so comparatively ignorant of Japan that they invariably sought out 
American consular officers in Tokyo (or the commercial attaché), their Japanese counterparts 
just as frequently possessed an abundance of contacts (usually through corporate extensions in 
the United States or business affiliates) such that in 1927, “in no case has this office been 
requested to assist such [Japanese] travelers in any way. It is thought that even if this office 
assumed the initiative in presenting Japanese businessmen with letters of introduction . . . it 
would be of little value in the promotion of American trade . . . .”374 
One of the reasons for this was the difference in language barriers. In China, it was much 
less common for local businessmen to be conversant in English.375 In Japan however 
(particularly in Tokyo), competence in English was so widespread that by the 1930s it was not 
even highly imperative to have language officers stationed there, other than to monitor and 
translate articles in the local press.376 For this reason, Japanese-American trade was very much in 
Japanese hands. Even attempts by language-trained officers to assist in settling claims of fraud 
frequently yielded little success. For example, in 1930 Kobe consul Erle R. Dickover sought to 
mediate nearly $10,000 of claims against a business member of the Kobe Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry. Yet although he received numerous assurances of action from the Chamber’s 
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Japanese president, no settlement was forthcoming but the alleged perpetrator continued to 
fraudulently market to American companies.377 Not only did Dickover’s attempt at mediation 
result in failure, but his efforts to do so ignited a controversy within the Embassy and at the State 
Department over the extent to which he had inserted himself in a trade dispute.378  The allegedly 
“dishonest” Japanese merchant publicized Dickover’s letters to the Kobe Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry president, publishing them in a local newspaper alongside his own open letter, 
castigating Dickover for attempting to exercise undue influence. 
Whereas Dickover was censured for refusing to certify invoices, in a similar case SIC-
China-trained consul Joseph E. Jacobs had been prohibited from doing exactly that. One 
important difference between the two cases was that Dickover’s refusal would have benefitted 
American companies seeking redress of fraud, whereas the action of his colleague in China 
sought to facilitate a potentially lucrative trade deal in keeping with promotion of the Open Door 
in China.379 On the surface a trivial issue, the placement of these letters in Dickover’s permanent 
personnel file highlights the shift away from emphasizing trade promotion and underscores the 
importance the State Department had begun to place on avoiding negative publicity in Japan, 
focusing on attempts to reconcile Japanese-American diplomatic difficulties rather than 
expansion of American trade in Japan. Commitment to trade expansion was still a badge of 
political correctness in the early 1920s, still evident for example when SIC-trained consul Max 
                                            
377 Erle R. Dickover to F. Kashima, April 2, 1930, Kobe, Japan, Erle R. Dickover, OPF, NPRC, NARA, St. Louis, 
MO. 
378 Edwin Neville to Erle R. Dickover, June 23, 1930, Tokyo, Japan, OPF, NPRC, NARA, St. Louis, MO. 
379 H.H. Braun to Joseph E. Jacobs, January 25, 1927, Yunnanfu, China. 610.1. Correspondence, American 
Consulate, Yunnanfu, China.  Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84.  NARA. 
138	
	
	
Kirjassoff was criticized for lack of trade reporting at his post in Yokohama, but gradually 
beginning to weaken in favor of other priorities.380  
The shift toward political reporting in general and American-Japanese relations in 
particular occurred gradually during the late 1920s and early 1930s. As previously mentioned, 
the existing import trade from the United States was generally handled by Japanese agents and 
rarely required consular intervention. Moreover, extraterritoriality in Japan did not exist as it did 
in China, and there was little that consular officers could do in the case of disputes (such as the 
case of fraud mentioned above) other than to refer American companies to Japanese law firms. 
 As in China (but perhaps to a greater extent), the vast majority of Americans in Japan 
were missionaries. For example, in Nagasaki in 1920, there were approximately 150 resident 
Americans, almost all of whom were missionaries. Among the seven American companies listed 
as present, the two most worthy of mention were Standard Oil and Singer Sewing.381 All of the 
American companies registered as active in Nagasaki maintained local branch offices (as 
mentioned elsewhere, Standard Oil and Singer Sewing also did so in China), and agents of those 
branches rarely visited the American consulate or requested their services.382 Consequently, very 
little of American missionary and commercial activity necessitated consular intervention. 
According to consular inspection reports of American consular offices in Japan, most such 
instances resulted from visits by American military vessels to Japanese ports.383 In places such as 
Nagoya, even though there were over 120 American companies listed as registered, all were 
managed by Japanese nationals; in 1924 not a single American resided there who was not a 
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missionary.384 In addition, in comparision to the contemporary, legal chaos that prevailed in 
China, in Japan the rule of law was fairly uniform and there was no extraterritorial legal recourse 
to which American expatriates could apply. 
Compounding this, even more so than in China, foreign competition for Japanese 
customers was especially fierce. As the 1920 inspection of the American consulate in Nagasaki 
highlighted, competition from British and German merchants necessitated that Americans “send 
good representatives to enter the field and make an energetic campaign.385 As in China, officers 
in Japan reported that Japanese merchants required lengthy terms of credit, but that American 
businesses required deposits in advance and cash payment in full on delivery.386 According to 
SIC-trained consul Henry Huggins, “Japanese credits are no worse than other credits; they 
merely have to be handled with a great deal of judgment and care. A man who knows the 
Japanese language, the intricacies of the law affecting families and trade, could do a good 
business in Japan if makes himself popular with the tradesmen.”387 Also like in China, there was 
widespread acknowledgement that pointing out trade opportunities was a vital role of the 
language-trained officer but that it was the responsibility of American business to take advantage 
of and pursue them. The recommendations that SIC-trained officers in Japan made regarding 
expansion of American commerce in Japan mirrored those made by their colleagues in China, 
but there was earlier recognition that the market was fairly saturated. In China, where language-
trained American officers were eyewitnesses to successful Japanese penetration of the coveted 
China markets, inspector Fleming Cheshire observed that the American consul “has written very 
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good trade reports and pointed out the exact conditions of American trade in his district, and the 
possibilities for future development: it is for our manufacturers to exploit the field: something 
more must be done than the mere issuing of trade circulars.”388 
One exception to this was SIC-China-trained Nelson T. Johnson, who began virtually 
every inspection review with the phrase, “I have read with much care and interest your report 
upon the trade promotion work of the office of the American Consulate at . . . .”389 Johnson’s 
predilection for trade expansion reflected the priorities impressed upon him as an SIC student in 
China. This exception would be relatively unimportant were it not for the fact that Johnson 
eventually become US Minister in and eventually Ambassador to China, remaining in that post 
until shortly before the outbreak of war with Japan. Johnson remained fixated on the priority of 
trade expansion even as SIC-Japan officers and non-SIC-China-trained inspectors began 
acknowledging the increasing political barriers to American trade expansion in Japan. His 1924 
review of inspection of the US Consulate in Nagoya, for example, steamrolled over consul Henry 
Hawley’s observations that not only were all American firms in the district represented by 
Japanese agents, but also that rising tariffs, economic nationalism in the form of “striving for 
economic self-sufficiency”, and “resentment against the recent United States immigration law” 
were increasing barriers to expansion of American trade in Japan.390  
Acknowledgment of these realities had to be hedged carefully, as overt criticism of 
superiors, the State Department, the United States government, or American society and cultural 
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in general could easily expose an officer to charges of disloyalty or accusations of “going 
native.” In the early years of the SIC, while reporting on Japan as rising industrial and economic 
power in Asia, some officers sought to cushion the “bad” news (for American exporters) with 
expansive prognostications concerning the prospects for American commerce in China. For 
example, American consul in Nanking Thornwell Haynes in 1906 observed that “so long as 
400,000,000 (conservative) Chinese continue to absorb Western ideas and so long as American 
brains retain their ingenuity to improve upon improvements, there need be no fear but that 
America will still hold its own commercially in the East.”391  
While such racially-tinged pronouncements are unsurprising given that trade expansion in 
China was the very goal undergirding the establishment of the SIC, they highlight the fact that 
early and late, American business as a corpus was not interested enough to do much more than to 
support consular reorganization as a seemingly effortless alternative to the investment of capital 
and personnel. This was true even though merchants of other nationalities were successfully 
doing exactly that. Major policy objectives such as the Open Door in China as well as 
comparatively minor bilateral trade disputes appear to be responses to domestic political and 
economic issues, granted impetus by American’s increasing desire for government intervention.   
As mentioned elsewhere, in the 1930s, there was an increasing trend in American politics 
that the US government undertake to “do” more in many areas of social and economic life. 
Related to Japan, one of these was rising alarm among American fishermen toward the “Japanese 
menace” to the salmon fisheries of Alaska, propagated by a publicity The Pacific Fisherman, the 
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leading fishing trade journal.392 The rather aptly-named Sturgeon was nominated to visit Alaska 
and the Pacific coast to investigate and report on the situation.393 According to Joseph Ballantine, 
American fishermen were particularly agitated because they “felt that our government was 
paying money to develop the salmon resources in the Bristol Bay area, and the Japanese 
government, without any cost to themselves, was taking advantage of it.”394 Through Sturgeon’s 
efforts in the Pacific Northwest and those of Eugene Dooman in Tokyo, the Japanese were 
eventually prevailed upon to voluntarily relinquish their fishing rights in the area, even though 
the disputed fishing had been occurring outside the three-mile-from-the-coastline limit 
established by treaty in 1911.395  
 Leo Sturgeon’s fishery dispute assignment—innocuous as it might seem—is also 
interesting because it highlights another trend in Foreign Service: through their long tenures in 
one area or position, individual officers often built up small fiefdoms of expertise that extended 
and perpetuated their maintenance in those positions. Intensified by the impetus to “do” 
something in response to social, political, and economic developments, the sphere of government 
action tended to increase. In Sturgeon’s case, a 13-month assignment to the State Department 
(transferred from Japan) to investigate a “threatened Japanese invasion”396 of the Bristol Bay 
fisheries lasted over eight years and eventually encompassed not only Bristol Bay but also the 
Northern Pacific, the Great Lakes region, Newfoundland, and even the Caribbean.397 
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Lengthy tenure in certain regions and areas of responsibility contributed to a highly specialized 
and capable Foreign Service. However, it also meant that certain channels of information were 
more susceptible to influence from some officers (or groups of officers) than others. As will be 
examined elsewhere, information regarding Japan proper (excluding Korea, Taiwan, and 
Manchuria) generally passed through Eugene Dooman, Edwin Neville, John Caldwell, Joseph 
Ballantine, and a few others. Likewise, in China, Nelson Trusler Johnson, Julean Arnold, Willys 
R. Peck, John K. Davis, and to a lesser extent, the infamous (or famous) “China Hands,” such as 
John S. Service, John Carter Vincent, and Edmund O. Clubb were the conduits through which 
information passed and commentary was made on events in the country.  
Not all of these informational fiefdoms were equal however. Much depended on what 
information the Embassy in Tokyo or Beijing deemed worthy of emphasis—even though 
consular dispatches were routed to the State Department as well as the Embassy in the country in 
question—as well as on what officers assigned to the State Department decided to summarize 
and refer to the Secretary of State. Concerning Japan for example, Joseph Ballantine observed in 
his oral memoirs that [while posted to the State Department between 1937 and 1945] “everything 
I thought the Secretary of State should know, I would put a memorandum, a briefing to the 
Secretary of State on it, so that he could either read the whole report, or he could just read that 
briefing and decide himself.”398 Monthly political reports from the respective US embassies 
generally comprised dozens of pages and included information drawn from consular posts 
around China and Japan, much of it unanalyzed, so some condensation and interpretation was 
undoubtedly necessary, but this further highlights the ability of some officers to selectively 
emphasize and interpret events developments as they thought appropriate. 
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Part of the reason for the emerging divisions was a generational divide in the Foreign 
Service, a contingency of history that has no explanation other than the events in question 
happened when they did. On December 7th, 1941, most of the professional cohort of SIC-trained 
officers that remained in either China or Japan had entered in the late 1910s; the budget cuts of 
the Great Depression had expedited the expulsion of inefficient officers (and perhaps a few 
efficient ones). Officers that had entered in the 1910s and early ‘20s were more numerous and 
were generally in their late 40s or early 50s at the youngest, and had occupied offices of high 
responsibility for years, if not decades. The much-smaller group of officers that entered in the 
late 1920s and very early 1930s were comparatively young professionals. For many of them 
(particularly the alternately reviled and praised “China Hands”) it was the exigencies of war and 
the pressures of time and place that thrust them into positions of great responsibility.  
 These developments highlight the shifting direction of American policy with regard to 
Japan. By the 1930s emphasis had begun to shift away from expansion of American trade in 
Japan towards protecting American interests from Japanese challenges. Simultaneously, 
expectations that the US government take more direct action—beyond merely providing 
information to American businessmen—was on the rise. The trend away from emphasis on trade 
was partially exigency-driven: in both China and Japan, the political situation prompted consular 
officers to devote increasing amounts of their limited time to reporting on political conditions in 
their districts.399 By necessity, officers in China were forced to concentrate on Chinese-Japan 
relations, the rise of Communism in China, and general political instability in China, whereas 
those in Japan dealt primarily with American-Japanese relations—and increasingly aggressive 
Japanese policies in China. Geopolitical developments in China rendered the issue of trade 
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expansion in China essentially moot. As inspector T.M. Wilson commented in 1932 (less than a 
year after the “Manchurian Incident” of September 18, 1931), “commercially things are certainly 
quiescent—if not dead—as far as trade extension [in China] is concerned at the present time.”400 
 However, recognition of trade expansion in Japan as dead letter did not mean that SIC-
Japan officers were anything less than detailed and accurate. Similar to the portrayals of China 
from SIC-trained language officers, SIC-Japan trained officers presented complex, nuanced, and 
thorough pictures of social, political, and economic life and developments in Japan between 
1906 and 1941. Underlying these portrayals was an attitude of sympathetic and realistic 
appreciation for the problems confronting Japan during this period. The two largest of these were 
interconnected: a rapidly rising population and skyrocketing demand for raw materials 
(particularly coal and iron) that far outstripped Japan’s domestically available resources. For 
example, in 1925, Tokyo consul Joseph Ballantine surveyed the decade’s second census, noting 
that Japan’s population growth and resulting population density rivaled those of industrialized 
countries in Europe.401 According to Ballantine, it was rapid population growth that spurred 
Japan’s industrial ambitions, noting that “birth control is repugnant to Japanese ideals as a 
possible solution, and consequently the alternatives open are emigration and industrialization.”402 
 Ballantine further observed (although it was common knowledge in the State 
Department) that the Japanese were prohibited from emigrating to the United States, Canada, 
Australia, “the countries which are regarded as the most promising fields for outlets.”403 
Regarding industrialization, Ballantine stressed Japan’s relative lack of raw materials while 
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stressing its stable political situation, strong educational system, and availability of hydro-
electric power.404 Other SIC-trained consular officials such as Edwin Neville (mentioned above) 
had reported on the dearth of raw materials such as coal and steel much earlier—noting than in 
1917 most iron ore was being imported from China and Korea, with 2/3 of the tonnage reserved 
for the railways, Army, and Navy.405 There is some doubt as to whether the notion of “surplus” 
population in Japan was accurate in the 1920s. During this period, nearly all of Japan’s overseas 
territories were “colonies of occupation rather than settlement,” leaving doubt in Neville’s mind 
about Japanese claims of excess population.406  
Similarly, in 1928 Charge d’Affairs ad interim (temporary serving in lieu of Ambassador) 
Edwin Neville reported on the results of a lengthy Japanese government study on Japan’s oil 
supply.407 Neville detailed such stiff competition among the seven main oil importing companies 
(Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Japan Petroleum, Asane, Okura, Rising Sun and Standard Oil) that Japanese 
companies had complained that Standard Oil and Rising Sun (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) 
were marketing their oil and gasoline at prices below the cost of production, and the Japanese 
companies were therefore asking for government protection.408  According to Neville, while 
considering a national oil monopoly, the Japanese government hesitated to raise import tariffs; he 
further observed that the staggering increase in demand for oil and gasoline was fueled by 
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skyrocketing consumption of American automobiles.409 In this case, American trade was 
expanding, and there was no need for additional encouragement. 
In this way, from the beginning of the language training program, SIC-trained officers in 
Japan kept watch over the actual as well as potential for expansion of American trade. 
Meanwhile, although SIC-China SIC Japan developed in tandem, the contingencies of their 
institutionalization produced differences in perspective and personality. The ad hoc manner in 
which particular officers became responsible for and experts in certain areas (ranging in subject 
matter from such banal matters as fishing rights to controversial topics including the rise of 
Communism in China) meant that personal differences of opinion on policy, reporting emphasis, 
and the relative importance of trade expansion could have long term consequences, both for the 
offices in question and for the State Department. 
These differences were rarely, if ever, visible at the senior levels: it was the relatively 
young group of SIC-trained officers who began to clash more with their superiors. In fact, 
ideologically and institutionally, senior officers resembled one another so much that according to 
Joseph Ballantine, “there was the highest degree of mutual respect among the senior Japan and 
the senior China officers . . . there was no difference at all. It was that group from Vincent 
down—Vincent, Davies, Service—that crowd of people.”410 Ballantine also disliked Owen 
Lattimore, asserting that a group of Chinese language officers had come under his influence.411 
For his part, Owen Lattimore was similarly pointed about Japanese-language officers, arguing 
that, “. . . at the end of the war it will turn out that some of the most true, devoted, unquestioning, 
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esoteric initiates of the Japanese Emperor cult have been holding jobs in the United States Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps, and State Department.”412 
However, Ballantine’s assertion of unity overlooked the issue of trade expansion. As 
noted above, trade expansion diminished as institutional priority for both SIC-China and SIC 
Japan officers, particularly in the face of increasing Japanese militarism in China in the 1920s 
and ‘30s. Yet circumstances in Japan caused this contraction to happen faster, setting the stage 
for large-scale and more politically important divergences later on. Like many of the other large-
ego “hardballs” discussed previously, Ballantine probably assumed more widespread agreement 
with his views than actually existed. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, 
differences of opinion concerning political developments and policy proposals for China and 
Japan did not cleave cleanly between SIC-China and SIC-Japan officers. As will also be 
developed more fully in the next chapter, among both such points of convergence and 
divergence, a growing belief that the US government should adopt and advance a more positive, 
active, and robust policy in Asia. Even as SIC-trained officers in Japan as well as China allowed 
their lip-service to the soft flop of ostensible American economic imperialism in China to fade, 
they would pave the way for far more vigorous varieties.   
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CHAPTER 6 
“A MOST WONDERFUL ACQUISITION TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE”413: WOMEN 
AND FAMILY OF THE STUDENT INTERPRETERS CORPS, 1902-1941 
 
 From its inception through WWII, no woman ever complemented the ranks of the 
Student Interpreters Corps (SIC). Nevertheless, women were intimately acquainted with the 
Student Interpreters Corps and the Far East Division, some as clerks and stenographers, but most 
as wives, acquaintances, and associates of various Foreign Service officers.  In the scant histories 
that exist of the Foreign Service, equally scarce mention is made of women.  Just as was the case 
with other institutions of the U.S. government, the Foreign Service of the early 20th century was 
almost entirely a male affair. Most histories of the Foreign Service and its officers during this 
period do not even attempt to mention women, probably because they do not appear to have been 
particularly important in the events and developments described.  Nevertheless, as wives, 
mothers, lovers, friends, and confidantes, women played a vital role in the success of the Student 
Interpreters Corps and the daily functioning of field officers in the Far East Division.  
 It is impossible to identify this role precisely. Because very few direct, official records 
exist however, women’s roles in the SIC and the “China Service” have to be read indirectly: 
most of the records in this connection consist of family data and inspector comments in male 
officers’ personnel records.  These records add a new dimension to studying American foreign 
relations in that they provided a window into these relations as lived experiences.  A colorful 
variety of women played a role in these experiences, although very few of their contributions 
appear in the footnotes of history books.   
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 The lesson most directly pertinent to the Student Interpreters Corps and the American 
Foreign Service in China, Japan, and Turkey between 1902 and 1941 is that until the late 1930s 
if not WWII, the United States did not provide adequately for its consular officers and their 
families or for the functions of consulates, particularly those in China. Far from the vanguard of 
nascent American imperialism, SIC graduates were the whipping boys of the U.S. Foreign 
Service; both they and their families sacrificed significantly during their service. Despite official 
rhetoric emphasizing trade expansion and commercial “empire,” the United States Consular 
failed to provide compensation and support for its offices and officers in “Open Door” China 
comparable to those provided by Britain and Japan. However, this problem remained a high 
priority for such “master architects” as Wilbur J. Carr and other senior State Department 
administrators. When human concerns eventually prevailed in the form of higher salaries and 
post allowances, the real winner was the State Department in that its personnel and budget 
continued to grow even though the much-touted commercial empire failed to materialize. 
 As mentioned elsewhere, the creation of the Student Interpreters Corps in 1902 through a 
Congressional budgetary appropriation was the first step toward reform of the U.S. diplomatic 
and consular service. A large raft of reforms passed in 1906; another set in 1924, and finally the 
Foreign Service Act of 1946 gave shape to the institution more or less as it exists in the early 
twenty-first century. However, the Foreign Service reached a sort of institutional equilibrium in 
the early 1930s, as pay, allowances, and promotions stabilized (albeit at levels that were still 
unsatisfactory to many officers) and the departmental emphasis on trade promotion gradually 
yielded place to political reporting. 
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 This chapter argues that the treatment of family relationships, salaries and compensation 
of consular officers in the Foreign Service between 1902 and 1947 obviated the existence of such 
a tripod. Just as Elihu Root and Wilbur J. Carr marketed consular reform using business and 
trade expansion rhetoric, so they continued to advocate pay increases and personnel 
improvements, all with betterment of the Foreign Service in mind. Rhetoric aside however, the 
Foreign Service as it existed between 1902 and the early 1930s was so unfriendly toward 
families that many officers delayed marriage until their early 40s. As will be seen from the 
example of George Hanson and Verne Staten, officers who married experienced significant 
hardships, while those who did not had little legitimate sexual outlet and occasionally invited 
scandal. The cases of Hanson and Staten also raise the question of how many American Foreign 
Service officers made use of the “thriving illegal Sino-American commerce” identified by Eileen 
P. Scully.414  
 American consular officers were usually invited to and attended the nuptials of their 
fellow nationals. Although, unlike their British counterparts, American consular officers could 
not perform marriages,415 they could (and did) attend the weddings of their fellow nationals 
abroad and issued certificates attesting to the validity of the marriage (rather than officiating in a 
separate civil ceremony).416 In many cases this confused clergy more accustomed to British (and 
other Great Powers) expatriate marital procedures. One young SIC graduate detailed to attend 
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such a ceremony was amused to hear the clergyman declare: “I now pronounce you man and 
wife in the presence of Almighty God and United States Vice Consul Norwood F. Allman.”417 
 More importantly, officers were influenced by their wives’ attitudes towards their careers 
as well as their daily duties.  As often as not, they were jealously protective of their husbands’ 
positions and privileges in ways that rarely are rarely described in detail in official records. For 
example, Nelson T. Johnson, then the American Minister in Beijing, stated that Willys R. Peck 
was “not happy in his dealing with subordinates,” and felt that this was “largely due to the 
attitude of his wife, as well as his sensitiveness to his rights as principal officer.”418  However, it 
was of paramount importance that he had a wife who “assists him well in his work. He is fond of 
his home and gives it a good deal of his time.”419 Although this enhanced his standing in the 
community, it occasionally caused problems, as Mrs. Peck apparently was “not always 
considerate of the feelings of subordinates in the office, because of her own jealous regard for 
her position.”420 
 Although their opinions and views regarding their husbands’ duty assignments rarely 
appear in official records, officers’ wives had an important stake in these decisions and they 
made their opinions known—at least to their husbands. For example, George Atcheson Jr.’s wife 
so strongly objected to his being posted to a rural location (Chungking) that Atcheson resisted it 
strenuously, referring repeatedly to “personal problems” and his “domestic situation.” 421 
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 If an officer was married, the character of his wife was considered a reflection upon his 
own and was noted in his efficiency record. For example, the wife of Paul R. Josselyn, one of the 
“China Service” officers, was described as “a woman of culture, discretion, and a most 
wonderful acquisition to the Foreign Service. She is unquestionably of great assistance to Mr. 
Josselyn in his work.”422 Very little information about officers’ wives appears in official records. 
Inspectors’ comments were usually restricted to brief mention of an officer’s marital status, 
along with the background and character of his wife. Max Kirjassoff’s wife was described as “a 
splendid type of the educated American woman, mother and mistress of her home.”423 In nearly 
identical terms, Jay Caldwell’s wife was similarly depicted as “a splendid type of the educated, 
Christian American wife and mother.”424 
 Some SIC-trained officers married foreign women, perhaps not surprising since most 
language-trained officers spent most of their careers and much of their lives overseas. Of these, 
the majority were British expatriates. For example, Charles Edward Allen (a Turkish & French-
trained officer), married Doris Harty, a “British Levantine,” whose family had “always lived in 
Istanbul” and was engaged in business there.425 In some cases, such marriages were highly 
advantageous to both the officers themselves and the State Department. For example, while 
studying as a Student Interpreter, George Bickford was rumored to receive financial assistance 
from his wife’s family (her father was a British citizen and Deputy Commissioner of the 
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Maritime Customs of China in Shanghai).426 According to an inspector, this happy union also 
benefited the U.S. government during Bickford’s service in China.427 
 However, such marriages were rare. Women who were not U.S. citizen did not acquire 
citizenship when they married Foreign Service officers. William L. Peck, when posted to 
Stockholm, Sweden, was unpleasantly surprised by this when he married Olga Alexandrovna 
Lamkert, who forfeited her Russian citizenship by marrying him.428 Because Peck’s official 
duties prevented him from leaving Sweden, his wife was unable to visit Russia, travel in Europe, 
or go to the United States to apply for citizenship.429 
 Most officers married American women (usually children of missionaries). For example, 
George Atcheson Jr., a China specialist, married a “native-born American of Spanish descent” 
named Marguerita de Laguna.”430 Joseph Ballantine was married to Emelia Ashburner Christy, 
from Berkeley, CA in 1917.431 Ernest Price married Florence Bentley of Titusville, PA, in 
November 1915 while he was a student interpreter (even though this was a violation of 
regulations).432 These officers represented the (relatively frustrated) norm of married, SIC-
trained consuls from the early 1900s to the 1930s. 
 
Pre- and Extra-marital Relations 
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 There were important exceptions to the monogamous rule. The women in the life of 
George C. Hanson offer particularly salient illustrations of the incompleteness of the record. 
Diplomatic histories have remarkably little to say about Hanson, erstwhile US Consul General in 
Moscow and one of the only American Foreign Service officers of the early 1930s who could 
speak Russian (having a Russian mistress most likely facilitated this),433 save that he 
inexplicably committed suicide en route to his new post of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February, 
1935.434 Out of context, Hanson’s suicide certainly appears inexplicable. Yet as discussed in the 
foregoing chapter, “Oddballs and Hardballs,” Hanson’s suicide came on the heels of an intense 
controversy stemming from his conduct as a guest at a private luncheon in New York, 1934, held 
for businessmen interested in trade with Soviet Russia.435 
 In the wake of this incident, the ensuing controversy and Hanson’s suicide, it came to 
light that Hanson had maintained a Russian mistress for some time.436 This information had 
apparently been given to T.M. Wilson (an official in the Personnel Division of the Consular 
Service) by a Mrs. Thompson Montgomery (a divorcee formerly married to an Englishman), 
who had been engaged to Hanson at the time of his suicide.437  Six months after his suicide, this 
lady called the State Department to request a meeting with T.M. Wilson to discuss Hanson’s 
personal situation at the time of his death. During their meeting at her home, T.M. Wilson 
noticed that she was wearing a ring of Hanson’s, cut down to fit her finger.438  After a brief 
discussion of Hanson’s record during which she emphasized Hanson’s hard work and enthusiasm 
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for his to-have-been latest post, she broached the subject of “Valentina,” of whom Wilson was 
apparently aware but had never met.439 According to Mrs. Montgomery, Valentina had been 
Hanson’s mistress in Harbin, had gone to the United States (in 1934) before him, met him at his 
boat, accompanied him nearly everywhere, and had stated on several occasions that she and 
Hanson were to be married.440 Mrs. Montgomery appears to have felt that Hanson and Valentina 
had been together while he was in New York (circa the time of the ill-fated luncheon) and 
implied that that Valentina was possibly a Soviet spy.441 The “Valentina” referred to seems to 
have been a one “Valentine Dulckeit Melgounoff,” noted as a “friend of George C. Hanson” who 
possessed a penchant for traveling “on ships with American Foreign Service officers.”442 
 Precisely who Valentine (or Valentina) was remains a mystery. An undated picture 
attached to the report in Hanson’s personnel file shows a fair-haired and attractive young 
woman.443  According to reports in this file, the lady was married to a Serge Melgounnoff, a 
painter by profession, living in New York as of 1935, who “would never be accepted in the 
social circle which Miss Dulckeit frequented.”444 After her marriage to Melgounnoff, not only 
did Valentine not live with her husband (who, when interviewed, had no idea as to her 
whereabouts), she immediately departed the United States for Paris.445  According a State 
Department memorandum in Hanson’s personnel file written by R.C. Bannerman under the 
heading “Department of State, Chief Special Agent,” Valentine,  
                                            
439 This fact appears nowhere else in the records pertaining to Hanson that I receievd from the NPRC in St. Louis, 
MO. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid 
442 Memorandum for [T.M.] Wilson, Foreign Personnel, “Valentine Dulckeit Melgounnoff,” February 22, 1935. 
George C. Hanson, OPF, NPRC, NARA, St. Louis, MO. 
443 Ibid. 
444 R.C. Bannerman, memorandum, “Valentine Dulckeit Melgounen,” November 15, 1935, George C. Hanson, OPF, 
NPRC, NARA, St. Louis, MO. 
445 Ibid. 
157	
	
	
 
“during her entire stay in the United States . . . maintained luxurious apartments and 
became acquainted with some very prominent people. It is quite evident that she is not a 
‘one man’ woman. The thought persists that she is far more than a mistress to several 
men and supporting herself that way. Fellow passengers describe her as very charming 
and cultured. There may be a Soviet or Japanese backing for these frequent trips to 
France, India, Japan, and the United States.”446  
 
 Hanson undoubtedly worked hard and he seems to have played even harder—his 
dalliances were by no means limited to Valentina. During the investigation into Hanson’s 
character that began with his inauspicious at the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce in 
New York in 1934, one Professor Samuel Harper apparently alleged that that, “after hours, 
Hanson seems to feel that he can act as he pleases. He sees much of the night life of Moscow, 
drinks to excess, is indiscreet in his conversation when under the influence of liquor, and his 
conduct is anything but a credit to his country.” Harper seems to have had ample opportunity to 
observe Hanson in his element, for his report further details several drunken incidents involving 
Hanson in Moscow, including one during which Hanson arrived late, made indiscreet remarks 
about a particular Russian man whom he had jailed while in Harbin, and finally “became very 
much under the influence of liquor, was hugging and kissing a woman at the table, and when he 
left Harper at the hotel he and the woman were engaging in very undignified behavior in the 
presence of the hotel porters.”447   
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 To be fair, Harper did not spare the U.S. Ambassador to Russia William C. Bullitt either, 
describing him as a “playboy” who “out-bourbons the Bourbons.”448  In addition to Bullitt’s 
overindulgence in alcohol, Harper also alleged that Bullitt frequently gave lavish dinner parties 
that lasted all night and, perhaps most damaging, “hosted a female member of the ballet at his 
house constantly, so much so that Harper was asked by certain Russians whether it was a fact 
that Bullitt was going to marry her.”449 Harper further claimed that Bullitt “displeases American 
businessmen by saying that he never expected considerable trade with Russia and is not worrying 
over the failure to effect more satisfactory trade relations.”450 
 Hanson’s life and relations with women therein at times resemble the plot of a James 
Bond movie. The difference between the official Hanson and the details of the real Hanson’s life 
highlights the partial transcript of foreign relations as lived experiences. What exactly happened 
to Hanson is unclear, but it is certain that Valentina and Mrs. Montgomery were intimately 
involved in the final chapter of his life. 
 T. M. Wilson, a close contemporary of Wilbur J. Carr and a senior bureaucrat in the 
Personnel Division of the Consular Service, was apparently aware of who Valentina was, but the 
memorandum gives no indication of whether he was aware of her relationship with Hanson or of 
its extent.451 The special agent who wrote the memorandum included a recommendation that 
when she next applied for a new passport, Valentina’s old passport be “sent in for cancellation 
and examination” to obtain an idea of the extent of her travels.452  
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 Little of Hanson’s adventurous life appears in official reports, let alone his dispatches. 
The extent of his relationship with Valentine cannot be determined accurately based on the 
existing records, but it can be shown that they were in the same places at the same time on 
several instances, in Harbin, China in June, 1932, and in New York, NY, from November 1st, 
1934, to October 5th, 1935.453  Although some officers married foreign nationals, most of them 
preferred to marry American citizens. Consequently, officers like George Hanson either never 
married or married in late middle age. For this reason, after fourteen years of service in China, 
Hanson had pleaded for a temporary assignment to the State Department in Washington, with a 
view to finding a wife as well as spending time with his 81-year old father; his request was 
denied.454  Hanson’s subsequent lifestyle suggests that although there were sexual alternatives to 
marriage, such choices could be disastrous for an officer’s career once exposed. 
 Aside from the dalliances of Hanson—which only entered his record after his suicide—
evidence of romantic liaisons is understandably rare. Indiscretions were ignored or covered up to 
the greatest extent possible. The case of Verne G. Staten of Bloomington, Illinois offers a good 
example of this. Staten was “a young man of pleasing manners and appearance,” 33 years old in 
1923, and a clerk in Amoy with the rank of Vice Consul. He was portrayed as anti-social—which 
was quite normal for clerks and student interpreters whose salaries were so low they could hardly 
make ends meet.455  The American community—one Mr. Morse, the General Manager for 
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Standard Oil in Amoy—loathed Staten for his inability to entertain socially, and Morse’s attitude 
was apparently shared by most of the American community in Amoy.456  
 Staten’s chief transgression was his inability to reciprocate official hospitality extended 
to him by the consulates of other nations, corporations such as the Standard Oil Company, as 
well as the leading Americans in Amoy.457 Americans were particularly offended by Staten’s 
failure to give a party for the 4th of July holiday.458  This was a bit unusual: consular officers 
were under tremendous social pressure to entertain the foreign community from time to time, and 
most particularly on this sacrosanct American holiday. However, the State Department did not 
usually have the funds to pay for such annual events and consuls generally paid these expenses 
out of their own pockets and then requested reimbursement, which the State Department 
routinely denied. For example, the State Department refused to reimburse George C. Hanson in 
1923 for hosting a diplomatically obligatory dinner for the Chinese military governor in 
Chungking, stating that it could not be considered a necessary and authorized expense.459 
 Nevertheless, Staten unusually low salary and the Amoy consulate’s complete dearth of a 
budget for representational expenses not only precluded his paying for such an event himself but 
also materially inhibited his usefulness in Amoy by earning him the scorn of American residents 
there. Inspector Nelson T. Johnson quickly recognized that Staten had been treated unfairly and 
did not possess the finances to meet social expectations in Amoy and arranged for Staten’s 
transfer to Tientsin.460 
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 In Tientsin, Staten’s social life seems to have improved while his luck went from bad to 
worse. According to confidential letters from C. E. Gauss, in Tientsin in 1925,  
 
“a young American woman of very good family at home, who has been residing  at 
Tientsin for a year or more, retired to the Salvation Army Refuge Home at Tientsin 
several weeks ago and has become the mother of a son; she has declared [Staten’s] 
paternity and her desire for the legitimation of the child.” 461 
 
 According to Gauss, Staten did not deny fathering the child, but “had been dilatory in 
making amends,” namely by marrying the girl and taking responsibility for the child.462 
Apparently, it had been the young lady’s American attending physician who brought the matter 
to the attention of the American Consul General in Tientsin (Charles Gauss), who (probably 
literally) jolted Staten to recognize his obligations.463 It is impossible to determine what had been 
holding him back, as this young man from Bloomington, Illinois who had served as a lieutenant 
in WWI almost certainly recognized his culturally dictated duties, but his low salary and near-
inability to support himself was probably part of his consideration. 
 Nevertheless, in order to prevent the scandal from becoming public knowledge, Gauss 
hastily arranged a marriage ceremony and the expeditious transfer of the young man and his new 
family unit to Antung, China.464 Scandal was averted none too soon: the girl’s presumed father, a 
Boston lawyer named Raymond P. Dellinger, soon contacted the State Department via his 
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Senator, demanding information regarding Mr. Staten.465 The State Department obliged by 
sending an abstract of Staten’s service record, including only his biographical information 
(education, training, home in Illinois, etc.), and the note that Staten “performs his duties in a 
satisfactory manner.”466 According to Herbert Hengstler, a nearly identical case had occurred in 
the Service previously, and that the young man in that case had collected himself and was doing 
good work at the time of writing.467 
 One other case further illustrates both the incompleteness of the record of familial and 
sexual experiences of Foreign Service officers in Near and Far East posts. SIC-China-trained 
consul and Harvard drop-out Horace Remillard was posted as a subordinate officer to Saigon in 
1921; while there he married a French-Canadian woman, whom he had engaged in 1917 named 
Yvonne Gay, whose family apparently owned the premises on which the American Consulate 
was located and whose brothers owned and operated a garage and repair shop directly beneath 
the consulate.468 One inspector reported that Yvonne’s family exerted a corrupting influence on 
Remillard, constantly urging him to use his official position to make money—which Remillard 
appeared all too willing to do—while observing that Remillard’s marriage appeared to be more 
for convenience for love: according to the inspector, in 1921, it was “commonly rumored that 
Mrs. Remillard is Consul Briggs’s mistress.”469 If Remillard was in fact cuckolded, he does not 
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seem to have cared, as his personnel file indicates that he rarely attended social events with his 
wife, preferring to stay at home while she attended parties.470 
 
Marriage Trends and Family Adjustments among SIC Graduates from 1902 to the 1930s 
 
 These cases underscore the gloomy romantic realities that confronted low-level clerks, 
consuls, and student interpreters between 1902 and 1924: pay was so low that for these talented 
young men of prime marriageable age, marriage was a difficult proposition. At the same time, 
marriage-worthy women were in short supply. Some officers, such as Hanson, resorted to (semi) 
discreet, illicit liaisons; others such Nelson T. Johnson and Clarence Spiker delayed marriage 
until middle age.471 Clarence J. Spiker (SIC China) remained a bachelor until his forties. 472  He 
had apparently been jilted in love in 1923, when he had expected to be married during trip to the 
United States while on leave, but was disappointed. On returning to his duties he was 
immediately posted Chungking and had scarce time or opportunities for courtship.473 Already 
depressed according to Inspector Johnson, Spiker found the consulate premises even gloomier, 
located as they were adjacent to a public execution grounds.474 Spiker’s long celibacy benefited 
his career He was praised as “highly dependable” having great energy and “no objection to 
unusually long hours.”475 He was described as immensely likable, jovial, with “a better than 
average knowledge of Chinese manners, customs, and history” in addition to a superb command 
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of spoken and written Mandarin.476 Most importantly, he served at every post assigned without 
complaining as vociferously as the vast majority of his married colleagues. 
 Despite such instances, the vast majority of officers did marry, either postponing (or 
foregoing) having children or becoming increasingly disgruntled and/or belligerent towards the 
State Department, eventually resigned. The best example of such was Ernest Batson Price. He 
was born to missionary parents in Henzada, Burma in 1890, graduated from the University of 
Rochester, and was appointed Student Interpreter in 1914.477 Exposed to foreign languages at a 
young age, Price mastered both spoken and written Mandarin to a higher degree than many of his 
peers and superiors. Although officers such as Nelson T. Johnson spoke colloquial Mandarin 
fluently,478 very few learned the Chinese characters as well as Price.479  
 However, a successful career as a language officer required more than just learning a 
foreign language; it demanded single-minded allegiance to the United States government and a 
willingness to accept unfairness and hardship without protest. Many of those the State 
Department recruited were able to learn the language of their assigned country and acquire 
administrative skills but had difficulty coping with the vicissitudes and inanities of working for 
Uncle Sam as a language officer in the Foreign Service.  
 Price was utterly unable to do so. Like many other China service officers, he developed 
exceptional fluency in Mandarin and possessed a keen analytical mind. According to Foreign 
Service inspectors such as Charles Eberhardt, he was also an able administrator, who brought the 
Canton Consulate into compliance with State Department regulations after a series of lazy and 
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recalcitrant predecessors.480  Unfortunately, he also had a contentious, abrasive personality, 
which eventually resulted in his resignation and prevented him from rejoining the Foreign 
Service after WWII. 
 As noted elsewhere, promotions were slow and junior officers were poorly paid.  In 
addition, consuls were expected to do a considerable amount of entertaining and usually paid all 
their own living expenses.481 When Price did not receive the promotion he believed he deserved, 
in 1929 he resigned after a series of acid exchanges and correspondence with Nelson Johnson, 
J.V.A. MacMurray, and Wilbur J. Carr.  Carr observed, “the ideal condition would be to promote 
at regular intervals all officers who, like yourself, deserve advancement . . . .”482 This was 
impossible, as promotions occurred only when there were vacancies in the next higher grade.  
 Price had actually threatened to resign frequently, first in 1921 after failing receive a 
promotion to Consul, and then continuously from 1927 to 1929, when his resignation was 
accepted in 1929.483  What aggravated Price (and no doubt other SIC-trained officers as well; 
Price was merely the most outspoken and pugnacious), in his words, was “seeing men without 
any consular experience appointed to the grade of consul while the regular career men who had 
worked their way up were ignored.”484  
 Although the complaints of Price and others were probably justified, in most cases they 
were counterproductive.  As Consul-General Eberhardt noted in his correspondence with the 
Personnel Division concerning Price in 1921,  
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“advancement in the Service depends largely on one’s own diligence and  uncomplaining 
application to the duties to which he is assigned . . . [Price] should  not in any way be 
permitted to get the idea that the ‘kicker’ and objector is given preference over the one 
who works diligently and uncomplainingly.”485  
 
 Price also had a penchant for independent actions that irritated or embarrassed the State 
Department, as well as a reputation of outspoken criticism of the government on numerous 
occasions.  One of these occurred in June, 1921.  Without first asking the advice of the American 
Minister in Peking, Price forwarded a letter from Dr. Sun Yat-sen (who was a personal friend of 
Price), president of a rival government in Canton addressed to the President, asking for 
recognition of his government, earning Price a reprimand for taking action that could have 
suggested U.S. recognition of Sun’s administration.486  The incident may have been a factor in 
his transfer to Foochow in December 1921.487     
 Shortly after his posting to Foochow, he and his wife lost their second child, who fell 
from the veranda on second story of the consulate.488  This probably intensified Price’s 
bitterness.  Despite these circumstances, the abrasive tone of Price’s correspondence and the 
implication that he sharply criticized the State Department to other Americans (and possibly 
foreigners) was more than his superiors could tolerate.  Commenting on Price’s obvious vitriolic 
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criticism of a U.S. naval commander’s refusal to provide what he (Price) felt was adequate 
protection of American missionaries in the area, Inspector Nelson Johnson noted, “as usual I am 
afraid he aired his feelings on the subject locally for I find that Price cannot see anything wrong 
or undignified in sympathizing with the local American community in any fancied complaint he 
or they have against the Government rather than make plain to them the necessity of the stand 
which the Government takes in the premises.”489 
 Inspectors such as Nelson T. Johnson described Price as “such an extremely callow youth 
that he is not regarded as much more than a minor clerk in the office who may be expected to 
grow up one day.” Nor did his choice of bride inspire confidence. The same inspectors 
considered her “a bright, charming, irresponsible little girl.”490 The timing of his marriage also 
caused irritation.  As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Student Interpreters required by law to be 
unmarried, yet Price married in 1915, midway through his language study program. 491  
 The State Department turned an unswervingly blind eye to violations of this rule—other 
Student Interpreters also married during their programs of study—yet it was almost certainly 
galling for officers such as Nelson T. Johnson, who postponed marriage until middle age, to see 
officers such as Price violate the rules and then complain obstreperously about a situation that 
was at least partially of their own making.  
 Price and his wife also wasted no time in having three children (a fourth died in March, 
1922).492  This exacerbated his financial situation as a junior officer. Moreover, between 1902 
and 1931, post allowances for living expenses and representational allowance were ad hoc, 
dependent on the flexibility of the State Department’s budget.  Hazardous duty pay, cost of 
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living adjustments, and other such forms of additional compensation did not exist. The sole 
means of determining the value of individual officers (in addition to entire posts) consisted of 
physical post inspections and annual efficiency reports. 
 Price was privately criticized for marrying so early in his career, as the drain on his 
finances curtailed his abilities to socialize with businessmen and soured his view of the Foreign 
Service.493 Inspector Fuller similarly noted the inadequacy of interpreters’ salaries in the case of 
Ernest Price, stating that “it is most unfortunate that he is married” and “I do not see how, even 
with favorable exchange, he will be able on an interpreter’s salary to keep a wife.”494 Inevitably, 
Price’s inability to rub shoulders with businessman, precarious finances, and an almost 
insubordinate stance toward superiors—all common complaints of and about SIC-trained 
officers—lowered Price’s efficiency ratings, retarding his promotions and perpetuating the very 
circumstances that had curdled his attitude from the beginning.495 
 Price and his family were also criticized for a (comparatively) abstemious lifestyle His 
wife was observed to have exercised “more than ordinary care in supervision of servants and 
household expenses, so much so … that the servants dislike to remain [in service] but this seems 
more from the fact that they have been spoiled by serving under impractical, careless, bachelor 
housekeepers such as [Percival ]Heintzleman, [Leo] Bergholz, etc., on whose purchases they 
could always make extra money ….”496 
 In this way, marital, familial, and financial circumstances materially and usually 
negatively affected the service and promotion schedule of even the best Foreign Service officers 
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from the turn of the century to the 1930s, when funding for personnel support finally reached an 
almost adequate level, largely due to the urging of senior Foreign Service officers who possessed 
greater influence in the Far East Division of the State Department.  
 Although most of the examples given here come from graduates of the China SIC (mostly 
because they existed in far greater numbers), numerous examples of Japan and Turkey officers 
who endured financial hardships—albeit to a slightly lesser extent. Harman Broomall, a student 
interpreter in Japan, failed the 6th year Japanese exam by a few points and was therefore 
ineligible for promotion (very few SIC graduates even took this exam however). Stating that he 
could not maintain his family with the dignity expected by the State Department on his current 
salary, Broomall resigned in 1924 to take a position with an American mercantile firm in 
Japan.497 
 Senior officers were hardly unmoved by the situations of officers such as Broomall and 
Price. J.V.A. MacMurray (Nelson T. Johnson’s predecessor as American Minister in Beijing) 
observed to Price, “I can only regret that our scheme of things so often assumes that our 
Government is entitled to make its servants pay for the privilege of serving, or get out.”498 
Price’s continuously strident demands for promotion and salary increases were generally 
absorbed with the caveat: “his ambitions for promotion are probably due to the fact that he is a 
junior officer with a family.”499 
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 Naturally, not all senior officers were as sympathetic as MacMurray, particularly officers 
such as Nelson T. Johnson and Clarence Spiker, who delayed marriage until early middle age.500 
However, in the face of Congressional parsimony, there was little that even the most sympathetic 
administrators could do, as even routine administrative functions were inadequately funded. For 
example, although a semi-regular inspection schedule existed after the major consular service 
reforms in 1906, efficiency ratings (on which promotions and pay raises were based) were often 
ignored or were skewed by the difficulties of evaluating personnel thousands of miles away from 
the administrative center (Washington D.C.).  This problem was particularly intractable in the 
case of Meryl S. Myers.  For twenty years, Myers was coincidentally either absent from his post 
(through no fault of his own) during every inspection tour; occasionally, his post was 
overlooked.501 
 Consequently, his personnel file contains a bewildering jumble of contradictory 
statements that do not always concur with the picture that emerges from consular post records. 
As mentioned elsewhere, it was through Myers’ efforts that the Andersen & Meyer Company 
obtained a $300,000 contract with Kotchiu Tin Trading Company; without his initiative, there 
would have been no agreement.502  Myer’s personnel file acknowledges his importance to this 
and numerous other instances—citing a particular businessman’s commendation of his efforts—
but without noting the scale of the transactions involved.503  Instead, the efficiency ratings often 
devolved into arcane bean counting over the number and style, and tone of commercial reports 
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and trade letters, without considering the location and size of the consulate, number of 
subordinates, and type of workload. (managing a high volume of passport and/or visa 
applications counted very little towards an officer’s efficiency, whereas a few well-written trade 
opportunity reports or commendation letters from businessmen were highly regarded).504 
  Inspector Charles C. Eberhardt was particularly harsh toward Myers.  In 1920, claiming 
that Myers intended to close the Swatow consulate in order to return to the United States on 
leave, he charged Myers with a “deplorable lack of Service Spirit,” shirking his work, feigning 
illness, of neglecting his official duties to study law, of “living in the most niggardly fashion” in 
order to save money—only to take a leave of absence while demanding a promotion.505 
 Unbeknownst to the inspector however, Myers had been so seriously ill while stationed at 
Chungking that a doctor as well as the American Minister (Paul Reinsch) recommended his 
transfer.  As for the “niggardly living,” when Myers finally had the opportunity to explain his 
financial situation to Wilbur Carr in 1920, it was noted that Myers’ wife had “departed for the 
U.S. some time ago. Since that time it has not been possible for Mr. Myers to support her in the 
U.S. and live up to the standard which maintained up to that time.”506  What is more, from family 
and marital status listed later in the file, it is apparent that Mrs. Myers left for the United States 
either pregnant or with a young child—another issue of which the inspector had been unaware or 
apathetic.507 Given the political unrest in China at the time, an officer’s sending his wife and 
child to the United States was logical, and was even common at other post throughout Asia and 
the Middle East. Chungking was considered a highly dangerous due to their climates. E. Carlton 
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Baker pleaded for a post transfer from Chungking in 1914 due to his wife’s health (they had lost 
an infant son a few months prior to his request), noting that although the previous two consuls 
and a clerk had stayed at the post for shorter periods than he, the health of all three had 
deteriorated rapidly.508 
 These cases illustrate the severe strain under which consular officers operated in China 
throughout the 1910s and ‘20s, while also highlighting the State Department’s expectations for 
their conduct. Family and financial hardships were further aggravated by the physical and 
political dangers associated with living in China during this period.  According to Price, due to 
civil war in October 1922, “all semblance of civil administration had vanished.  Not a civil 
official remained, and both the city and Nantai [an island] were without police.”509   
 Physical danger made financial security an even more pressing concern: officers had to 
consider what would happen to their families if their livelihood disappeared or a drastic change 
in their family status occurred. Officers who encountered special family problems, whose 
spouses died or who died themselves received little or (most commonly) no help for their 
families other than sympathy from the Federal government. For example, SIC Turkey graduate 
Ralph Bader’s wife died after giving birth to twins while he was stationed in Cairo. Bader 
returned to the United States on extended leave and resigned shortly afterwards.510 Because of 
Bader’s knowledge of Turkish, French, and Persian, Wilbur Carr (chief of the Consular Bureau) 
wrote to Bader, urging him to reconsider his resignation. 511 It is interesting to note that Bader 
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neither requested nor was he offered special treatment (such as a special post allowance). Cairo 
was considered a difficult and dangerous post due to the hot climate; after the death of Bader’s 
wife, George L. Brandt, another language officer, sent his wife and child back to the United 
States for health reasons.512 In addition to his immediate family, Willys Peck also for a time 
helped to support his brother’s widow, after his brother was killed in France during WWI; he 
requested—but was denied—a post allowance to support his family while stationed in war-torn 
Tsingtao.513 When SIC China graduate George Bickford died—after a protracted illness 
contracted through alleged (by his supervisors) overwork, his supervisor was informed that the 
State Department could do nothing directly for Bickford’s widow and/or children who were left 
destitute and dependent on family members in the United States.514 
 The family of SIC Japan graduate Max Kirjassoff fared only a little better. Max 
Kirjassoff was a Russian Jew and an American citizen naturalized through his father.515  When 
Kirjassoff and his wife were killed in a fire immediately after the Yokohama earthquake, not 
only were the futures of their children thrown into question, a legal and cultural scuffle occurred 
for custody of their children, as they did not have a will.516 Kirjassoff, who was Jewish, had 
married the sister of his SIC Japan colleague, James Ballantine, whose family was Christian. 
After the death of Kirjassoff, when his sisters requested custody of the children, Ballantine wrote 
to the State Department, demanding that the children be remanded to him, stating, “while I have 
no prejudice against Jews as such, it is unthinkable that Christian children should be brought up 
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in Jewish surroundings.”517 The private tribulations of  Raymond C. Curtice (SIC Japan) led him 
to shoot and kill himself on February 15th, 1922, after incurring a debt to the U.S. government of 
$11,000. 518 He left behind a wife and three children.519 Exactly how he incurred this debt and 
what impelled him to commit suicide in not clear from his records. In any case, Curtice was in 
debt and left his family without means and dependent on his father, who was a Protestant 
minister.520 
 These unpleasant but real contingencies made saving for the future imperative for 
Foreign Service officers but the fiscal realities of government service made doing so difficult for 
many SIC-trained officers, particularly those with families. Consuls such as Percival 
Heintzelman noted that all of their salaries went to maintaining their families and that they were 
therefore unable to save any money for the future. This was because compensation was fixed by 
law, from the rank of Student Interpreter onwards, and salary increases only came with 
promotions, which in turn were only given as vacancies became available in the next higher 
grade.  However, senior officers and State Department administrators were aware of and worked 
to rectify the problems of adequate compensation and personnel support. The issue gave 
Consular Bureau chief Wilbur Carr considerable distress, as he observed to Heintzelman,  
  
“there is no single problem of personnel work so important as the question of adequate 
salaries in the service. These salaries must be sufficient to give officers a  comfortable 
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living and also enough to enable them to save something. This is the end toward which 
we have been working for a number of years.”521 
  
 Nevertheless, as the petulant tone with which officers such as Price and Heintzelman 
often broached the subject of salaries and post allowances often obscured the very real unfairness 
of their position vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts and the U.S. State Department. As 
Heintzelman observed in his appeal to Carr, American consular officers were expected to 
maintain high social standing in their communities.522 Indeed, failure to socialize with the local 
foreign communities and his reluctance to maintain the dignity of the American Consular service 
were some of the very reasons Heintzelman was given low efficiency ratings and denied 
promotions, pay raises and allowances.523 
 From the above anecdotes, it is abundantly clear that there was very little support for the 
families of the SIC in China, Japan, and Turkey. Officers were at the mercy of a capricious rating 
system when it came to promotions, pay increases, and advances, and there was no safety net 
whatsoever for the families of officers who died on duty. Although the transcript can never be 
more than partial due to the overwhelmingly male nature of the State Department of the early 
twentieth century, it is complete enough to suggest that the support network for the SIC—touted 
as a pillar of the American imperial project in Asia—was so entirely inadequate as to beg the 
existence of the entire enterprise. 
 The outlines are clear however. From 1902 to the early 1930s, the Foreign Service’s 
system of pay and allowances did not sufficiently meet the ordinary needs of officers’ families, 
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let alone those in extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, appropriations for the operational 
expenses of missions and consulates (particularly those in China) were barely adequate to their 
functions and provided nothing for the social expenditures of these offices. The Rogers Act of 
1924 sought to address many of these deficiencies of the Foreign Service (re-named as such by 
the aforementioned bill), regularizing promotions, post allowances, detailing field officers to the 
State Department for periods of duty on a regular basis and allocating some funds for 
representational expenses (hosting, entertainment, etc.). However, these changes were 
implemented slowly: post allowances were distributed unevenly, and representational expenses 
were not authorized and implemented until the early 1930s.524 
 As will be discussed in greater detail later, by this time trade expansion as a departmental 
priority had greatly diminished, increasingly eclipsed by Japanese militarism and Chinese 
Communism. Beginning with the Japanese seizure of Tsingtao during WWI and Chinese 
political instability of the warlord period, political reporting garnered greater importance. In 
addition, as mentioned elsewhere, Japanese merchants had triumphed over their largely 
uninterested American counterparts, and Japanese consular officers and their military 
compatriots were busily closing the Open Door in practice (albeit not name) everywhere they 
could.  
 In this sense, this part of the Student Interpreters Corps’ story remains part of a U.S. 
government agency aware of its own needs and sluggishly but persistently promoting its own 
growth independent of the desires of any foreign policy elite. This examination of the women 
and families of the SIC, although incomplete, highlights the ad hoc pattern of inadequate initial 
investment, gradual consolidation and bureaucratic growth. It also underscores the fact that 
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commercial imperialist ideology did not translate into an imperialist bureaucracy. If American 
imperialism in China existed, it was only in the form of an ad hoc, intermittent, mental 
commitment to economic expansion that never translated into mechanisms of implementation, 
supervision and control, let alone into an appreciable increase in the balance of American foreign 
trade. 
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CHAPTER 7 
“IF THE LORD HAD CONSIDERED IT DANGEROUS:”525 THE SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MISSIONARIES AND THE SIC, 1900-1941 
 
 Along with trade expansion, American missionary activity in Asia and the Middle East, 
has been charged with complicity in an overarching American imperialist project. In an attempt 
to paint imperial stripes on the early twentieth century American presence in China, Thomas 
McCormick has depicted the consul, missionary, and naval officer as “the expansionist trinity” 
of the United States.526 Similarly, according to American missionary historian James Reed, “four 
decades of the Open Door policy … helped provoke the unjustifiable attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941 and left the United States ill-equipped to deal creatively with the rising force of Chinese 
nationalism.”527  Reed has attributed the lack of vision to “in large degree to the Protestant 
missionary movement,” suggesting at the same time that this produced a collective mentality, 
“the Missionary Mind,” which he asserts “colored the attitudes of the foreign-policy public and 
shaped the policies pursued by government officials.  Long after the missionary movement itself 
was on the wane, the Missionary mind continued to exercise a profound effect on policy.”528   
 Reed further argues that, “because the foreign policies pursued by a democratic republic 
may be said to rest upon the virtue of the people, or at least upon that section of the public which 
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is interested in foreign affairs, one may also suggest some deeper flaw in society.”529  For Reed, 
the source of this flaw is abundantly clear: asserting, “those who would seek some tragedy in our 
foreign relations need look no farther,”530 he unequivocally places the burden for the United 
States misguided policies squarely on the thought and practice evangelical Protestant 
Christianity.531 Examining the ground-level relationships between American Foreign Service 
officers and missionaries, this chapter will argue that the relationship between American 
missionaries and US government representatives was ambivalent and that arguments such as that 
of Reed offer a reductionist portrayal of American evangelical Protestants and exaggerates the 
influence of Christianity on Americans in China. Echoing (and at many points, relying on) 
Reed’s study, Chinese scholar Jing Wang has highlighted the impact of missionaries on 
American government perceptions of China, observing the growth of missionary-board spending 
on China, the rapidly rising number of new American missionaries in China, and underscoring 
that missionaries played a role in influencing the Woodrow Wilson administration to recognize 
the new Chinese republic following the 1911 revolution.532  
Yet while missionaries made significant contributions to the American understanding of 
China and possibly influenced the outlooks of some individual officers, this chapter argues their 
impact was limited, complicated by the heavy emphasis the State Department placed on trade 
expansion in China until the 1920s. Furthermore, while the substance of this entire study tends to 
highlight the influence of language-trained Foreign Service officers on US perceptions of and 
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policy proposals for China and Japan, it must be emphasized that their influence on actual policy 
formulation was highly circumscribed—this will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.  
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the influence of reports by SIC-trained officers on 
State Department perceptions of political, social, and economic developments depended heavily 
on which officer reported on them and who actually read the reports in the Far East Division of 
the State Department in Washington. During the 1930s, one of the most important figures in the 
Far East Division was Stanley Hornbeck, who served as head of the Far East Division from 1928 
to 1937, and from 1937 to 1944 as a special advisor to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.533 SIC-
Japan-trained Joseph Ballantine noted that reports from field officers generally passed through 
himself on the way to Cordell Hull, along the way reviewed and amended by Hornbeck534—an 
informational bottleneck through which information that challenged his opinions did not pass 
easily.  In this way, any influence missionaries might have exerted through diplomatic channels 
would have been more indirect than that of field officers themselves. Studies by scholars such as 
James Reed and Jing Wang have highlighted missionaries’ influence on American domestic 
public opinion and perceptions of China, particularly noting the explosion of missionary-
published works on China near the turn of the twentieth century, and the concomitant rise in 
church-based giving to missionary endeavors in China.535  
 As has been outlined previously, during the first two decades of the 20th century, 
American trade expansion and Open Door ideology were the chief priorities for the State 
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Department in China; missionary protection was a necessary but incidental component of 
officers’ duties. Moreover, as Reed has asserted, “men doing business with Asia did not, as a 
rule, have missionary minds . . . they were in it for the money: thus the business attitudes toward 
China and Japan [were] markedly different from the perspectives common in the Protestant 
religious community.536 State Department officials themselves possessed greater affinities with 
the views of businessmen outlook than that of missionaries. In fact, consular dispatches, 
inspection reports, and personnel files indicate that many officers believed that they knew what 
would benefit American trade in China better than businessmen themselves.  
As noted previously, with the beginning of a (putatively) merit-based system of 
appointments and promotion in 1906, senior State Department officials repeatedly the role of 
consuls in promoting American trade in their districts.  American consular officers tried to push 
skeptical businessmen through the Open Door, but by and large, they did not go—and both 
officers and Consular Service inspectors were cognizant of this. For example, during his 
inspection of the US consular offices in Shanghai (at the time staffed by missionary-turned 
consul, Dr. Amos P. Wilder) Fleming D. Cheshire observed,  
 
“the many answers to trade inquiries have placed before the parties making the inquiry 
valuable information as to what should be done if they desire to enter the China markets 
with their goods—something more than the mere sending of trade  catalogues which do 
not and cannot increase trade among a people who cannot  read them.”537 
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Despite the preponderance of missionary interests in Shanghai, US consular officers gave far 
greater attention to American businessmen from the turn of the century into the 1920s, that is, 
trade promotion was a US government priority; protection of missionaries was incidental to the 
consular mission of providing services to US citizens abroad.  When businessmen complained to 
inspectors about a consul general or consul’s commercial efficiency, it took little more evidence 
for the inspectors to recommend their transfer. During this period, not only consular officers but 
also native employees were evaluated on their utility to advancing American trade, in the 
Ottoman Empire as well as China. For example, Elias T. Gelat and Antoine Thomas Gelat of the 
Jerusalem office were similarly educated in missionary schools, and were Syrian Christians.538 
According to Inspector A. Gottschalk, Antoine was “one of the most useful, loyal men we have 
among the corps of natives employed throughout the Ottoman Empire . . . is particularly good at 
commercial work.”539  
 Moreover, there was a hiring preference in American consulates in China, Japan, and the 
Ottoman Empire for hiring Christians, although it was not an official policy and its application 
was far from universal. In the Ottoman Empire, the State Department generally preferred to hire 
Christian subjects of Greek and Armenian descent.540 In China there was a tendency to hire 
Christians—particularly in offices staffed by American consular offices with close ties to 
missionaries—but this was much less uniformly the case. Conversely, local Christians rarely 
appeared in American consular offices in Japan. Arguably least religiously and culturally 
influenced by missionaries, Japanese employees were highly educated; Shuten Inouye of the 
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Kobe office was a teacher of Japanese, an accomplished essayist, and had been educated in 
Japanese government schools.541 
However, the overriding priorities for the State Department were that native employees 
and consular officials alike be loyal to the Department and free of vested interests, whether they 
might be financial assets or missionary agendas, and demonstrated commitment to the goal of 
expanding American trade. Consequently, suspected of having missionary interests at heart, 
missionaries-turned-consular officers were particularly vulnerable to criticism related to trade-
promotion.  In the case of Amos P. Wilder, American Consul-General in Shanghai in 1911, 
Fleming D. Cheshire concluded,  
 
“Dr. Wilder possesses ability, is active and alert, and I believe endeavors to maintain a 
high standard of efficiency as Consul-General, but I am afraid he lacks one very essential 
qualification—as members of the mercantile community here tell me—commercial 
instinct.  He is criticised [sic] by some of the American merchants here as an 
unsatisfactory officer in dealing with commercial matters, is too much a politician; whose 
instincts are political rather than commercial.”542    
  
As Cheshire portrayed it, the problem was that Wilder did not submit enough commercial 
reports, relegating the task SIC-trained subordinates assigned to the Shanghai office.543  In 1911 
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these included John K. Davis, Esson M. Gale, James P. Jameson and Frank W. Hadley.544  These 
officers also handled all of the “protection cases” involving American claims against the Chinese 
government.  In Shanghai during 1911, these cases were fairly evenly divided between Standard 
Oil’s complaints of piracy, theft, and the growing pains of business expansion (the construction 
of new storage tanks, for example) on the one hand, and missionary disputes with local Chinese 
authorities over land leases and the construction of buildings (schools, hospitals, churches, 
etc).545  The inspection report observed the rise of nationalism, and “the dissemination of ‘rights 
recovering’ propaganda” made it difficult for missionaries to obtain long-term leases, and in 
many instances the Chinese refused to fulfill contracts for the construction of new buildings.546  
 In these instances, the “good offices” of the American Consulate-General usually 
resolved the disputes.  Cheshire noted,  
 
“this Consulate-General fully appreciates the fact that the missionary societies would do 
well to enter upon their fields of work bearing the olive branch rather than the sword, and 
every effort is made to prevent unnecessary friction with the natives in these cases.” 
 
Although missionary-related protection cases constituted nearly 50% of the workload of the 
American Consulate-General in Shanghai, both inspectors and Foreign Service emphasized the 
commercial importance of the city.  For example, consul Amos P. Wilder noted, “the city of 
Shanghai is often called the commercial capital of the Chinese Empire, nearly half of all China’s 
imports entering here, for either local consumption or distribution to the Yangtze and coast 
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ports.”547 However, although it was understood that missionary protection constituted the bulk of 
the workload at many posts in addition to Shanghai, unless missionaries wrote to the State 
Department to commend or complain about individual officers, their resolution of missionary 
problems rarely found its way into the efficiency ratings on which promotions were based.  Even 
inspection reports only mention missionary-related work in passing, or, as in the case above, to 
criticize the ability of missionaries to advance American trade. 
Studies such as that of James Reed begin by positing existence of a “foreign policy 
elite.”548  This elite is difficult to define: its composition varied according to the outcomes of 
each presidential election (due to the political appointments), yet somehow in Reed’s portrayals 
it determined the course of United States foreign policy. In the case of China, American trade did 
not pass through the Open Door in the hoped-for volume, either to follow the flag (ie, through 
the acquisition of a traditional empire), or to follow missionaries. 
 In the early twentieth century, studies such as that of Reed argue that “opinion 
leadership” was oriented toward Europe by virtue of language training, class, and worldview, but 
was illiterate on East Asian affairs, thus, “the Missionary Mind rushed in to fill this vacuum.549  
Although this might have been true at the end of the 19th century, even by 1911 (the beginning of 
Reed’s study) this was changing, particularly as Chinese-trained officers gradually filled the 
ranks of consular officers in China. Reed’s argument hinges on the United States’ reaction to the 
1911 revolution in China and the United States’ of the Chinese Republic,550 against the advice of 
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Charles D. Tenney, the Chinese Secretary (and a SIC graduate551).552 As Reed observes, by the 
next year (1912), Tenney had executed an abrupt about-face.   In a dispatch to the American 
Minister, Tenney had highlighted the increasingly anti-foreign attitudes and disregard for treaty 
obligations.  He also observed, “the Chinese literati and gentry who have espoused 
Republicanism are still less actuated by any wish to improve the lot of the people.  They are 
utilizing the change in government to strengthen their hand in the exercise of the local tyranny 
which they have always tried to exercise . . . .553 Tenney’s about-face on the 1911 revolution did 
in fact mirror the depictions of American missionaries. Charles Tenney is a good example of a 
missionary-turned consular officer (at least temporarily). A medical doctor serving as consul in 
Nanking, China in 1913, Tenney was strongly criticized by inspector George Murphy for owning 
“a considerable amount of real estate in Tientsin” and recommended his transfer to another 
country even while admitting that Tenney’s influence had “greatly improved this office and 
conditions at Nanking.554 
As Wang and other scholars have noted, American missionaries did contribute to an 
increasingly positive perception of the Chinese Republic, following the 1911 revolution.555 They 
were sympathetic optimists in their views, and envisioned the realization of a Christian China.556 
They also played an active role in arguing for social reforms in China. For example, medical 
missionaries played a crucial role in gathering evidence on the debilitating effects of opium use, 
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while nearly both medical and evangelistic missionaries advocated for the end of the opium trade 
and prohibition of its use by the Chinese, adamantly keeping the issue alive.557   
 However, just as Thomas McCormick’s assertion of American economic empire in China 
founders on examination of SIC-China officers’ trade expansion efforts, so too do claims such as 
that of Reed on the existence of a putative “foreign policy elite,” guided by a “missionary 
mind.”558 The American Foreign Service made a concerted effort to distance itself from 
missionaries, local employees, and businessmen.  Too close an association with outside 
influences (usually entailing local Chinese/Japanese/Turkish residents, businessmen, and 
missionaries) potentially compromised an officer’s usefulness and frequently affected an 
officer’s efficiency rating, according to Foreign Service inspectors and senior State Department 
officials. 559  Abstemious habits (for example, disdain for gambling and refusing to consume 
alcohol) factored into selection of post assignments.  Officers who like Ernest Price closely 
associated with missionaries were often channeled away from important commercial offices, as 
the refusal to drink alcohol made odious to high society to American businessmen, and 
threatened to compromise their effectiveness in trade promotion.560  Inspector Robert Frazer Jr. 
observed that either rigid abstinence or overindulgence in any common vice (drinking, dancing, 
gambling) could damage an officer’s reputation in the local community.561 
On the one hand, American missionaries, businessmen, and Foreign Service officers 
mingled extensively and often exchanged views via telegrams, letters, and conversations.  
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However, in concrete instances where there was a connection between consular officers and the 
American missionary community, both inspectors and fellow officers deliberately warned the 
State Department of this.  For example, in November 1920, consul George C. Hanson notified 
the Department that during his absence on leave, vice-consul Price “showed a marked preference 
for the company of missionaries and was very popular with them” but “was not popular with the 
American and foreign business community.”562 According to inspector, Hanson reported, “while 
at Foochow, [Price] was evidently outspoken in his disappointment at not being more rapidly 
promoted in the Service, and spoke of resigning if this condition was not bettered.  The 
missionaries by their petition evidently hoped to assist him.”563 
There does seem to have been some tension between Price and Hanson, likely rooted in 
their vastly different lifestyles and outlooks. As mentioned elsewhere, Hanson was a Chinese and 
Russian polyglot, an outgoing heavy drinker (by most accounts), and a womanizer. Aside from 
being a heavy cigarette smoker (along with his wife), Price was abstemious and socially 
conservative. After returning from leave while stationed together at Foochow (Hanson was 
senior in rank), Hanson wrote that Price “did good work but was overjealous [sic] in pressing 
several very doubtful claims made by missionaries against Chinese.  Apparently, every request 
the missionaries made he strived very hard to grant.”564 
Hanson also deplored Price’s criticism of the Department, noting that “new provisions for 
Vice Consuls” had improved their financial situations.565  He observed that “businessmen . . . 
have treated them lightly because they considered them the results of inexperience, lack of 
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balance, and conceit.  The missionaries have probably taken them seriously.”566 This does seem 
to have been the case. Price was one of the “odd-balls” of the Far East Division, clashing with 
hardball supervisors, who were the ideological and political gatekeepers of these circles of 
influence.  One such collision was the acrimony between Nelson Johnson and Ernest Price 
concerning the latter’s views of American policy in China and his tendency to air his opinions 
among other Americans in his consular district.  In a discussion with Price in 1927 concerning 
both his service record and his views on American policy, Nelson Johnson quoted a portion of 
one of Price’s own dispatches back to him:  
 
“I would be remiss in my duty if I did not also record . . . the practically unanimous belief 
of Americans in this district that their Government has utterly failed in its duty in not 
having adopted, enunciated and carried through a definite policy with respect to 
Americans and their rights and interests in China. There are those who feel that the 
Government should have protected them.  There are those who feel that it should not 
have protected them.  But there appears to be no disagreement on the principle that the 
Government should either have told Americans that they should get out of China, and 
assisted them to do so, or should have told them they might stay, and assisted them to do 
so.”567   
 
 Moreover, Price explicitly advised increasingly greater protection for American 
missionaries in his consular district of Foochow, even if doing required violations of Chinese 
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sovereignty. His heart was probably in the right place: spread out through the city, Americans 
ran two schools (a boarding school for 150 girls, and one for almost 1000 boys), a hospital, and a 
homeless shelter.568 In the event of an invasion of the city by Communists or bandits, this 
philanthropic American interests would be vulnerable targets. According to Price, the 
contingency plan was that thirty Marines from the U.S.S. Rizal would concentrate at the 
American Consulate and two other locations on one side of the river that divided metropolitan 
Foochow.569 Priced deemed a force of thirty insufficient to protect American interest and urged 
the numbers be increased, yet despite his insistence, the U.S. commander insisted that any 
augmentation of the force “would mean a conspicuous violation of the sovereignty of China.”570   
Price’s case illustrates how the complex and often contradictory relationship between 
missionaries and Foreign Service officers contributed to a growing consensus that the United 
States should increasingly favor direct intervention in China’s internal affairs. Although—as 
noted above—perceptions of an overly intimate relationship between SIC graduates and 
American missionaries invited the disapprobation of senior officers, areas of overlapping interest 
existed in daily life and professional development. 
The professionalization of the Student Interpreters Corps in China was partly due to the 
ties between the Consular Service and American missionaries in China.  There was a simple 
reason for this: missionaries constituted the vast majority of Americans living in China, from the 
turn of the twentieth century to the beginning of WWII.  Even in large commercial centers such 
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as Shanghai, American missionaries greatly outnumbered businessmen.571  Missionaries often 
played important roles in the language training and testing of the SIC, including in Japan and 
Turkey, but their role in shaping the “China Service” was particularly strong.  In the first place, 
the State Department regulations for the biennial examinations of student interpreters required 
that they be “examined for promotion to the grade of interpreter by a board composed of the 
language officer and two Americans designated by the chief of the mission.”572  In most 
instances, at least one of the two was a missionary.  Similarly, after 1917, for the first year of 
their training, SIC recruits attended the North China Union Language School, established to 
teach Americans (primarily missionaries) the Mandarin language.573  Following the suggestion of 
Willys R. Peck (the Chinese Secretary of the American Legation), the U.S. Army also chose to 
use the school to train its Language Officers.574   
 An important part of the story of United States foreign policy; missionaries were 
intertwined with the development of the Consular Service, particularly in China.  Consular 
Service inspectors such as Fleming Cheshire sought out and consulted senior missionaries for 
advice on where to open new consulates, close obsolete offices, or for personal information 
concerning the character and conduct of the consuls (inspectors usually stayed in the area for 
only a few days at a time).575 
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 So far as concerned the protection of American interests, consuls dealt more often with 
missionaries than with merchants.  In places like Chungking, China in the early twentieth 
century, “protection,” usually entailed a personal appeal or visit to a local Chinese magistrate and 
reporting the exchange to the American Legation in Peking and the State Department.576  
Inspector Stuart Jamieson Fuller wrote, “no American should ever be sent here on less than 
US$1800.  At present exchange he could not live on less than US$3000.  Vice Consul Meinhardt 
lives on the charity of missionaries.”577 
 In China at least, on balance the Consular Service more than repaid any charity received 
from missionaries.  Inspection reports, dispatches, and correspondence reveal a symbiotic 
relationship between American missionaries and the United States Consular Service.  This 
rapport was stronger in China than in Japan or the Ottoman Empire, particularly in China’s 
interior, where the American consul’s informal relations with the local magistrates could make 
the difference between life and death.  In some provinces, missionary-related work occupied 
much, if not most, of consuls’ time.  In the Chungking district in 1919, for example, there were 
190 American residents. All but five of these were missionaries; one was doctor and the other 
four were Standard Oil employees.578 
Missionaries regularly corresponded with American consuls in their districts, reporting 
on social, economic, political, and military conditions. For example, while serving as consul in 
Changsha province in 1916, Nelson T. Johnson relayed to the American minister, Paul S. 
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Reinsch, that Chinese soldiers in Kuangsi had opened gambling houses in violation of local laws 
in order to supplement their income.579 More worrisome however, were reports from American 
missionaries at Yoochow that armed groups of bandits were roaming the countryside, claiming to 
have been “armed and provisioned” by the American missionaries there.580  
 Although the reports were untrue in this case, the incident highlights the ways in which 
missionaries could be a nuisance to Chinese authorities and therefore cause problems for US 
Foreign Service officers by exacerbating anti-foreign attitudes in Chinese public opinion and 
among Chinese government officials. Although they did not always couch their observations in 
enlightened terms, American consular officers recognized these realities and attempted to 
address them squarely. For example, SIC-China-trained consul Samuel Sokobin noted in 1923 
that the anti-foreign agitation in his district was not a new development but rather one that 
derived from several centuries of antipathy towards foreigners as “barbarians, an inferior, 
despicable people, not to be received among the Chinese and not to be permitted to reside in the 
country.”581 Sokobin argued that  
 
“we [the State Department] must clearly understand this—the Chinese do not like the 
foreigner he is American, British, French, or Japanese. They do not want us; they do not 
appreciate our beneficence, our desire to help them keep up in the march of civilization. 
                                            
579 Nelson Johnson to Paul S. Reinsch, Changsha, China, June 27, 1916, “Correspondence, American Consulate, 
Chansha, China, Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84, Records of the Department of State, NARA, College 
Park, MD. 
580 Ibid. 
581 Samuel Sokobin, “The Changing Attitude of The Chinese toward Foreigners,” American Consulate, Kalgan, 
China, March 31, 1923, Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84, Records of the Department of State, NARA, 
College Park, MD.  
194	
	
	
Not every child appreciates being dragged along by his father, who marches down the 
street in great haste, leading the child by the hand.”582  
 
Sokobin concluded that these feelings were “innate and instinctive and not to be 
eradicated by sentimental concessions.”583 Missionaries sometimes aggravated such sensitivities, 
and remained aware of instances of friction that could irritate officers’ relations with the Chinese 
government. For example, Dr. H. McLean, a British missionary in Yunnanfu with China Inland 
Mission, reported that an American missionary named William Marcus Young had been so 
zealous in mission work that he had “on more than one occasion antagonized the local 
officials.”584 
To be sure, officers from missionary backgrounds tended to be more sympathetic towards 
missionaries. Pronouncements such as that of Sokobin above are starkly at odds with decades-
earlier assertions by officers such as Willys R. Peck (himself a child of missionary parents and 
born in China) described Chinese history as “largely a record of recurrent cycles of submission 
to foreign domination and of nationalism which expels such domination and restores Chinese 
intellectual and political independence.”585 He further noted that Chinese officials “refer with 
much gratitude to the cultural benefits derived by China from the efforts of American 
missionaries, educators in general, and the education of students as the result of the Boxer 
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Indemnity remission.”586 Writing to Willys R. Peck (in China), Edwin Neville (in Japan)  opined 
that the United States would continue to have strong “cultural or religious influences” in China 
for some time to come but believed that once China achieved a strong central government, that 
those influences would “while undoubtedly for good,” would “work out in a manner much 
different from what the founders intended.”587 
The relationship between missionaries and Foreign Service officers in China was a 
special one. Unlike their counterparts in Japan, consular officers in China often relied on 
missionaries for information regarding political, military, and economic conditions in the 
Chinese interior—particularly during the 1930s through WWII. These reports were sometimes 
dishearteningly similar. For example, during the war, reports from American missionaries in the 
Tibet region for example provided information on Japanese troop movements and activities, as 
well as local attitudes, noting that all classes of the population there “are all pro-German and pro-
Japanese. They frankly praised the Germans and the Japanese . . . and said that they will gladly 
become the peasants of the Japanese if they come here . . . .”588 SIC-China-trained consular 
officers in western China mirrored these reports. Raymond P. Ludden and John Carter Vincent 
reported widespread ambivalence among the Chinese on the front lines in the Yunnanfu region, 
declaring,  
 
“I came out of Japanese internment and volunteered to return immediately to China 
because I thought that with the United States in the war the Chinese would do everything 
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possible to prosecute the war against the Japanese. I have been sadly disillusioned and the 
longer I remain here the more evident it becomes that the Chinese are prepared to fight 
the war against the Japanese to the last American, but not otherwise.589  
 
SIC-trained officers kept a close eye on attacks against American life and property in 
China, whether threatened by the Japanese, Chinese nationalists, bandits, or Chinese 
communists, and recorded aggression against American missionaries and businesses alike.590 
Consular officers in China often requested and received information from US missionaries in the 
Chinese interior.591 They also did their best to warn missionaries—American and foreign alike, 
as was standard practice among consular bodies in China—of impending attacks in their areas. 
Nelson T. Johnson wrote to Willys Peck in 1933 that the American Legation was recommending 
that missionaries in Tungchow close the American mission school there in the wake of Japanese 
military aggression there.592 This practice often saved lives, as in the case of one F.S. Hatton, an 
American missionary stationed at a small village in Yunnanfu province in 1935, whom the US 
consulate in that province warned by special courier messenger of an advance by Chinese 
Communist troops.593  
However, Americans often remained in areas under threat of attack by communist, 
bandit, and Japanese forces even when an evacuation had been recommended by the American 
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consulate or Embassy, leading to accusations by other missionaries as well as consular officers 
that “the Americans are running undue risk.”594 In most cases, evacuation in the face of danger 
fell to missionaries themselves to arrange. Moreover, as their correspondence with American 
consular officers indicates, they were most often aware of the danger before American officials 
themselves were.595 For example, in June, 1935, all 18 of the American residents of Yoochow—
all missionaries of the Reformed Church Mission—in Yunnanfu province evacuated to Hankow 
in advance of the Chinese Communist assault there on the advice of local Chinese friends and 
magistrates, and in coordination with the “well-to-do” Chinese of that city.596 It is worth noting 
that an American gunboat, the U.S.S. Guam, paid a visit to the Yangtze river near Yochow and 
Chenglingki where the Communist forces were concentrating, staying there at the behest 
(“earnestly begged,” according to the commanding officer of the Guam) of the local Chinese 
Nationalist garrison in order to deter attack and allow missionaries to evacuate if necessary.597 
 However, in 1935, even while some missionaries were evacuating areas threatened by 
Communist advances, other missionaries were entering for the first time. For example, whereas 
the China Inland Mission ordered its personnel to evacuate Chinghai (although not all of them 
obeyed), at the same time a group of Seventh Day Adventist missionaries traveled to the 
province to open a new mission despite the apparent danger.598 In this province alone, dozens of 
missionaries from four different American denominations were active, many with families, 
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stationed in remote areas.599 The Seventh Day Adventists in Lanchow exemplified missionaries’ 
reluctance to abandon their posts even in the face of danger. Consul General Paul Josselyn 
warned them that “it will be difficult, if not impossible, for this office to render any effective 
assistance if the Red forces should actually threaten the city of Kaolan [nearby Lanchow].”600 
Missionaries often stayed at their posts not out of recalcitrance or blind devotion to their duties, 
but rather because they often possessed more detailed, accurate, and up to date information 
concerning the situation in their districts. This is illustrated by the correspondence between the 
director of the China Inland Mission in Lanchow and Consul General Paul Josselyn, in which the 
former stressed that the mission was keeping a close eye on political and military developments 
and had evacuated the mission in the past without having been warned by the US consulate.601 
As mentioned above, American naval forces in China occasionally visited threatened areas if 
they were accessible by boat. Consular officers also tried to arrange protection by Chinese 
government police and military for American missionary personnel whenever they were 
threatened. However, missionaries were often zealous in their aims to penetrate new areas but lax 
in applying to Chinese authorities for the necessary residence permits and transit passes. As 
noted above, SIC-trained Samuel Sokobin observed that Chinese officials were particularly 
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annoyed by requests for protection when the missionaries had arrived uninvited and without 
proper authorization and documentation.602  
One such instance is highlighted in correspondence between US Ambassador to China 
Nelson T. Johnson and Wang Chao-ming, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.603 Johnson had 
received news from the Seventh Day Adventist Mission in Tatsienlu, Sikong province, that the 
area was under threat of an imminent Communist attack, and wrote to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, requesting emergency protection for Americans residing or traveling there.604 The acting 
minister responded by duly asking provincial officials to provide protection, but protested to 
Johnson that “it is not right that the three Americans . . . arbitrarily went into the interior without 
having obtained interior traveling huchaos [passes].”605 Lack of local protection could be 
disastrous for missionaries. For example, Willys R. Peck wrote that refusal of Chinese authorities 
in Hunan to protect American missionaries led to the murder of one Dr. Reinhart in Yoochow, 
Hunan in the early 1933, leading to increased efforts by consuls to inform both local magistrates 
and the Foreign Ministry of the presence and activities of American missionaries, even if such 
exertions aroused the ire of Chinese officials. 606 
Chinese officials were also often annoyed by the attitudes of both missionaries and 
Foreign Service officers toward the Chinese government’s efforts to combat bandits and 
Communists: troops were often quartered on private property—including that of missionaries—
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and payment rendered in nearly worthless (by local standards if not actually so legally) Chinese 
National Government banknotes.607 For example, in 1935, Nationalist troops occupied the 
compound of the Christian and Missionary Alliance in Kansu. When consular officers 
objected—and they usually did so strenuously, albeit in culturally appropriate terms608—Chinese 
government officials promised to investigate but assured US representatives that troops had been 
prohibited from occupying missionary chapels themselves.609 
As for missionaries entering China or new areas of China during this turbulent decade, 
religious zeal tended to override any doubts concerning security, even when warned personally 
and explicitly by American consular and military officers. Independent Pentacostal missionary 
George L. Ward offers an excellent example of this.  Despite the civil war in western China, in 
1935 Ward brought his wife of five months and two step children to China, intending to go to 
Kanting (also known as Tatsieulu). Neither Ward nor his wife and children could speak any of 
the regional Chinese languages; they had very little money, “no knowledge of China” and no 
organizational support.610 Despite all this, on being warned by the commander of the USS Palos, 
Ward insisted that “the Lord had directed him to go to Tatsieulu and Batang, and if the Lord had 
considered it dangerous he would probably have warned him or maybe was trying his (Ward’s) 
faith.”611 To the captain’s admonition that travel through the mountains with winter would be 
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especially perilous for the small children, Ward replied that “the Lord tells us where we must 
preach and if we do not we must return to Montana and give up our church and our souls.”612 
Such zeal might have been admirable, but it complicated Foreign Service officers in their efforts 
to protect American citizens.  
By the 1920s, American policy in China had become increasingly reactionary, 
responding to crises with limited resources other than diplomacy until the outbreak of WWII. 
Although “anti-foreignism” will not be dealt with in detail here, American Foreign Service 
officers in China were alive to the fact that missionaries were often a logistical and/or financial 
nuisance to the Chinese government, frequently traveling to the Chinese interior provinces 
without permission but requesting protection when threatened by bandits or Communists and 
strenuously objecting to occupation of their mission properties by government forces combating 
the former. However, the influence of missionaries on US Foreign Service officers was muted, 
and it is difficult to trace anything more than a highly circumscribed line between the perceptions 
they helped to translate for the US government and American public and actual policy 
implementation. What they did do, along with SIC-trained American Foreign Service officers in 
China and Japan, was to begin sounding the call for more direct, interventionist policies—as the 
above quote from Ernest Price suggests. 
 Nonetheless, arguments that missionaries exerted a direct influence on foreign policy are 
difficult to reconcile with the structure and function of the United States Foreign Service as it 
existed between 1900 and 1941 in China. As has been indicated, although there was a unique 
relationship between American missionaries in China and Foreign Service officers, this was due 
to more to the comparatively large number of missionaries in China relative to other countries, as 
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well as the fact that a significant number of SIC-trained officers (including comparatively 
influential first-generation SIC graduates, such as Willys R. Peck, Joseph Ballantine, and Eugene 
Dooman, as well as some of the more well-known “China Hands,” such as Ernest Price, John K. 
Davis, Eugene Dooman and John Hall Paxton were likewise from missionary families. They 
putatively personify the “Missionary Mind,” as Reed calls it, and yet nearly all of them criticized 
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and several praised the Chinese Communists and advocated U.S. 
recognition of the PRC—these were among the chief reasons that several of them were fired or 
forced to resign in the 1940, as has been extensively examined elsewhere.613 
 Most of the younger officers (those who entered service in the late 1920s and early ‘30s) 
who were not disciplined had experienced the good fortune of being transferred out of China 
prior the beginning of World War II.  Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson was transferred (under 
protest) to Australia in 1941, just months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.614  Born to 
missionary parents in Soochow, China, John K. Davis was also transferred out of China before 
the war, but for him it was out of the frying pan and into the fire: after several dangerous 
assignments in China, Davis found himself in Warsaw in1939, shortly before the German-Soviet 
assault on Poland.615  
 The views of officers such as Davis will be more thoroughly examined in another 
chapter. However, the interconnections between Foreign Service officers, the SIC, and American 
missionaries indicate that the actual relationship, although special, was far more multifaceted 
than has been hitherto acknowledged. There were many voices, many minds, many influences, 
but despite some common denominators, their priorities were generally distinct from one 
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another. As has been stressed here and in previous chapters, during the early 20th century the 
State Department heavily stressed trade expansion; this emphasis drove an invisible yet tangible 
wedge between missionaries and SIC-trained officers—at times frustrating the latter who 
received scant recognition for missionary-protection work. As American policy in China tended 
increasingly toward crisis management, American missionaries were as much a headache for 
American officials as they were an intelligence asset. Moreover, their stubborn insistence on 
penetrating new areas of China was a constant nuisance to Chinese authorities.  
 Yet in one area there was increasing harmony: missionaries as well as consular officers 
increasingly agreed on the need for the United States to take more direct, interventionist action. 
As will be highlighted later, there were many opinions as to what course or courses of action 
should or should not be taken, and in the 1930s there was a proliferation of diplomatic projects 
and studies (as mentioned previously), but the subtle intimations were that the responses to 
Japanese aggression and Chinese Communism should be military or financial support to the 
Chinese government.  
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CHAPTER 8 
IMPERIALISM TRANSLATED: STUDENT INTERPRETERS AND AMERICAN 
IMPERIAL MIMICRY IN ASIA, 1902-1941 
 
 “We must push forward, and by every worthy means at our command seize the markets 
of the world.”616 Regardless of whether they were realizable and/or actually realized, such were 
American attitudes toward economic expansion at the turn of the twentieth century. The intended 
field of conquest was the markets of Asia, in particular, the fabled China market. Yet as 
American commercial and political leaders guided national ambitions in this direction, they 
became acutely aware of the inadequacies of the United States’ consular service.  There was a 
widespread conviction among commercial and political leaders that “in China national prestige” 
was just as at stake as was financial gain and that without vital reforms “the greatest market of 
the future [would be] supinely delivered to our trade rivals because of this and other blunders by 
our government.”617 Seeking to expand and professionalize the United States’ diplomatic and 
consular corps, imperially minded reformers sought to portray the United States as an imperial 
rival, adopting imperialist rhetoric and stressing language training and consular 
professionalization as the twin secrets of overseas economic success. These State Department 
reformers used the language of an imperial project and aped the economic imperialism that they 
knew from experience (particularly with the British and French) in order to capitalize upon the 
exaggerated perceptions of the China market by American businessmen and accomplish their 
goal of bolstering and centralizing United States government power.   
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 Although the economic benefits were never realized, they prompted the creation of the 
Student Interpreters Corps (SIC), cementing it as a defining feature of the U.S. Consular Service 
in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire during the first decade of the twentieth century. In this 
framework, the presumed secret to commercial success in China was a language trained, 
professional consular service, capable of actively promoting national business interests within 
their districts. The establishment of the SIC and the concurrent reorganization of the U.S. 
Consular service consciously emulated existing imperial models, particularly those of Britain and 
France with respect to pay, promotion, and responsibilities. Through these reforms, State 
Department officials sought to carve out space for an American economic empire in Asia. 
However, despite turn of the century expansionist rhetoric, language trained officers could not do 
the businessman’s work for him. The dream of economic empire thus materialized little further 
than English-language product catalogues on the coffee tables of American consulates in China. 
 Scholars of British imperialism such as Andrew Thompson and Bernard Porter have 
debated the domestic effects of imperialism’s waxing and waning on British society and 
politics.618 Diplomatic language training and cultivation of foreign language-competent officials 
was part of British imperial expansion—although it was often a long process. According to G. R. 
Berridge, for a long period after the British embassy had been established in Istanbul, few British 
ambassadors learned Turkish.619 After the British government assumed responsibility for paying 
the ambassadors’ salaries, the Levant Company began agitating for reform of the dragomanate, 
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whose ranks had thitherto been filled by “Franks” of Italian extraction.620 The Company (as well 
as many in the British diplomatic service, not to mention merchants) felt that these non-British 
interlocutors were entirely too ready to yield ground on issues of trade privileges and 
concessions.621 
 As discussed here and elsewhere, nationalist encouragement of trade provided one of the 
impulses for the United States’ implementation of language training programs, which tended to 
belatedly imitate its former mother country’s diplomatic and consular strategies—particularly 
those related to the coveted “China Market.” Scholars such as Charles Campbell Jr., Paul Varg 
and Thomas McCormick have written extensively on the importance of the China market in 
American business perceptions and its relative importance in American foreign policy—
particularly the articulation of the “Open Door” policy.622 Historian Michael Hunt has raised 
several questions relating to the historiography of the China Market, including the importance of 
foreign markets to American businessmen, the role of domestic overproduction, the extent of 
their reliance on government support, and the function of that support in their overseas 
successes.623 Although analyses such as those of Hunt have done much reveal the tenuous, 
ephemeral character of American enterprises in countries China, they underestimate the utility of 
exaggerated economic expectations to imperial projects.  
 By underscoring only the disappointing results of early twentieth century commercial 
expansion, Hunt and other “realists” underestimate the importance of expansionist rhetoric to 
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official perceptions and institutional development, particularly that of the State Department.624 
Conversely, by stressing anticipation of economic gain as the prime mover of turn of the century 
policy, McCormick and other “Wisconsin school” historians overlook the translation of these 
expectations into institutional change and neglect the frustration of these hopes as measured by 
tangible economic gains. An examination of the United States’ Student Interpreters Corps brings 
together these contrasting perspectives by highlighting the influence of exaggerated economic 
expectations on the reconstitution of the American consular service while noting the failure of 
these efforts in the actual bid for an economic empire. 
 In terms of raw economic power, the United States had surpassed many of its European 
competitors by the turn of the twentieth century.625 As the aforementioned scholars have noted, 
this rise in economic capability was accompanied by a concomitant surge in commercial 
ambitions.  In this vein, postulations of American economic imperialism have concerned 
contemporary portrayals of the China market, the top-down process of policy-making, domestic 
politics, and the American economy. For example, in McCormick’s depiction, efforts to carve 
out a commercial empire in the mythical China market offered a way to avoid a domestic 
redistribution of wealth.626 In his understanding, the putatively lucrative China market offered a 
convenient “exporting the social question” of turn-of-the century income distribution and the 
notion of capitalist overproduction.627  
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 Turn of the century expansionist zeal was also an expression of American nationalism. 
For example, Varg has observed that it “flattered the ego of Americans to think of their country 
as the supplier of the world’s market and coincided with their nationalist spirit.”628  This hubris 
was not without some foundation.  Although the domestic market—followed by Europe—
provided the greatest outlet for American finished goods, the U.S. share of global manufacturing 
increased from 23.3 percent in 1870 to 35.8 in 1913, and exports had increased so much that 
“Europeans began talking about an ‘American invasion.’”629  While pressing congressmen 
regarding consular overhaul, businessmen such as Theodore Search (president of the National 
Association of Manufacturers) stressed that these gains were “only the beginning of our conquest 
of the world’s markets, and the consular service of the United States is a most essential and vital 
factor in the growth of this business.”630   
 In terms of personnel and training, American consular service was in a disreputable 
condition from the 1890s until the turn of the twentieth century—particularly with a view 
towards trade promotion.631 However, State Department officials were acutely aware of this and 
it was they who took the lead in pushing for reform of the Consular Service and the creation of 
the Student Interpreters Corps.  The greatest obstacle at this time was Congress. Opposition 
revolved around the concern of many members that the proposed reforms would undercut the 
constitutional powers of the President.632 Nevertheless, long-lasting institutional change required 
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positive Congressional; reformers knew that in order to effect they had to succeed in “convincing 
others that a reorganized foreign service had important benefits.”633  
 To accomplish this, Secretary of State Elihu Root dispatched Consular Bureau chief 
Wilbur Carr to the House Foreign Affairs Committee to drum up support for congressional 
action on consular reorganization in 1906.634  He and like-minded allies on the Committee in turn 
reached out to American commercial associations such as the National Board of Trade, urging 
that they send delegations to Congress in order to win votes for the reform bill.635 Root and Carr 
articulated a vision of American prosperity that reverberated with otherwise ambivalent 
businessmen, which enabled them to carry through specific reforms.636  
 Economic expansionist rhetoric was the covering rationale in the campaign of stimulating 
ambivalent American businessmen to support controversial reorganization of the United States 
consular service—as the provocative nature of proposed reforms had stymied efforts to do so for 
several years at the end of the nineteenth century. Although they sincerely believed that consular 
professionalization could improve aggregate U.S. foreign trade, such was neither the immediate 
nor primary goal of reformers such as Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and Wilbur Carr. Rather, 
they envisioned American military and diplomatic organizations that would enable the United 
States to stand shoulder to shoulder with the imperial powers that existed at the turn of the 20th 
century.  
 To this end they seized upon the exaggerated perceptions of the potential value of the 
China market. By emphasizing consular language training and professionalization as the keys to 
the United States’ future economic success, these reformers played to the tunes of early twentieth 
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century American nationalism and achieved most of their desired results. With regard to 
commercial expansion and consular reorganization, their goals were primarily an increasingly 
professionalized and language-trained Foreign Service, actively engaged in expanding the United 
States economic power. The creation of a language-training program was the sine qua non of 
efforts to facilitate economic expansion in Asia. Language training was the most obvious 
component of professionalization.  When compared to the consular services of other countries 
(most often Britain and France), it was among the most glaring deficiency, aside from the 
abysmal consular furnishings, dilapidated offices, and low numbers of officers.637   
 The desire for a renovated, language-trained consular service percolated upward from 
overseas officers, including Edwin Conger, the U.S. Minister to China. One of the most 
important components of reform— far as increasing trade in the Far East was concerned—was 
the matter of language training. Like other American officers in China, Conger was impressed by 
the size and efficacy of the Great Powers’ language training programs, and urged that Congress 
create a similar program.638 Business organizations also emphasized the model of the French and 
British while arguing for a restructuring of the Consular Service. For example, John Ela of the 
National Business League of Chicago stressed that there was no comparison between the United 
States’ system and that of Britain, with regard to the collection of reliable commercial data as 
well as language training.639 
 Reform advocates also stressed national security and appealed to patriotism. 
Congressmen such as Robert Adams Jr. noted that a lack of language-trained consular officers 
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seriously hampered American intelligence-gathering efforts during the Spanish-American 
War.640 In a similar vein, Edwin Conger, the American Minister to China, pointed to the 
language-training programs of all the other “Great Powers” in China in 1902, noting that this put 
the United States at a serious practical disadvantage in relations with the Chinese Government, 
particularly vis-a-vis Britain and France.641 
 However, it was loyalty in the campaign for overseas markets that stirred the greatest 
animus against foreigners in the Consular Service.  For example, during committee hearings on 
consular reform, Robert Adams Jr. asserted that non-Americans  
 
“have little idea of our policies and usually no sympathy with them . . . Above all  they 
are, as a rule, of no value to in our efforts to build up our export trade, because their 
sympathies and the interests of their local associates are generally opposed to the success 
of those efforts.”642 
 
According to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (on the influential Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations),  
 
 “to compete successfully with the agents of foreign powers, and to conduct 
 advantageously the political and commercial affairs of our own country, the 
 appointee to this service should be familiar not only with the laws, customs, 
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 industries, manufactures, and natural products of our own land, but they should be 
 instructed in the laws, pursuits, language, the contributions to commerce, and the 
 character of the people to whom they are accredited.”643 
 
Even the Chinese Minister to the United States was quoted in mobilizing Congressional support 
for establishing a language-training program:  
 
“most European governments send young men to the East to learn the language and study 
the customs of the country. After a residence of two or three years,  after they have proved 
themselves proficient, they are then placed in responsible  positions as student 
interpreters, consular assistants, etc. . . . it might not be unwise for your Government to 
adopt a similar system.” 
 
 Formal language education had become an integral component of Western imperial 
diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century.  Seeking to attract more capable consular officers, the 
British Foreign office under Sir Phillip Currie adopted a competitive examination system in 1877 
and instituted a two year training program for “student interpreters” in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, 
and Russian, modeled on a similar program for British consular officers in China, Japan, and 
Siam.644 
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 Russia likewise had at least a rudimentary system in place by the mid-nineteenth century, 
with foreign language-language instruction offered at the General Staff Academy, including 
Arabic, Persian, Tatar, and others.645  Similarly, by the turn of the century, German merchants as 
well as consuls had earned a reputation for making a diligent effort to learn foreign languages, 
which translated into much more successful and efficient trade with the Chinese until WWI.646  
By 1894, even Japan had established a scholarship-based language-training program as part of its 
consular service, which eventually included training in Russian, German, Arabic, and Chinese 
for aspiring consular and diplomatic officials.647 
When Congress finally acquiesced in creating a student interpreters training program in 
1902, Conger forward a copy of the British regulations,648 and these were incorporated 
wholesale—right down to the amount of their salaries—into the State Department guidelines.649 
Although created as a single entity by law, the Student Interpreters Corps was actually three 
distinct, semi-autonomous training programs. These were established in 1902, 1906, and 1909 in 
China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire respectively.650 The size, composition, and administration 
of which were contingent upon the host nation societies, in addition to the particular American 
legations.  By the beginning of World War II, over 100 officers in China, Japan, and the Ottoman 
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Empire had graduated from these programs, with the vast majority serving as America consular 
officers in China.651 
 State Department inspectors sought to inculcate avid concern for American commercial 
expansion in junior consuls stationed in Asia. These officers in turn provided frequent 
recommendations to American companies and business looking to do business in China. 
However, the overriding theme of their suggestions was that if Americans wanted to do business 
in China, they had to learn Chinese, work alongside the Chinese and learn Chinese business 
practices. Companies that followed this model (such as Standard Oil and Singer Sewing) 
experienced a fair amount of success; most others did not.  Early consular service inspectors 
sought to instill a sense of ownership of and responsibility for American trade. Alfred Gottschalk 
emphasized to officers in his “Near East” inspection district that their job was to  
 
“equalize the figures of the balance of trade year by year—if possible to make the 
imports [to the country in question] exceed the exports. Or, at least, to show American 
merchants how they should proceed in order to accomplish this; and if they should fail to 
heed your advice, to report the fact to the Department, in a Consular Report pointing out 
one of the weaknesses of our trade system.”652 
 
 Language-trained U.S. consular officers were to lead American businessmen to trade 
opportunities; they could not, of course, compel merchants to take advantage of them. Inspectors 
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gave arcane yet specific examples to drive home what they expected of junior officers. On one 
inspection tour, Alfred Gottschalk interrogated officers, asking that if a non-American merchant 
was “getting 40% of the outside trade of your district and furnishes it with very inferior hams, is 
it not your duty to advise our Chicago packers through [sic] the Consular Reports that here is an 
opening for them?”653 Consular officers brought home the bacon for American companies less 
ways as well. For example, former Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson recalled chasing down 
delinquent payments for the Singer Sewing Company throughout China during his days as a 
junior consular officer.654 
 Senior State Department officials took seriously the commercial expansionist rhetoric 
that circulated during the early efforts at consular reform. They sought to translate the 
exaggerated perceptions of value in China market (and other Asian countries) into actual 
economic gains and saw their protégés in the consular service as the linchpins of the United 
States’ future success.  However, the results could hardly have differed more from early 
expectations.  
 Although they were careful to couch their criticisms in terms of trade promotion, 
language-trained consuls sought to dispel the notion that American goods would conquer China’s 
markets without a fight—an assumption demonstrated by the cascade of English-language 
catalogues sent by U.S.-based companies.  U.S. consuls in cities throughout China were annually 
inundated with catalogues and pamphlets advertising all manner of American products but while 
they maintained this documents in their consulates’ reading rooms, they pointed out that English-
language advertising offered no benefit to the majority of Chinese merchants who could not 
                                            
653 Ibid.  
654 Nelson T. Johnson, The Reminiscences of Nelson T. Johnson (New York, NY: Oral History Research Office, 
Columbia University, 1957), 191. 
216	
	
	
speak or read English; to be effective, American companies needed to physically market their 
products.655 
 Aside from providing such gentle reminders, language-trained consular officers were also 
considered a vital asset because of the “personal capital” necessary to acquiring market 
intelligence.  Even disgruntled officers such as Ernest Price (considered by superiors to be out of 
tune with the concerns of American businessmen) understood that personal involvement was 
necessary if American trade with China was to expand, and tried to give specific suggestions on 
how to achieve this. For example, if a single firm was too small or could not afford 
representation on its own, Price suggested that an association of companies appoint a marketing 
and distributing agent in Shanghai to reach smaller centres such as Foochow.656 
  While working as a consular service inspector, ambassador-to-be Nelson T. Johnson 
expected that China officers exhibit a dedication that bordered on fanaticism. According to 
Johnson,  
 
“most of this information should be part of the personal capital that any efficient  officer 
brings to the partnership into which he has been taken by the Government . . . it should be 
his one aim in life to be the best informed man in his district on questions of this kind and 
to that end he will give all of his waking time to the acquiring of the information.”657 
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 The State Department expected language-trained consular officers to all pay grades to 
socialize with local businessmen. Although not explicitly part of their job descriptions, it was 
considered more important than their routine duties and language competency. At the student 
level, some interaction did occur. In the early twentieth century, the British-American Tobacco 
Company and Standard Oil established Mandarin language-training programs in China, designed 
to create a layer of middle management, probably to provide command and control for its native 
marketing staff.658 According to consular service inspector Stuart J. Fuller, these employees 
conversed with the U.S. student interpreters in Shanghai, China, and former Ambassador Nelson 
T. Johnson recalled that he saw them often and spoke highly of their abilities in Mandarin.659 
Business historian Sherman Cochran has observed that this language course, sophisticated as it 
was for its time, “was far too superficial to produce American China specialists capable of 
replacing Chinese compradores and sales agents,” especially in comparison with their studious 
and persevering Japanese counterparts.660 These employees have likely been as overlooked as the 
U.S. government’s Student Interpreters themselves, at least in terms of their administrative and 
strategic role in Standard Oil’s operations in China. 
 However, from the standpoint of relationships between U.S. consular officers and the 
vast majority of American businessmen in China, such connections were negligible. Low- to 
mid-ranking American consular officers were too poorly paid to mingle with their commercially 
oriented compatriots—a fact which caused their superiors considerable frustration. For example, 
despite being “far and away the best” interpreter “in the entire China service,” inspector Stuart J. 
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Fuller blasted Ernest Batson Price for being married, as it was a drain on his finances, preventing 
him from mingling socially with American and foreign businessmen in Tientsin, China.661  On 
the other hand, Inspector Charles C. Eberhardt praised George C. Hanson, an unmarried 
colleague of Price as “a genial man and a good ‘mixer’ and it is believed that he is better than the 
average in his qualifications for successfully intervening with local authorities when the occasion 
calls for such action.”662  Consular officers had to walk a fine line when it came to personal 
conduct. Every area of their private lives was subject to scrutiny, and either dissolute or 
abstemious behavior could be seen as a detriment to their efficiency as Foreign Service Officers. 
Inspector Charles Eberhardt stressed this while commenting on local missionaries’ presumed 
disapproval of Consul George Hanson’s occasion indulgence in cards, spirits, and dancing while 
stationed at Foochow in 1921.663 
 Character was a prime asset in the diplomacy of American commercial expansion, for 
both consuls and businessmen, and with good reason. As Inspector Fleming D. Cheshire 
observed, merely offering lower prices was insufficient in acquiring foreign business in 
Manchuria. Personal relationships were paramount. He noted, “one British travelling-man has, 
during a short stay of a few weeks, secured contracts amounting to £8,000, while American 
bidders, although lower, secured nothing.” 664 In this instance, “there was hardly the pretense that 
superior goods or lowest bidders carried the day;” the contracts for South Manchurian Railway 
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rolling stock went to a Manchester-based British company that had gone to considerable effort 
and expense to entertain the Japanese chief engineer.665 “Would it not be interesting to find out 
what reception Mr. Yoshino was given by, say, the American Locomotive Company?” Inspector 
Cheshire pointedly asked, “such an investigation might show a curious state of affairs—an 
interesting lesson in the diplomacy of international trade.”666 
 Attempting to ensure that its overseas representation met the demands of American 
economic ambitions, inspection reports routinely compared American consulates, their staffs, 
salaries, and funding with those of other foreign consulates in the same location. Although the 
salaries of American officers in China were markedly lower than those of their foreign 
colleagues, and their living allowances, consular premises and working budgets were as well. In 
1913 for example, Inspector George L. Murphy criticized the shabby appearance of the U.S. 
Consulate in Dairen, Manchuria, noting that the British were going to considerable expense to 
erect a new building for themselves and pointedly noting that the both the British and Russian 
Consulates received annual expenditure allowances beyond those of rent, native interpreter 
salaries, telegrams, and courier expenses.667 The subsequent inspector went to additional effort to 
compare local consular salaries, noting that the United States paid its officer about four-fifths the 
salary of their British and Russian colleagues, required them to pay a significant portion of the 
rent, and required accounting for contingent expenses, whereas the British and Russians did 
not.668  
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 In the same report, Inspector Stuart J. Fuller included a chart of estimated living expenses 
based on figures given by local businessmen, including room and board, utilities, clothing, and 
other routine expenses for “a gentleman of standing in the community who lives well but not 
extravagantly.”669 The estimate for a single man significantly exceeded the salary of the consul 
(Adolph Williams), whereas most officers (including Williams) at the rank of consul or higher 
were married with children.670 In a similar vein, State Departmental politics complicated 
challenges to the orthodoxy of a lucrative—yet unrealized—China market. Wilbur Carr stymied 
the transmission of less than flattering reports on the Chinese practice of “squeeze,”—despite 
conscientious efforts by commercial attaché Julean Arnold to highlights it’s pervasive, semi-
institutionalized role in Chinese economic life.671 
 
“Themselves entirely ignorant of conditions, they come to some arrangement with a firm 
established in Far Eastern Asia, who may or may not know anything of the product, 
commence before they are ready, and find out only too late that they have commenced a 
comedy of errors.”672  
 
The editorial made it plain that the China market was little more than a Shanghai 
cowboy’s version of El Dorado:  
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“Today we see individuals and firms coming out here in considerable number, devoid in 
the majority of cases of the most rudimentary knowledge of trading demands, conditions 
and practices of Far Eastern Asia, merely ‘looking over the ground’ to see whether it 
would pay them to start.”673 
 
Instead of hasty ventures, Commerce and Finance called for American businessmen and 
companies interested in China to invest in personnel to study Chinese culture and society as well 
as economic conditions. It closed with the admonition, “let wealth beget knowledge, so that in 
the later years, when it may be necessary, you will be in the position of using knowledge to beget 
wealth.”674 While stressing the accuracy of these observations, Consul-General Edwin 
Cunningham warned against any official endorsement of them by the State Department, arguing 
that to do so would irreparably harm future American commercial ventures, both in Shanghai 
and throughout China.675    
Although a vital consideration from a business standpoint, even the slightest reference to 
China’s political instability could arouse controversy. According to Clarence H. Matson of the 
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 
 
“after talking to various businessmen in China, my personal reaction was that the  less we 
had to do with Chinese trade the better, and if I had been compelled to write a strictly 
honest report at the time, that is what I would have said. However,  this did not coincide 
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with my preconceived ideas and I held off from writing any report until I could get what I 
hoped was a better perspective.”676 
 
Noting the recent kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, Matson noted, “you can’t tell the average 
American businessman that China has a stable, unified government when such a thing can 
happen, nor does the American understand why Chiang was pardoned—instead of being shot.”677 
In view of the political instability, Matson thanked Arnold for criticizing his previous optimism, 
observing, “I have some backing in case any of our Los Angeles businessmen lose money in 
China and blame me for not telling them to keep out.”678 Not surprisingly (given his frank 
admission that the purpose of his office was to “encourage larger business between Southern 
California and this country [China]”), Arnold took issue with Matson’s assertions, complaining 
to Matson’s colleague, Arthur G. Arnoll, that Matson had fundamentally mischaracterized his 
depiction of Sino-American trade opportunities.679 In his response, Arnoll dismissed Matson’s 
pessimism, calling him “a newspaperman” and assuring Arnold that “fundamentally he feels as 
you do, that there are immense possibilities ahead of us in China and that everything should be 
done and nothing left undone . . . to the increase and betterment of our trade.”680 
 Arnold’s enthusiasm for American trade expansion in China is fairly representative of the 
view of most consular officers during this period.  Yet he and his colleagues strove to provide an 
accurate picture of what American businessmen needed to accomplish in order to succeed. In 
instances when officers such as Arnold appeared overly optimistic about American trade 
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prospects in China, their sanguine observations were often mischaracterized. A 1920 article in 
the Wall Street Times exemplifies this.  The article cited his predictions that in coming years 
China would demand more heavy machinery, vehicles, and a wide range of hardware—all of 
which, in his vision, the United States would supply.681 Although the sensational headline (for 
the business audience) drew attention to Arnold’s predictions for future Chinese consumption, 
and the article made only a passing reference to a recurring admonition of SIC-trained consular 
officers, namely that Americans needed to study Chinese language and history.682 In the 
American business imagination, the hoped-for ‘China Market’ was little more than a mirage; 
companies looking for quick and easy profits without investing time, energy, and intellectual 
rigor, quickly began to look elsewhere.  
 The need for personal involvement and direct investment were primary reasons for this, 
as was the high cost of American products.  For example, in 1921, Consul George Hanson urged 
that American companies establish branch offices in Foochow and market their products 
directly.683 He stressed,  
 
“the high cost of American goods is what obstructs the trade in American goods.  If 
American business houses sincerely desire to enter permanently in the local trade, they 
must be satisfied with little or no profit during the period they are introducing their goods 
to the Chinese. Prices ordinarily quoted for American goods appear to the Chinese dealer 
so prohibitive that he is loath to place an initial order with the result that he has no chance 
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to try out the goods. Competition with other foreign firms should be met and the 
confidence of the Chinese secured first; profits would then follow as a matter of course. It 
is believed that lower  prices and longer credits would help the sale of American 
goods.”684  
 
In the absence of accommodation on the part of American business, the ability of language-
trained consuls to facilitate trade expansion was miniscule. This Mandarin expert went out of his 
way to offer to translate American price lists for companies seeking to answer an inquiry for a 
few dozen bicycles and spare parts by a Chinese company.685 
 American consular officials were usually unsuccessful in seeking compensation for 
allegedly illegal taxes in China as well. A dispute involving the Standard Oil Company is a 
representative example. In July, 1922, a sub-agent of Standard Oil in Takushan, China was 
compelled to pay a 10% “Famine Tax” on several hundred cases of oil, in addition to the regular 
customs duties.686 The legal status of the tax was unclear; according to American Minister Jacob 
Gould Shuurman, the famine surtaxes involving the use of stamps were in contravention of the 
commercial treaties with China, but refused to protest other taxes, such as likin or trans-shipment 
taxes, provided they did not discriminate against American companies.687  
 With this guidance, Standard Oil maintained that the tax was illegal, and paid under 
protest. The official Chinese response was initially seemed to confirm this. Chinese officials first 
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claimed that there were no records of the tax having been collected,688 but when Standard Oil 
produced tax receipts, the customs official claimed that Standard Oil’s agent did not possess the 
required transit pass.689 Eventually the matter of the famine tax was referred to for negotiations 
between the Chinese Government and the Diplomatic Body at Peking (a collective reference to 
the foreign treaty powers).690 
 Combined with China’s underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, political instability, 
and the general poverty of the population, the prospect of irregular taxation raising prices 
unpredictably made direct investment a dubious prospect for businessmen.  Yet these realities 
failed to dampen the enthusiasm (real or contrived) of SIC-trained consular officers for whom 
demonstrated trade promotion constituted a vital consideration in their opportunities for 
promotion and pay increases. The allure of the China market, however illusory, percolated all the 
way to lowest ranks of the U.S. consular service. For example, SIC novice Samuel Sokobin was 
convinced that low-priced American goods such as cigarettes, soap, matches, etc., would bring 
enormous profits if only companies would invest personnel in marketing them, noting the 
Japanese success in doing so.691 Their recalcitrance in doing so highlights the illusory, ephemeral 
influence of the China market on American efforts to carve out an economic empire in Asia. 
Anticipation of commercial expansion in China was enough to bring about sweeping changes in 
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the U.S. consular service—even to the point of creating a new cadre of area specialists—but 
official euphoria failed to stimulate private investment. 
 The gulf between espoused economic expansionism and the actual market activity 
resulted from a mix of apathy and cultural prejudice.  James Linn Rodgers, consul at Shanghai in 
1907, placed the burden of responsibility for sluggish trade extension on the apathy of American 
businessmen, while calling for a more robust government role in promoting business expansion 
in China.692 Similarly, in a 1916 New York Times article, SIC-trained Commercial Attaché 
Julean Arnold bemoaned that in China, “the door is open but we don’t go in, although China is 
begging for our activities.”693 Recalling his experiences as a junior consular officer, former 
Ambassador Nelson Johnson noted, “it was considered by the British and American merchants to 
be a little infra dig to learn Chinese . . . the only American company that really went out to have 
its young people learn the Chinese language was the Standard Oil Company.”694 Willys R. Peck, 
Johnson’s longtime friend and close advisor of many years also recalled that American and 
Britain merchants in China viewed the Chinese with general disdain.695 
 Such preconceptions prevented American businesses from tapping into Chinese 
commercial networks, a vital element of success to any marketing endeavor.  SIC-trained consuls 
were alive to this reality but labored, largely in vain, to make their commercially-oriented 
compatriots aware of this.  For example, while recommending that American companies employ 
Chinese compradores, managers and assistants, Consul George Hanson stressed, “Chinese 
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business is conducted along different lines than American business and the time when the 
American business man in China can dispense with the services of able Chinese assistants has 
not yet come.”696 He further emphasized, “it has been the experience of some companies 
[primarily Standard Oil] that Chinese labor under foreign supervision is as good as American 
labor under certain lines.”697 
 Differing attitudes toward risk compounded the detrimental effects of prejudice and 
complicated marketing, buying and selling.  Believing the virtue of their products, American 
manufactures expected Chinese merchants to assume all the risk (by not extending credit or 
credit with onerous terms), which fostered resentment among Chinese buyers.  Consul General 
Carleton Baker observed, “many importers in China complain that American manufacturers 
expect them to assume the entire risk and to bear the full expense in connection with the sale of 
new products and they feel the burden should be more equally divided between those who hope 
to reap the ultimate profits.”698 
 Other tangible obstacles also rendered meaningful penetration of the China market far 
more difficult than blithe and pithy statements suggested. Paul Varg’s work has underscored 
such challenges as the restriction of trade to the treaty ports, the lack of a reliable transportation 
system, the price and variety of finished manufactures, and the habits of Chinese consumers.699 
Similarly, Michael Hunt has examined the meager gains of American exporters in China in 
detail, in particular considering how important U.S. government support was to the efforts of 
Standard Oil and the British-American Tobacco company to expand their business while 
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stressing the overall lackluster character of U.S. trade expansion in China from the turn of the 
century to the outbreak of WWII.700 
 For mid-sized enterprises, China’s unstable political situation and uneven pattern of 
taxation was a serious obstacle.  Citing the prevalence of “illegal” taxation (particularly likin, the 
provincial custom of assessing fees on previously taxed goods in transit), John K. Davis 
commented, “when China’s diplomats enter the conference room and say to the diplomats of 
other countries, ‘if you do this, China will promise to do that,’ how can the diplomats of other 
such countries avoid the conclusion that no dependence can be placed on such promises?”701 The 
problems of political instability, irregular taxation, and cultural prejudice were all chronic 
hindrances to American commercial expansion in China.  However, Japanese encroachment in 
China gradually eclipsed all of these, beginning immediately after Japan’s seizure of the German 
concession in the Tsingtao region.   
 Exhorted to be mindful of business conditions during their training as student 
interpreters, United States consular officers were sensitive to both the actual and potential effects 
of Japanese expansion on American commercial opportunities in China. For example, after the 
Japanese assumption of German privileges in Tsingtao, Willys R. Peck noted that the proposed 
Japanese concession would include the extensive facilities of the Standard Oil Company.702 He 
also stressed that “jealous Japanese espionage” in the area made it impossible for Chinese 
merchants “to engage freely in those business relations with American merchants, which it has 
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been the desire of our Government to foster.”703 Peck further observed that the Japanese proposal 
for an International Settlement in Tsingtao offered an undeveloped, rocky, and remote location, 
asserting that this was an attempt to curtail discussion of the Settlement, so as to avoid actually 
sharing the port with foreign merchants and foster de facto Japanese dominance in province.704 
Willys Peck’s concerns were well founded. His influence can be seen in his 1940 assessment 
that, 
 
“It has become evident, however, from Japanese acts that the Japanese program envisages 
the establishment by armed force of Japanese hegemony over “East Asia” and the 
exaction of tribute from foreign nationals for that share of economic enterprise in China 
which the Japanese shall decide to allow to them.”705  
 
While the Secretary did not give the talk, the fact that the comments were prepared by officers in 
the Far East Division indicates the structure within and the extent to which language-trained 
officers shaped the State Department’s perception of events.706 
 Although the anticipated profits never materialized, the institutional reforms brought 
about by this venture remained in place. In the rhetoric of reformers, imperial ambitions 
translated into imperial practices. Language trained officers in China and Japan differed over 
how to deal with issues such as extraterritoriality, Chinese Communism and Japanese militarism, 
yet they became increasingly interventionist in that they believed the U.S. government should 
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not simply stand on the sidelines leaving the risk to businessmen but ought to take a more 
proactive role. While ostensibly pursuing economic empire in Asia, the United States became 
increasingly entangled with East Asian affairs, leading inexorably to its WWII clash with Japan 
and postwar confrontation with Chinese Communism.  The result was entanglement in 
progressively more intricate Asian controversies without experiencing the anticipated economic 
gains. 
 Exaggerated perceptions of the China market undergirded the creation of the Student 
Interpreters Corps (SIC) and stimulated a reorganization of the U.S. Consular Service in China, 
Japan, and the Ottoman Empire according to established imperial paradigms.  In this framework, 
the secret to commercial success in China was a language trained, professionalized consular 
service, actively promoting national business interests.  The establishment of the SIC and the 
concurrent reorganization of the U.S. Consular service consciously emulated existing imperial 
models, particularly those of Britain and France. State Department reformers went beyond 
business interests and Congressional constituencies in highlighting the perceived benefits that 
institutional reorganization would bring. However, the economic benefits that accrued to 
American businessmen were so far removed from the touted possibilities, this chapter argues, 
that the rhetoric of trade expansion was far more to the State Department important than the 
actual realization of increased trade.  
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CHAPTER 9 
FOR “THE AMERICAN BIG BROTHER” “TO SELL AMERICA TO CHINA”: FROM 
OPEN DOOR "IMPERIALISM” TO INTERVENTIONIST “ORIENTALISM,” 1902-
1941707 
 
 This chapter places the American Student Interpreters Corps in China, Japan in the 
context of other imperial language training programs. These language-training programs were 
indispensible to East-West interactions in Asia and the Middle East during the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.  Intended as the equal of such programs, the Student-Interpreters Corps developed 
into an important means for constructing U.S. government perceptions of “the Far East” as well 
as an important (albeit complex) component of policy formation.  By the beginning of World 
War II, over 100 American Foreign Service officers in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire 
began their careers as student interpreters and spent most of their professional lives in those 
countries.708   
To be sure, these officers were influenced by a variety of generational, ideological, and 
social differences, and their actual policy goals both shifted internally and differed from one 
another. Nevertheless, their long-term service in Asia produced a consensus that if the United 
States simply pursued the correct concoction of policies, it could not only realize its foreign 
policy objectives in the region but transform Asian societies as well. As will be emphasized in 
this chapter, the mentality undergirding the American approach to China gradually shifted, from 
a vague chauvinism to an increasingly strident awareness of “Oriental” and “Asiatic” crises from 
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which the United States could not afford to remain apart. This led to the reluctant adoption of 
interventionist attitudes but at the same time to disagreement over the long-term policy goals of 
such intervention and even the forms that such intervention should assume. 
 Using an interdisciplinary interpretive framework, this chapter draws on the theoretical 
work of literary critics such as Lina Unali and Edward Said, political scientists like Ruth Roland 
and Theda Skocpol, and linguists and historians including Frances E. Karttunen and Michael 
Hunt.  Building upon their conclusions regarding modes of representation, social 
marginalization, and cultural intermediaries, this chapter presents foreign language education as 
a cultural interstice within which attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions of “other” cultures can be, 
and often are exchanged, transmitted, transformed, and even internalized by “outsiders.”  
 Outlining American interpreters’ representations of the cultures and attitudes they 
perceived and sought to represent, to translate, this examination considers consular dispatches, 
oral histories, memoirs, and even business correspondence to highlight the ways in which foreign 
language study transformed cultural attitudes—reflected by written representations and analyses 
of these cultures—while providing practical, accommodative policy alternatives. Within this 
dynamic cultural space however, the proliferation of normative constructs based upon class, 
gender, and perceived racial differences precluded the translation of appreciative cultural 
understandings into accommodative foreign policies. 
 This chapter surveys the dispatches, personal correspondence, personnel files, and 
memoirs of three generations of American student interpreters. The particular focus here is the 
role of SIC-trained officers in shaping the U.S. State Department’s understanding of American 
involvement with problems in China and the ways in which their framing of these problems 
shifted in response to perceived political goals. The underlying assumptions associated with the 
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Open Door transformed as it closed, giving way to new postulations as the notion spread that the 
United States should intervene more and more directly in Chinese affairs. These latter 
assumptions, this chapter argues, are more recognizably Orientalist than those associated with 
the Open Door, leading to disagreements among SIC-trained officers over how the United States 
should respond to specific problems such Japanese militarism and Chinese communism. These 
culminated with its internal atomic bomb controversy and the post-WWII struggles over the 
occupation of Japan and whether or not to recognize the People’s Republic of China (the 
antecedents of these controversies are covered in more detail in chapter nine). Although these 
controversies lie largely outside the scope of this dissertation, their salient feature is the role that 
the language-trained officers played in facilitating change in the discourse of American 
Orientalism in China. Functioning as both linguistic and cultural intermediaries, United States 
government interpreters and translators were vital to the construction of an American “Orient.”  
As will be argued presently however, the American “Orient” of the Student Interpreters 
Corps was a different species than that of Said’s Orientalism. While highlighting the contours of 
the contribution of the Student Interpreters Corps to the evolving US perceptions of China and 
Japan, from the turn of the twentieth century to the onset of US entry into WWII, this chapter 
also seeks to underscore both their differences from and similarities with the Orientalism of 
Edward Said. As examined in previous chapters, the ideology undergirding the American project 
in China gradually shifted from that of trade expansion to interventionism, hastened by political 
and military crises instigated by Japanese aggression, Chinese resistance to that aggression and 
the intensification of Communist opposition to the Nationalist Chinese government. This chapter 
will emphasize the changing language and perceptions of SIC-trained officers as they reluctantly 
but increasingly came to support American intervention in China. Whereas Said highlights 
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Orientalism as a discursive system that preceded imperialism, rather than emerging as 
rationalization of it,709 the American counterpart evolved in rather the opposite fashion, tending 
towards ideological completeness in tandem with the increasing inevitability of large-scale 
American intervention in China. The first section will examine “Orientalism” of the Open Door, 
arguing that while SIC-trained officers were actually attempting to implement the Open Door, 
such attitudes were characterized chiefly by chauvinism and nativism. The chief Orientalist 
assumption in this vein, visible in the very establishment of the SIC, was that only Americans 
could represent China to the United States.  
Moreover, simply being American was insufficient: language training and loyalty to the 
United States government (as opposed to religious or entrepreneurial causes) was also necessary. 
The second portion of the chapter identifies a different variety, increasingly interested in directly 
intervening in China’s affairs, that developed alongside the trade expansion rhetoric of the Open 
Door. However, as detailed in the third section, although a reluctant, tenuous consensus emerged 
in the 1930s, which saw American intervention as increasingly inevitable, and the chameleon of 
American Orientalist discourse evolved to accommodate it, such accord shattered when it 
encountered the questions of the specific goals and forms such intervention ought to assume. 
 
The SIC and the “Orientalism” of the Open Door, 1902-1931 
 
 In this milieu, it is important to reiterate that the American “policy elite” remained 
largely Orientalist in outlook as well as policy formation.710 However, this outlook changed 
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markedly between 1902 and 1941, from the perception of a need to “Americanize” the Foreign 
Service in order to facilitate American trade expansion, to a growing sense that an Oriental 
challenge to it (the Japanese) had to be answered, an awareness that ultimately overrode Open 
Door imperatives.711  Senior officials at the turn of the twentieth century such as Paul Reinsch 
(erstwhile United States Minister to China) spoke and wrote effusively about influencing 
“impressionable Orientals” even though his primary concern was trade expansion.712  Through 
his protégé, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck, his outlook and ideas remained influential in the Far East 
Division of the State Department on the eve of American entry into WWII in 1941.713 
Nevertheless, the creation of the American Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) in 1902 inspired 
progressively more frequent challenges to the Orientalist chauvinism by cultivating regional 
specialists. They in turn formulated policy alternatives that increasingly differed from one 
another, as well as those of policymakers in Washington D.C.   
 As with numerous Orientalist assumptions, so it went with institutions: the establishment 
of the American Student Interpreters Corps (SIC) was a deliberate, nearly wholesale imitation of 
the contemporary British system.714 As mentioned elsewhere, the United States often mimicked 
or appropriated wholesale the views of its parent country, Great Britain;715 the establishment and 
structure of the SIC offers another example of this. As highlighted in previous chapters, the 
United States was a latecomer to language training for government service, and the British 
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system offered a culturally familiar and accessible model to American reformers and 
businessmen who envied equally the consular services of commercial rivals Britain, France, and 
Germany.716 As discussed in chapter seven, the appropriation of imperial training methods 
facilitated the evolution of a progressively interventionist mentality toward Asia within the U.S. 
State Department. 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, State Department reformers, their allies in Congress, 
and American businessmen were acutely aware of the inferiority of the United States Consular 
Service, particularly in the area of foreign language competency.717  The key issue was 
demonstrable commitment to trade expansion. In this vein, not only were the loyalties of 
native/local interpreters in the Consular Service suspect; those of American missionaries were 
distrusted as well.718 
 As they contemplated changes to the lackadaisical U.S. Consular Service in the Far East 
and the Ottoman Empire, inspectors and senior officials idealized the social status and diplomatic 
position of traditional dragomen [tercümanlar] as they established a professional corps of 
interpreters loyal to the United States government. American administrators and inspectors 
stressed that even the most linguistically competent student interpreter graduates were 
incomparable to that Ottoman “dragoman,” who possessed tremendous informal influence in 
local business life and politics. The primary reason for this was that they enjoyed “a sort of 
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backstairs entrance to every official’s home, and an immense acquaintance among high and low 
in native circles, which brings him every new bazaar rumor.”719   
  A desire to enjoy the influence of (idealized) Ottoman interpreters and translators existed 
parallel to but in tension with two other demands: financial efficiency, and above all, loyalty.720 
With “native” interpreters seen as unreliable in the eyes of early reformers, the addition of 
American interpreter training program to the American consular service was a vast improvement 
over reliance on locals as interpreters—although the practice of hiring them never ended entirely.  
Even after SIC-trained officers were available for every consulate that could make use of their 
services, U.S. consulates in China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire continued to employ local 
interpreters and various other workers.721 Partly because the SIC was only a few years old and 
still untested when it was extended to the Ottoman Empire in 1909 (and only lasted eight years 
before it was discontinued), the United States relied primarily on local employees as translators.   
 Yet although Christian and Jewish subjects continued to provide most of the formal 
translation and interpreting services of the American Embassy in Istanbul and U.S. consulates 
throughout the Ottoman Empire,722 this situation was untenable for several reasons. Primary 
reliance on local interpreters could not continue for long in a professionalizing Foreign 
Service—particularly considering that nativism provided some of the impetus for the creation of 
the Student Interpreters Corps: only Americans could interpret China for Americans. Congress 
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therefore took steps to limit native interpreters. For example, consular reforms passed in 1906 
limited the annual salaries of non-citizen employees to $1000; employees at this rate or more 
were prohibited from engaging in outside business.723  In the Ottoman Empire, local interpreters 
could obtain extensive trade privileges and/or tax exemptions through system of capitulations,724 
which made the position attractive despite the low pay.  
 Not only was this system subject to frequent abuse,725 but local or foreign nationals were 
often so intimately involved in local politics and ethnic strife that the work of the consulate 
suffered.726 Moreover, local hires were increasingly criticized for failing to prioritize American 
commercial interests.727  The result was that unless directly supervised by an American, local 
hires were increasingly considered unreliable. Foreign consular agents, missionaries, and locally 
hired interpreters were regarded as particularly untrustworthy with a view to promoting 
American trade. It was this latter trend that enabled reformers like Elihu Root and Wilbur J. Carr 
to enlist business support (in the form of lobbying a recalcitrant Congress) to renovate the 
decrepit U.S. consular service—at the time dependent upon political patronage and riven by 
partisan rivalries.728        
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 Congress established the SIC with the primary goal of expanding American trade, an 
enterprise that some historians have considered a project of “informal empire.”729 An early 
lobbyist for consular reform John Ela of the National Business League of Chicago had declared 
magnanimously that the “business world has awakened to its opportunities.  Extension of trade is 
an undoubted fact.  We must push forward, and by every worthy means at our command seize 
the markets of the world.”730  Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson summed up the contemporary 
American self-perception with the assertion that “we [Americans] asked for no colonies. We 
didn’t want any colonies.  We had no need of them for we had our great West to develop. We did 
need however, and did want, the right of our merchants to trade without discrimination.”731   
 It should be noted that this “Open Door” endeavor was neither an attempt to forcibly 
open new markets per se nor a campaign against protectionist tariffs. It was rather an attempt to 
secure for American merchants the same right to do business in China as that enjoyed by their 
British, French, and Japanese counterparts.  During the push for reform in the American consular 
service, businessmen as well as State Department officials widely believed that American 
products would conquer the market wherever they could compete freely.732 
 Central to this effort was the notion that training a handful of United States consular 
officers in Chinese, Japanese, and Turkish would relieve American businessmen of the necessity 
to personally familiarize themselves with the local language and culture in their attempts to 
penetrate Asian markets.  These language-trained specialists worked tirelessly, but in the end 
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unsuccessfully, to dispel this impression.733 Only a handful companies (including Standard Oil, 
Singer Sewing, and British-American Tobacco) sent their own sales representatives to Asia, and 
fewer still required even a modicum of language training for such field agents.734   
 Efforts to professionalize the Foreign Service encountered resistance from men such as 
Senator John Tyler Morgan (a former Confederate Army officer), who asserted that officers who 
enjoyed life tenure “forget their Americanism, mixed up with all kinds of governments.  They 
forget the requirements and the obligations of being an American citizen representing their 
country in a foreign country.”735  From the beginning, the notion of sending officers overseas and 
training him a foreign county caused some to question the loyalty of such men, amid worries that 
they might go “native.”  
 Yet at the same time, there was a growing awareness that only specifically trained 
individuals could represent China for American business interests. Until the establishment of the 
SIC, there was no system for training American diplomatic and consular officers at all, let alone 
a language education program.736 White American speakers of Mandarin were almost 
exclusively missionaries.  Partly for this reason, historians such as James Reed and Christopher 
Jespersen have stressed the prominent role of missionaries in shaping American attitudes toward 
China.737  Their importance in shaping popular perceptions toward China—as well as Japan and 
the Ottoman Empire—should not be underestimated.  Until the early twentieth century, in many 
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instances the U.S. government depended on missionaries as interpreters and translators 
(particularly in China and Japan) in American consulates and embassies, simply because they 
were the only Americans available who could speak the language.  For example, the American 
Legation in Peking at the turn of the twentieth century relied solely on E. T. Williams as 
interpreter, causing Edwin Conger (the American Minister) to protest, “no private concern of 
one-fiftieth the importance would take any such chances for even a moment.”738   
 However, by the turn of the twentieth century such exclusive reliance was increasingly 
considered to be unwise by officials like Conger who believed that both the missionary and the 
businessman were ill suited for diplomatic work.739 This generalized unease gradually 
transformed into distrust.  As mentioned in a previous chapter, by the 1920s, too close an 
association between an American officer and local missionaries in China could cast doubt on his 
loyalty and negatively affect his efficiency ratings and promotion opportunities.740 One reason 
for this was that American missionaries in China at this time were beginning to expect their 
government to take a more active role in protecting their lives and property overseas, and when 
this was not forthcoming from local American commanders, they often fiercely criticized the 
U.S. government.741 From the standpoint of senior officers such as Nelson T. Johnson, the reason 
was simple: the United States government was an interest group in its own right and it was the 
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duty of Foreign Service officers to publicly articulate and defend policy decisions even when 
they privately disagreed with them.742    
Such trust was perceived as vital, not least because of the vast responsibility placed on 
officers stationed in countries throughout the world. Until the twentieth century, American 
diplomacy was in many ways a personal affair, the style of each office depending on the officer 
in charge.743  In many of the smaller offices in China and Japan for example, the consul was the 
only American employee, if not the sole worker.744 However, when officers lived and worked in 
cities with significant numbers of American missionaries, hundreds of miles from their 
immediate superiors, it was not uncommon for some officers to sympathize with the views of 
local Americans (and in some cases, local nationals) more than the official position of the United 
States government.745 Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of Open Door Orientalism was 
that only specifically trained Americans, free of the vested interests of religion and business, 
could successfully represent the Chinese Orient. 
 
Representing the Open Door: American Orientalism, and the U.S. Foreign Service, 1902-
1931 
 
 At the same time, emerging gradually from 1902 to 1931, a parallel American 
“Orientalism” towards China appeared in the early twentieth century. This parallel development 
makes American “Orientalism” in China difficult to define, riddled with paradoxes and 
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contradictions, and complicated by both contemporary and modern historiographical 
controversies over American exceptionalism.746 On the one hand, this outlook inherited most of 
the qualities that Edward Said attributed to the “worldwide hegemony of Orientalism,”747 in that 
it presumed Western superiority over China. On the other, its unique genealogy makes it a 
chameleon, frequently changing its colors to suit various political environments, and it proved an 
amazingly resilient and effect cultural construct as specific questions of possible (and actual) 
American intervention in Chinese and Japanese societies became ever more salient in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and will be mentioned later.  
 Most examinations of Orientalism, whether American or otherwise, focus upon various 
categories of cultural products (literature, film, etc.), the attitudes which these artifacts express, 
and the policies and politics attributed or associated with them.  For example, in American 
Orientalism, Douglass Little has stressed that a peculiar blend of popular misconceptions as well 
as cultural and political paternalism have compelled Americans to “underestimate the people of 
the region and overestimate America’s ability to make a bad situation better.”748   
 Meanwhile, Melanie McAlister has acknowledged the expansion of American power in 
the Middle East while highlighting an assemblage of interest groups that have variously 
facilitated, accommodated and challenged that expansion. These factions have articulated 
contending visions “even as they worked to construct a self-image for Americans of themselves 
as citizens of benevolent world power.”749 Canvassing the enterprise of cultural production in 
areas such as news media, literature, and film has done much to illuminate the murky—and 
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mercurial—realm of attitudes, perceptions, and assumptions that have constituted the discursive 
field of Orientalism.   
 Literary critics such as Edward Said, Homi Bhaba, and Lina Unali have referred 
primarily to the literary descriptions of places, events, and societies within a host of cultural 
artifacts in crafting their arguments regarding the meanings and interpretations attached to 
them.750  However, the act of interpreting and translating Asian and Middle Eastern societies 
with a view to producing and disseminating coherent and intelligible cultural representations for 
popular consumption is only one aspect of this process. The mechanism by which the state 
produces and consumes these same perceptions is an important component as well. Examining 
this process is vital to comprehending the way these observations translate into policies, thereby 
highlighting the channel between abstract perception and concrete action within the sphere of 
state autonomy.751  
 During the first half of the twentieth century, language-trained Foreign Service officers 
were a vital component of the United States’ image of the Far East (particularly China and 
Japan) as well as important agents in policy formation. These officers’ training put them in a 
unique position within the United States government. Their language education was intended to 
train them as interpreters who would provide information on the host nation and whose loyalty 
was above question.  Frances Karttunen has described interpreters in history as “conduits through 
which information flowed between worlds in collision translating more than just words and 
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bringing comprehensibility to otherwise meaningless static.”752  In this vein, they acquaint both 
sides with the cultural meaning and context that adds value to simple exchange of verbal 
information.753   
 As Homi Bhabha has argued, this dynamic process involves a certain amount of mimicry, 
of appropriating and internalizing elements of an Other, while simultaneously remaining distinct 
and aloof from it.754  Benedict Anderson has noted that for the colonial interpreter, this places 
him a step above his native-born compatriots while permanently relegating him to a subordinate 
position within the colonial hierarchy.755  This process has been often studied in the case of 
colonial-subject intermediaries,756 less so in the instance of colonizer-citizen intermediaries, and 
still more infrequently in the case of American interpreters and translators in the Asia and 
Middle East of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 Drawing upon Michel Foucault and Edward Said, Robert Young has argued, “academic 
knowledge is part of the apparatus of western power . . . ‘and it is in discourse that power and 
knowledge are drawn together.”757  With the goal of producing specialized knowledge for the 
exercise of power and the creation of wealth, the establishment of the American Student 
Interpreters Corps was an important if unacknowledged step in that process.758  However, 
examination of the perceptions and portrayals of China and Japan  that U.S. government 
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interpreters produced highlights tension within the conceptual framework of American 
Orientalism.  Their constant reiteration of the ongoing changes in Chinese and Japanese societies 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  As Edward Said has observed, the narrative of 
change presents a challenge to the “synchronic essentialism” inherent in Orientalist discourse 
because “if any Oriental detail can be shown to move, or to develop, diachrony is introduced into 
the system.  What seemed stable—and the Orient is synonymous with stability and unchanging 
eternality—now appears unstable.”759  Said makes several claims of “orientalism” in 
Orientalism; some of these are true of the SIC-generated American vision of the Far East and 
some are not. 
 Generically, SIC-trained Foreign Service officers tended to exude the “high-handed 
executive attitude of nineteenth and early twentieth century European colonialism” that Said 
outlines.760 At the same time, the officers of the SIC could be said to have enjoyed the same 
positional relationship with China as that of Flaubert with “Kuchuk Hanem” (speaking for her, 
representing her as “oriental”)761 in that they enjoyed positional privilege and higher economic 
status than many of the people with whom their training had prepared them to relate and engage. 
As noted in chapter three, it should be reiterated that maintenance of perceived high status (vis-à-
vis host country populations) for American Foreign Service officers was expected, by their 
superiors as well as by ordinary American businessmen, who thought little about, and likely 
understood even less of the operations of America’s embassies and consulates in China and 
Japan. For example, writing to Commercial Attaché Julean Arnold, James A. Thomas opined 
that the “United States Minister to China is the head of the American colony in China,” and 
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called for all Americans to work with him, and that “whether they be republican or democrat,” 
they should “assist him in every way to get results.” The desired “results” were, of course, 
expanded American trade in China (apparently a renewed priority in November, 1929).762  
 Americans preferred to perceive their Foreign Service as being the equal of those of other 
governments. However, Americans and American Foreign Service officers tended to adopt an 
attitude of triumphal progressive optimism vis-à-vis the Chinese Orient, where, in the American 
imagination, the feverish energy and vitality could be put to efficient and benevolent use—and 
SIC-trained officers were the heralds of such gospel. Headlines such as “Julean Arnold, 
American Commercial Attaché at Peking, China, will tell his great story of ‘The Sleeping Giant 
of the Orient,’” often peppered newspapers’ front pages when SIC-trained officers returned to 
the United States on leave.763 And although presumed backward, the Chinese Orient portrayed 
by such officers was one where Americans could both better humanity and make a profit. 
 The historiography of Sino-American relations has repeatedly underscored the tendency 
of Americans to view their actions in China in the most positive possible light—an exceptionalist 
vision.764 While admitting criticism (often authoring it themselves), SIC-trained officers were 
among the most ardent adherents of American exceptionalism—a mindset that facilitated a 
uniquely American species of Orientalism and accommodated “multilateral imperialism” in 
China.765 For example, after more than thirty years of service, erstwhile SIC trainee and longtime 
Commercial Attaché Julean Arnold stressed that Americans sent more money to China to 
support missionary activities than American business extracted in trade and asserted that “the 
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modern American trader followed rather than preceded the (American) missionary.766 Arnold 
suggested pairing incoming students from China with American businessmen, asserting that “the 
American big brother would gain an intimate contact” that American trade with China would 
benefit, while China’s economy and society prospered.767 Arnold further stressed that  
 
“our American manufacturers are distressingly slow to appreciate the value of 
educational and industrial films, when interestingly and intelligently made, in their 
potentialities to sell America to China. To a people like the Chinese, who are emerging 
from domestic handicraft into a modern industrial society and who are now delightfully 
receptive, they are particularly valuable as suggestive of ideas and methods helpful to the 
raising of the economic levels of their masses—hence their purchasing power.”768  
 
Of all the SIC-trained officers mentioned in this dissertation, Julean Arnold exemplifies 
the shifting emphasis from trade expansion to reluctant interventionism. In both enterprises, 
language-trained Foreign Service officers had vital roles to play: he concluded the above-
mentioned speech by emphasizing that  
 
“we [Americans] have been contributing hundreds of millions of dollars and sending 
thousands of our citizens to China and Japan to help in the education of those people 
better to understand the institutions, ideals and methods of the West. Unfortunately, in so 
doing we have neglected to provide the facilities whereby our own people might be 
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educated to understand and appreciate the very rich cultures and civilizations of Asiatic 
peoples…if we, as a Pacific power, would do our part in a manner creditable to the 
intellect of our nation, we must set to work immediately to make our physical gateways 
to the Far East intellectual gateways as well.”769   
 
One of the oldest of the China hands, Arnold had been one of the very first American 
Student Interpreters in China in 1902.770 Throughout his life and his over thirty-year career in 
China, Arnold remained a close friend and confidant of Nelson Johnson, Willys Peck, and, 
perhaps slightly more distantly, of Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck. Officers such as Arnold were 
instrumental in constructing the American understanding of China-beginning with such basics as 
that China was a polyglot society, wherein the languages spoken in Beijing, Canton, and 
Shanghai were as different from one another “as is French from Italian.”771 While Arnold’s 
vision still emphasized trade (hardly surprising given his role as Commercial Attaché), it was 
laced with an understanding of growing American power that had to be acknowledged and 
exercised, but also appropriately informed and guided. 
 It was SIC-trained officers who could provide such guidance, and it was SIC-trained 
officers such as Julean Arnold, Willys Peck, and William Langdon who convinced their 
superiors that the United States really was making progress in understanding societies such as 
those of China and Japan. For example, in a letter to Nelson Johnson introducing SIC-Japan-
trained William Langdon’s translation of Viscount Ishii’s memoirs, Stanley Hornbeck 
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commented, “I had long thought that certain other nations more intently and understood us better 
than we them. In the light of events of the past ten years and what I have seen and heard and read 
during that period, I have gradually come around to a conjecture that, taken by and large, we 
understand certain other nations better than they do us. I still think they study us more intently; 
but the simple fact is that we are much more difficult to understand than are they.”772 
Responding to these comments, Johnson regretted that the United States expressed its 
comparative lack of interest in China (vis-a-vis that of Japan) in writing and expressed dismay at 
Ishii’s observations on the perceived malleability of American public opinion—particularly in 
New York.773 In his reply, Hornbeck agreed with Johnson but asserted that “we have, in the 
positions where matters of policy are decided, men who know a great deal, seek to know more, 
are willing to be informed, and use pretty good glasses. With regard to the public, it is very 
difficult to make estimates.”774 
With the exception of occasional articles and translations such as those mention above, 
very little of the material that SIC-trained officers produced was prepared for public 
consumption. Moreover, the framework of perception they helped to prepare, assemble and 
extend differed substantively from the universally and perpetually self-reinforcing Orientalism 
that Said identifies with regard to literary portrayals of the Middle East. During the first half of 
the twentieth century, American interpreters and translators in the United States’ fledgling 
Foreign Service portrayed Asian and Middle Eastern societies as anything but “lifeless, timeless, 
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forceless” and in desperate need of Western stimulation.775  The China of the American Student 
Interpreters Corps was not the Orient of Edward Said’s Orientalism, neither were SIC graduate 
canonical Orientalists, representing the Orient, precluding any possibility of self-representation. 
Although they were undoubtedly American creatures and subject to the extant cultural prejudices 
of their time, their education, experience as interpreters and translators, and role as political, 
social, cultural and economic observers shaped their understanding of these societies and 
acknowledged the capacity for self-directed change.   
 
From the Open Door to Interventionism: 1931-1941 and Beyond 
 
 Language-trained officers developed their own views concerning the internal politics and 
foreign relations of the country in which they lived and served.  Although explicit documentation 
is scant, they do appear to have attempted to influence policy in accordance with their views, in 
some cases via seemingly innocuous action. For example, Ernest B. Price became close friends 
with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in China during the mid-1920s, and when the latter became head of a rival 
government in Canton and sought U.S. aid, Price eagerly forwarded Sun’s letter to President 
Warren G. Harding and received a sharp censure for doing so—along with a stern reminder the 
United States did not recognize Sun’s government.776  Ernest Price is an interesting example 
because although he was their senior by over decade in age and time in service, 777 in many his 
sympathies lay with the “China Hands” of the 1940s.   
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 Unlike the ostracized China Hands however, Ernest Price was never accused of being a 
communist or even a Marxist.778  This was most likely because, by his own admission, during the 
war he had been fooled by wartime Nationalist censorship and propaganda depicting the 
Communists as “ . . . ‘roving bands of Communist bandits’ in no way interfering with the 
Japanese.”779  His susceptibility to Nationalist rhetoric concerning the Chinese Communists 
(CCP and PLA) was probably due, at least partially, to his earlier association with Dr. Sun Yat-
sen. Although he resigned in 1929, after repeatedly claiming ill treatment by the Department,780 
he subsequently built strong ties with the Institute of Pacific Relations781 and corresponded with 
Owen Lattimore concerning Sino-Japanese and Asian-American relations.782 
 Other examples of (failed) attempts to influence policy include numerous warnings about 
impending war with Japan from Japan Hands such as Joseph Grew, John K. Emmerson, Eugene 
Dooman, and others.  These officers strove against mischaracterizations of the Japanese as cruel 
fanatics,783 portraying them instead as willing to compromise with American demands. For 
example, Japanese-trained John Emmerson, stressed that both Japan and the United States had 
mistaken images of each other before the war; he emphasized the American misconceptions were 
based on racism and distrust, while asserting that the Japanese underestimated American 
willingness to fight.784  Language-trained officers such as Emmerson, Dooman, Ballantine, and 
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others who rubbed shoulders with Japanese officials repeatedly warned that war with Japan was 
coming, while highlighting the fact that through back-door channels, the Japanese had offered to 
come to an arrangement satisfactory to the United States—provided it was done secretly.785 
 Such guidance often failed to influence policy, particularly if they had to pass through 
officers with differing understandings of the issues. For instance, if the aforementioned warnings 
ever reached the President, it was only with caveats and disavowals, attached by the chief of the 
Far East Division, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck, who stubbornly denied that Japan would ever attack 
the United States.786  Not only did he belittle those Japanese-trained officers who repeatedly 
warned in 1940-41 that war was coming but ten days before the Pearl Harbor attack he asserted 
writing that Japan would avoid conflict with the United States, and continued to encourage 
further U.S. sanctions against Japan.787 Right down to the day before the attack he dismissed the 
Japan hands’ warnings and tried to diminish the force of their arguments.788  Moreover, 
Hornbeck did this in confidently Orientalist language, which not only disparaged the Japanese as 
being “overly sensitive” due to Japan’s history of natural disasters but also inferred that 
American officers there had “caught this nervousness” as if it were an infection disease.789 
American Orientalism could be an obstacle to accurate understanding just as easily as it could 
bolster American confidence that the United States knew best. 
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   The day after the attack however, Hornbeck displayed a far more petty and self-serving 
side of his personality.  According to Eugene H. Dooman, who received his information “from a 
friend in the Far East Division,” Hornbeck went to Secretary Hull’s office and absconded with 
the memoranda he had written that minimized the chance of war of with Japan.  After having 
encouraged sanctions and other actions that likely hastened the onset of war, Hornbeck probably 
could not bear to leave evidence that the Japan Hands had been correct about Japan’s intentions. 
 By the eve of WWII, there had emerged two rival, if somewhat overlapping, perspectives 
on the future of U.S. relations with China and Japan. Saturated with prima donnas, adherents 
encompassed a variety of strong views, but the contours of two distinct schools of thought had 
emerged in the 1930s. A man of the left and influential among the China Hands, Owen Lattimore 
displayed the same variety of vague chauvinism toward Asians (particularly the Japanese) as did 
Stanley Hornbeck. Not only did he lambast Japan’s Emperor cult, asserting that it had no place 
“in an age of chemistry, plastics, electronics, and stratosphere navigation,” but called for the 
Emperor and eligible for succession to be forcibly interned—if the Japanese were unwilling to 
eliminate the institution on their own.790  He also advocated a punitive economic and political 
reorganization of the country that would have stripped Japan of most of its industrial capacity.791  
Japan Hands were adamantly opposed to this—just as they opposed the doctrine of unconditional 
surrender, arguing that use of the atomic bomb was unnecessary—and advocated a 
compassionate peace with Japan.792 
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 Similarly, some of the China Hands also became embroiled in the heated political debates 
over whether to cooperate with the Chinese Communists during the war, and afterwards, whether 
or not to recognize the People’s Republic of China.  Admiration for the Communists’ leadership 
and integrity was typical for American Foreign Service officers in China at the time.  As of the 
late 1930s, the SIC-trained U.S. Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson believed that many of the 
Communists were agrarian reformers, led by men of “considerable character.”793   
 Like other senior officers in the Foreign Service at the time, Johnson was (ideologically) 
opposed to American meddling in the internal affairs of other countries,794  although 
conservatives like Ballantine would have been comfortable with giving more aid to Chiang Kai-
shek and thereby meddling in China’s internal affairs.   In his reminiscences, Joseph Ballantine 
also asserted “there was the highest degree of mutual respect between the senior Japan and the 
senior China officers. There was no difference at all. It was that group from Vincent on down—
Vincent, Davies, Service—that crowd of people” who articulated a different vision postwar 
American relations with China and Japan.795  It was the perception that some of the junior China 
Hands went outside the chain of command in attempting to influence postwar policy that made 
them so controversial, first within the State Department,796 and later among American 
academics.797     
However, notwithstanding the Communists’ anti-American campaign and various other 
provocations, a majority of American “foreign policy elites”798 favored U.S. recognition of the 
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Communist regime. As Joseph W. Ballantine has noted in his memoirs, in 1949, he was among a 
“small minority which voiced opposition to the [U.S.] recognition of Red China” at a State 
Department roundtable held from 6-8 October, stressing that was the Communists imprisonment 
of the American Consul General and his staff at Mukden that ultimately prevented this.799 
Anticipated by erstwhile Student Interpreter Edward Rice, Chen Jian has argued that the harsh 
Chinese action in the handling of the Angus Ward case was probably Mao’s personal decision.800  
Within the State Department’s contending views at the time, both the conservative impulse to 
directly support the use of force against the Chinese Communists and the liberal desire to remake 
Asia according to an American conception of democracy proceeded naturally from the 
developing consensus (outlined in previous chapters) that the United States ought to assume 
more direct, interventionist policies in East Asia—particularly in China.  
 Bolstered by a chameleon American Orientalism, a consensus had emerged that the 
United States had to “do” more, but foundered on the questions of what to do in specific 
instances. With even the structure of the SIC modeled after its British counterpart it is not 
surprising that American Orientalism echoed its elder coefficient, but the American species 
proved far more ephemeral and exigency-driven that outlined by Edward Said. Still, it remained 
resilient. As Said observed, “each age and society re-creates its ‘Others.’”801 Transitioning from 
the vague, chauvinist Orientalism of the Open Door, from the 1930s into the 1940s and beyond, 
American Orientalism was becoming a discourse of American power, with competing 
interpretations across the American political spectrum.  
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 These trends emerge equally in the writings of Stanley Hornbeck and Owen Lattimore or 
Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby—on opposite sides of the American political spectrum with 
regard to China and Japan.  Asserting that the peace of Asia depended on freeing the people 
“from feudal restraints,” White and Jacoby blithely attributed the Japanese defeat in WWII to the 
inherent wickedness of Japan’s war plans.802  In their portrayal, Americans “had been threatened 
out of the darkness of the Orient; we had recognized the threat as something indescribably 
malevolent and had fashioned a steamroller that crushed it to extinction.”803    
 Hinting that a catastrophe similar to the recently-concluded war with Japanese might 
occur if the United States did not intervene, White and Jacoby likewise disparaged China, 
declaring that the “Chinese who fought this war [WWII] were peasants born in the Middle Ages 
to die in the twentieth century.”804 Imperialist rhetoric on the right (with regard to China and 
Japan) was muted at the end of WWII (although it flared after the fall of the Nationalist 
government) because senior State Department officials had held tenure under both Republican 
and Democratic presidents.  Nevertheless, Japan officers’ policy recommendations met fierce 
criticism from China specialists, who were hostile towards Japan.  For example, Stanley K. 
Hornbeck portrayed the Japanese as insatiable expansionists opposed to the United States modest 
and (putatively) ambivalent acquisition of the Philippines.805  He also propagated contemporary 
wisdom that American missionaries were the heralds of civilization in throughout the Far East.806    
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 The intellectual exponents of the political right and left in the United States’ “foreign 
policy elites” displayed a similar nonchalant arrogance towards Asian societies.807  Not only did 
both sides “underestimate the people of the region and overestimate America’s ability to make a 
bad situation better,”808 there was an assumption that the United States could and did influence 
the internal affairs of countries like China simply by adhering to passive and non-interventionist 
policies.  In other words, without committing significant military or financial resources.  This is 
particularly visible in the dual “lost China” and “lost chance” myths the emerged after the 
victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists in 1949.  
 The “lost China” myth tended to be a conservative mantra, whereas the “lost chance” 
myth was predominantly a left-liberal doctrine.  For example, Dr. Anthony Kubek attributed the 
“loss” of China to Communism to a handful of language-trained American Foreign Service 
officers, while darkly suggesting that China’s conversion to Communism would make 
Communists everywhere more willing to attack the United States.809  Both the “lost China” and 
the “lost chance” myths derive from the American-centered notion that with the right blend of 
policies, the United States could have prevented the Communist takeover, or alternately, could 
have made China an important regional ally against the Soviets.810   
 It is admittedly difficult to gauge the weighted significance of the individual views of 
various officers. Regarding their immediate relevance to policy however, personal relationships 
and officers’ proximity to the ambassador and senior State Department officials was the most 
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important factor in determining what views reached the Secretary of State and/or the President. 
As previously noted, there was a long-standing friendship between Julean Arnold, the United 
States’ commercial attaché in China, and Willys R. Peck, a close friend of Nelson T. Johnson 
and the Counselor of the Legation during much of Johnson’s tenure as Minister and 
Ambassador.811 However, after Ambassador Johnson’s transfer out of China in 1941, the “China 
hands” were institutionally marginalized within the State Department and their ability to inform 
policy was increasingly limited. Similarly, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, many of the 
Japan specialists were sidelined by fate (many of them interned by the Japanese), their voices 
drowned out by advocates of a vindictive peace with Japan.812  
However, neither the Japan Hands nor the senior China Hands such as Nelson believed that a 
harsh settlement with Japan was in the interests of the United States. Rather presciently, in 1932 
(in the aftermath of the 1931 Manchurian Incident), Johnson stressed that economic and/or 
political ruin in Japan would not be in the interests of the United States: “a broken Japan is of no 
service to us.”813 In like manner Johnson also opined that “there can be no settlement of these 
difficulties in Asia without participation and approval by Soviet Russia . . . I believe that Soviet 
Russia by her recent conduct has sufficiently demonstrated that she is not prepared to consider 
any of the recent settlements final.”814 
 As awareness of the likelihood of American involvement in East Asian conflicts became 
increasingly acute, the language used to frame the issues increasingly came  
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Later that year Johnson also confided to Hornbeck that “it is an odd turn of fate that the 
machinery for the composition of controversies between nations should rest upon the ability of 
that machinery to settle a dispute of no immediate concern whatever to those nations, a questions 
of concern only to the Orient, where Nationalism, the twin brother of Protestantism and both the 
product of the European Reformation has but just begun to weld together peoples hitherto bound 
only by ties of clan and family.”815 The “machinery” to which Johnson was referring consisted of 
the Kellogg—Briand Pact, League of Nations, and naval armament treaties. Commenting on the 
US stake in Sino-Japanese conflict, Johnson observed that  
 
“none of this concerns the United States directly; it probably does not mean the loss of 
one dollar from an American purse. On the contrary, the development of this area under 
Japanese enterprise may mean an increased opportunity for American industrial plants to 
sell the kind of machinery and other manufactured goods that will be needed where so 
much energy is being displayed.”816 
 
As the likelihood of American involvement became more apparent, racially tinged, Orientalist-
style language appeared more frequently. For example, writing candidly to Far East Division 
Chief and friend Stanley Hornbeck about Japanese machinations in Manchuria (following the 
“Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931), American Minister to China Nelson Johnson 
ranted, 
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“the present leaders in Japan have lost no opportunity to take action in Asia calculated to 
impress upon the Asiatic mind the utter failure of the internation machinery set up by 
western nations . . . whatever the reaction there may be to these activities among western 
nations, the reaction here in Asia must, I submit, be inevitably against the prestige of 
Europe and the United States. The West must either choose to follow the leadership of 
Japan down this path . . . or eventually we will have to stand at Armaggeddon and do 
battle with Asia under Japanese leadership for the ideals which we have heretofore 
advocated for ourselves and Asia.”817  
 
Johnson also underscored the problem of what the United States should do about granting the 
Philippines independence, implying that the Japanese threat made him wary of prematurely 
taking such a step.818 At the same time, cognizance that American involvement in the crisis was 
looming facilitated the expression of attitudes that comported with a nascent American 
Orientalism.  
Awareness of growing American power in the Pacific played to notions of benevolent 
American exceptionalism. According to Commercial Attaché Julean Arnold, as he urged to the 
National Foreign Trade Council in New York to assume a greater role in analyzing and 
promoting Sino-American trade, “we are facing ever increasingly larger opportunities and 
growingly graver responsibilities as a Pacific power.” 819 Implied however, was the notion that 
this increasing responsibility involved standing up to Japanese who 
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“insist upon playing the role of big brother to the Chinese, but in doing so demand the 
cream for themselves while they expect to be credited with having enforced a special 
protective service upon the Chinese when they forbid the latter sharing the skim milk 
with any others than their would-be protectors.” 820 
 
 As Japanese aggression in China became progressively ever-more blatant, the language 
that SIC-trained American officers used to condemn it increasingly sought to create a moral 
foundation for American intervention that comported with notions of American exceptionalism, 
vis-à-vis the turpitude of Japanese behavior in China. As Julean Arnold stridently highlighted to 
Nelson Johnson in 1938, 
 
“for a country that claims the honor of being a first class power, its methods of 
administering its rebuke to China for past grievances flavor distinctly of those of the 
Middle Ages rather than of a modern world striving to give evidence of humane 
consideration towards weaker and more backward peoples.”821 
 
Chinese officials were well aware of American attitudes and played to them in the hopes 
that the United States would both pursue pro-China policies itself and encourage them among 
other friendly countries, such as Great Britain. For example, in the view of Chinese Foreign 
Minister Lo Wen-kan, the United States had only “two fundamental policies, i.e., the Monroe 
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Doctrine and the ‘Open Door.’ It is vital to the United States that Japan shall not succeed in 
abolishing the ‘Open Door’ policy, for this would mean the loss of American ascendancy in the 
Pacific.” In a conversation with Willys R. Peck, Minister Lo also played up the perception that 
the United States had used the issue of war debt repayment by Britain to pressure the British 
government away from a “pro-Japanese” stance.822 
 Yet even officers such as Peck who were highly sympathetic to the Chinese predicament 
were reluctant to offer unqualified support, due to concerns about the ability of the Nationalist 
Chinese government to effectively govern the country. They also worried that certain segments 
of Chinese society were in fact more friendly to the Japanese than to countries such as the United 
States and Great Britain. For instance, during a conversation among Willys R. Peck, Chinese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Lo Wen-kan, and the Chinese Minister for Industries Chen Kung-
po, the latter downplayed foreign aspersions cast against Chinese nationalism. He noted that 
“foreigners spoke of the “North” and the “South,” but that all he could say was that foreigners 
and white skins and fair hair and that the Chinese in the North and the South had similar yellow 
skins and black hair.”  
The racially-tinged comments lead the reader to wonder Cheng thought of the Japanese, 
particularly given the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ more circumspect observation to Peck that 
“the strife in China was merely a series of family quarrels.”823 Peck noted in his summary to 
Johnson that “both Lo and Chen Kung-po seemed to take pleasure in pointing out that the British 
attitude toward China had almost always been wrong,” and that the latter took pains to highlight 
                                            
822 Willys R. Peck, Confidential, “Memorandum of Conversation: Sino-Japanese Controversy,” January 28, 1933, 
[Nanking, China], Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, box 4, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA.  
823 Willys R. Peck, “Memorandum of Conversation: Attitude of Foreign Nations toward China,” January 30, 1933, 
[Nanking, China], Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, box 4, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA. 
264	
	
	
the instances in which the British Consul General had humiliated him.824 When Peck asked 
whether China could “really handle Manchuria satisfactorily,” in the unlikely event “the 
Japanese were to withdraw suddenly their forces from Manchuria.” Lo apparently replied that “it 
would be easy for China to control Manchuria, if there no outside interference,” because “the 
Chinese people were the easiest people in the world to govern.” 825 This did little to mitigate 
Peck’s skepticism.826  
 Officers such as Peck highlighted perceptions by both the Japanese and Chinese that 
foreign meddling in China had thwarted easy realization of their respective goals. According to 
Willys Peck’s depiction, “the Japanese think that China is per se incapable of uniting to resist 
any foreign power and that Japan should have been able to amputate Manchuria with almost no 
pain, if China had not been bolstered up by America and the League and by the world-wide 
publicity of which she had been the center.”827 Peck added that, “feeling as many of the Japanese 
leaders seem to feel regarding assumed venality of Chinese politicians, etc., it is not at all 
unlikely that they are sincere in asserting that Japan knows China better better than other nations 
do and that the League and the occidental nations in general are basing their criticisms on a 
hideously mistaken set of ideas.”828 
 However, even while they acknowledged that the ruling circles in Japan sincerely 
subscribed to such views, these were becoming increasingly unpalatable for SIC-trained officers, 
who were beginning to regard them as a threat not only to the United States but also the entire 
world. For example, in Willys Peck’s depiction,  
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“in the face of China’s weakness and Japan’s efficiency with machine guns and airplanes, 
common sense would seem to be on the side of those Chinese leaders who advocate 
capitulation to Japan, but the question remains whether it would be common sense on the 
part of the world to acquiesce in a state of affairs which, in the opinion of many, 
hopelessly discredits the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact, and the efforts of the world 
to struggle out of international anarchy.”829 
 
 The portrayals of SIC-trained officers of Sino-Japanese conflict and Nationalist-
Communist military ferment in China left these officers between a rock and a hard place. On the 
one hand, the Nationalist government appeared weak and corrupt; on the other the Japanese were 
increasingly flouting agreements that the United States regarded as providing the basis of 
international peace and stability.  In the 1930s, this was becoming apparent locally to officers 
such as Willys Peck, who observed that their Japanese counterparts could not be relied upon to 
accurately and consistently define Japanese policy in China but that it was rather the Japanese 
War Ministry that did so. Peck evinced considerable glee in relaying to Johnson Chinese Foreign 
Affairs Minister Lo Wen-kan’s portrayal of officers in the Japanese Foreign Office as practical 
“puppets,”  and even more so on the latter’s observation that “the difference between the 
Japanese and the Chinese warlords was that the Chinese warlords were ‘rascals’ and ‘damn 
fools,’ while the Japanese warlord were by no means ‘damn fools.’”830 Sooner or later, it was 
apparent to them, the United States would have to take action, but the time was not quite ripe for 
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it, and beyond such apocalyptic but vague visions of having “to stand Armageddon,”831 there was 
little consensus among SIC-trained officers in the 1930s of what exactly America should do. 
 As will be further outlined in the succeeding chapter, perceptions of both China’s 
international problems and domestic difficulties (namely, Communism) tempered American 
desires to unilaterally encourage Chinese nationalism. On the question of extraterritoriality for 
example, Johnson opined that the United States could choose to “go it alone” by relinquishing 
the hodge-podge of legal and economic privileges “and clear out of the International Settlement, 
and still I doubt whether we would accomplish much by the deed.”832 In formulating this 
opinion, Johnson relied on his correspondence with Peck, who had stressed that premature 
American acquiescence on the issue of extraterritoriality would force the United States to 
formally rely on Japan for protection of American rights in the International Settlement and 
elsewhere and in so doing would not only make the United States look weak but also to appear to 
be in collusion with Japanese interests in China.833 Perceptions of autocratic tendencies in 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government further complicated matters. For example, in a letter 
to Hornbeck, Johnson mused over how to respond to the Chinese government’s censorship of the 
1932 hit film, Shanghai Express, noting that Peck regarded the matter in a manner sympathetic 
to the Chinese government but that American newspaper headlines surrounding such actions 
created unfavorable public opinion in the United States that was difficult to ignore.834 
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 World politics were likewise difficult to dismiss. In a conversation between Willys Peck 
and Chinese Minister of Finance T.V. Soong touching on world politics as well as the Chinese 
situation, Peck observed “there seemed to be a general tendency toward dictatorships, such as 
those exercised by Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin,” noting that “even in the United States the 
President had been given by Congress unusually wide powers for the reorganization of the 
Government.” Soong, for his part, concurred in general and opined that he thought China 
immune to a dictatorship, as it lacked a figure of the caliber of Stalin.835 As will be dealt with 
more explicitly in the next chapter, such a figure was already at work shaping China’s future, and 
many SIC-trained officers were cognizant of his handiwork. 
Despite all this, SIC-trained officers remained remarkably sanguine about China’s future. 
For example, Julean Arnold observed that although “it is true that China has not developed a 
republic in the commonly accepted definition of this word, but I am of the opinion that popular 
democratic government will eventually be developed in this country in a manner that will 
conform with the commonly accepted conception of popular democratic government.”836 
 Seeking to provide accurate portrayals of Chinese and Japanese society and politics while 
reconciling them with American foreign policy goals, language-trained officers challenged 
presumptions of empire while paving the way for more explicit implementations of them.  As the 
eyes and ears of the United States government, they interpreted these societies for their country 
and were vital to the American understanding of Asia from the turn of the century until World 
War II.  Although they failed to actualize their respective visions, they were instrumental in 
cultivating the perception of Asia as a region that American policy could and should transform. 
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CHAPTER 10 
FROM IMPERIAL EPITAPH TO COLD WAR PRELUDE: CHINESE COMMUNISM 
AND JAPANESE MILITARISM FROM LANGUAGE OFFICERS’ PERSPECTIVES, 
1925-1941 
 
Previous chapters have largely detailed the preoccupation of Foreign Service offices on 
the prospects for expansion of American trade in China. The failure of this expansion to 
materialize, and the gradual shift of emphasis away from trade towards largely reactionary 
policies, derived primarily from political developments, particularly Chinese Communism and 
Japanese aggression in China. As noted in previous chapters, from the 1920s onwards, there was 
increasing pressure for American policy to become more proactive; despite this, Americans 
became increasingly reactive, without ever having approached realization of an economic empire 
in China.  
This chapter argues that American commitment to the aforementioned ideal remained as 
abstract in this crisis-ridden period as during the inception of the SIC birthed by it. With the 
putative ideal of economic imperialism having faded to the background, American Foreign 
Service officers constructed an accurate picture of the growth of Communism as a political, 
ideological, and military force in China, as well as the challenges inherent in combating it. In this 
area, SIC-trained offices played a hybrid role, acting as sources of intelligence as well as 
diplomatic interlocutors.  
This chapter will simultaneously argue that in the portrayals of language-trained Foreign 
Service officers in China, the single greatest challenge in combating the Communists for the 
Nationalist (KMT) government was the Japanese, whereas the Communists forced the hand of 
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Chiang Kai-shek to begin posturing (at least superficially) against the Japanese, and at the same 
time took advantage of the weakness and corruption of Chiang’s regime to entrench their support 
base in outlying provinces. Both the factual accuracy and political loyalty of these officers has 
been variously called into question—particularly during and immediately after WWII—but in 
the midst of accusations and recriminations, this chapter argues that subsequent historians as well 
as the principal actors themselves failed to realize that the latter’s recommendations were crafted 
to support the rhetoric of an Open Door imperialism that had long since failed to launch, let 
alone obtain.  
Contrary to various treatments of American diplomacy in China asserting a pervasive 
lack of analysis of national events,837 American Foreign Service officers carefully analyzed both 
local and national developments from their vantage points in various provinces. So 
comprehensive was their coverage in fact that during this period a small but discernible gap 
emerged between two generations of China Hands, namely, those who entered service in 1900s 
and 1910s, and those who entered in the 1920s and afterwards, during the shift away from 
promoting trade to reacting to political and military crises. A similar divide emerged between 
Japan and China officers as well.  
Although such a variety of opinions existed that generalizations are difficult, younger and 
more junior officers tended to view the Communists more favorably, and were more likely to be 
stationed in outlying provinces where the Communists were active. From their frequent postings 
in Manchuria (where their Japanese language skills were useful), both junior and senior 
Japanese-trained officers tended to view both Japanese aggression and Communist activity there 
with greater alarm (likely due to the alarm with which their Japanese counterparts viewed it). 
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“Old” or “senior” China Hands encompassed officers such as Nelson Johnson, Willys Peck, and 
Julean Arnold and Paul R. Josselyn, whereas the younger group comprised officers such as John 
Service, Edmund Club, John Hall Paxton, and Arthur Ringwalt. Among the Japan Hands, the 
dominant figures were Joseph Grew (longtime US Ambassador to Japan but not a language 
officer), Joseph Ballantine, John Caldwell and Eugene Dooman (Dooman was close to both 
Ballantine and Grew but some of his views might well place him among the moderates). There 
were also two groups of moderates (if such a term can be considered appropriate): among the 
SIC-China officers these included officers such as Ernest Price and Edwin Stanton; among the 
SIC-Japan officers they embraced officers such as Erle Dickover and Max Kirjassoff.   
With the exception of these moderates (most of whom left service before the war or 
luckily escaped scrutiny for various reasons), few of these officers escaped searing criticism for 
propounding the views dictated by their long tenures in the Foreign Service—in some cases from 
each other. Over the course of several decades, these officers carefully constructed portrayals of 
and postulated responses to Chinese Communism and Japanese militarism. Prior to WWII, 
despite increasing pressure on the US government to adopt more proactive policies, the United 
States was unwilling and/or unable to directly combat either Communism or Japanese militarism 
in China. From the above-mentioned groups of SIC-trained officers, the older China officers 
tended to see Chinese Communism as more influenced by the Soviet Union than did their junior 
colleagues (who generally observed the Communists more directly).  
Perhaps best represented by Jay C. Huston (whose quest to understand Communism in 
China bordered on the obsessive), this group tended to see force, coupled with economic reform, 
as the only effective way to combat the challenge that Communism posed to the Chinese 
government. They likewise took saw Communism as a greater irritation (albeit not a serious 
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immediate threat) to the United States. The younger group of officers tended to see the 
Communists as not only more of challenge to the Nationalist government, but one that also 
offered a potentially viable alternative. Both groups of China officers viewed both Communism 
and Japanese aggression as preventing Chiang Kai-shek’s consolidation of power and 
implementation of economic reform in China.  
Simultaneously, Japan officers (such as Joseph Ballantine and Eugene Dooman) were 
generally in agreement with the younger group of China officers on the strength and viability of 
Chinese Communism but were inclined to agree with their older China colleagues on the threat 
that Communism posed (at least potentially) to American interests in Asia. However, Japan-
trained officers maintained a more realistic and accurate view of both Japanese attitudes towards 
United States and the likelihood of war between the two countries. 
The views of these officers provided the lenses through which both the United States at 
the time and subsequent scholars have viewed US policy towards pre- and post-war Japan and 
China, leading to various assertions of lost chances and missed opportunities.838 However, while 
these officers did indeed provide careful coverage and thorough analyses of developments in 
China and Japan and even formulated policy proposals, these were constrained by the channels 
through which their reports flowed to decision-makers in Washington, as well as by anti-
interventionist sentiment in the United States (which lies largely outside the scope of this study).  
To briefly highlight this attitude, even when the December 12, 1937 Japanese sinking of 
the USS Panay made war seem increasingly likely, anti-interventionists responded by proposing 
a constitutional amendment that would have severely curtailed the ability of the United States to 
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go to war.839 Even as Americans were increasingly expecting their government to “do” more (a 
trend detailed elsewhere in this dissertation), their caution with regard to use of military force 
curtailed the ability of the United States to respond to threats to the “Open Door” in China—the 
policy which putatively undergirded the United States’ pursuit of economic imperialism840 and 
had led to the creation of the SIC and the preservation of which, in portrayals of scholars such as 
Walter LaFeber and Thomas McCormick, formed the basis of the US approach to China and 
Japan.841 The contradiction between the desire for government to “do” more clashed with 
American non-interventionism. Against this background, examining American Foreign Service 
officers’ assessments of Japanese militarism and Chinese Communism during this period 
highlights that however prescient their appraisals may have been, Open Door imperialism was a 
dead letter, more a badge of political correctness than a proactive policy. 
Although the United States was not prepared to “do” much about either Chinese 
Communism or Japanese aggression in the 1930s, the aforementioned groups of language-trained 
officers clearly understood the problems they posed for both present and future American policy. 
Foreign Service officers recognized the inefficacy of Chiang’s policies towards both the 
Communists and the Japanese and put forward differing visions of American post-war policy for 
Japan and China. From the 1920s onward, the China Hands recognized the staying power of 
Chinese Communism, whereas the Japan Hands recognized the impasse in Japanese-American 
relations and the likelihood of war. Towards the end of WWII, the China Hands recognized that 
the Chinese Communists would likely prevail in the looming civil war.  
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The China Hands’ understanding of Chinese Communism was born out of decades of 
first-hand experience with its complex genealogy in Chinese society and politics. Officers strove 
to furnish vivid and detailed and portrayals of all the social, political, and economic 
developments transpiring within their districts. Consequently, during the 1930s, the Chinese 
Communists figured prominently in many of them. SIC-trained Arthur Ringwalt stressed that the 
Communists held much stronger appeal for Chinese peasants in Yunnan province, and that as an 
ideology was much more effective than efforts to counter it.842 Ringwalt spoke admiringly of 
their effectiveness, noting that in 1935, the populace of Kunming was “so unnerved by tales of 
the invincibility of the Communists” advancing on Yunnanfu province that “they were in no 
condition to offer any resistance,” even to three young boys of the advance troops. One was 
killed, one wounded; when the third opened fire with a pair of pistols, the petrified local militia 
apparently dropped their weapons and fled, leaving the city to the Communists.843 Writing of the 
Communists’ ideological and organization discipline, Ringwalt related a locally-propagated 
anecdote, telling of a woman Communist with local forces who gave birth to child. Leaving the 
child with a peasant family in Yunnanfu, the woman pinned a note to the infant’s clothing 
stating, “you are not my son, although you were born from my womb. You belong to the 
country. When you grow up you must work for the country and society and not think of me.” 
When she departed she left the family with a sum of money and a warning that if ill were to 
befall the child the family would be killed.844 
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According to Ringwalt, “the Communist army under Chu Te and Mao Tse-Tung owes its 
strength to its compactness and its almost fanatical unity of purpose. Its organization is such as to 
make for the extreme of flexibility. Its leaders have displayed an ingenuity which only years of 
hardship in the face of overwhelming odds can produce. Perhaps for the first time since the early 
years of the T’aiping Rebellion has a large body of troops been imbued with the same resolution 
and disinterestedness. The stress placed on political education would seem to be justified.” 845  
Ringwalt further highlighted the rigor of the Chinese Communists’ ideology by noting that, when 
Chiang Kai-Shek offered a reward of one hundred thousand dollars for the capture, “dead or 
alive,” of either Chu Te or Mao Tse-Tung, Chu Te reportedly “offered one dollar for the capture 
of General Chiang.” 846 
  As noted in previous chapters, missionaries, along with businessmen and local informants 
provided consular officers with a detailed picture of the spread of Communist influence in China. 
One Reverend G.R. Wood from Sining, Chinghai province, China, for example, reported that 
some of the Nationalist troops in Kansu had defected to the Communists, that the loyalty of the 
remainder in his province of Chinghai was uncertain, and that Tibetan Buddhist troops had 
joined the Communists with the understanding that the practice of Buddhism would be 
unmolested.847 SIC-trained consul Arthur Ringwalt noted that not only did this tolerance become 
standard practice, but that prominent Tibetan figures were incorporated in the Chinese 
Communist forces and given positions of high responsibility.848 While striving to remain 
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objective in tone (and asserting that the Tibetan and Chinese “races do not mix well”), Ringwalt 
observed that Nationalist-Tibetan relations fared much worse, even devolving into armed 
clashes.849 Arthur Ringwalt similarly reported that Japanese political agents in Yunnanfu sought 
to agitate the Annamite community against the Chinese central government, promising Japanese 
aid should the provincial government in Yunnanfu form a coalition with other provinces.850 
Consul General Paul R. Josselyn similarly highlighted the Communist strategy of treating 
defeated or captured Nationalists troops in order to build good will, noting that in December 
1935 when the Communists captured a Nationalist unit in Hunan province, they fed the 
Nationalist troops, compensated them for their weapons and ammunition, and sent them home.851 
While striving to report dispassionately, Josselyn further noted that the pay of the Nationalist 
troops in Hunan “many months in arrears. Man for man they are hardly a match for the fighting 
men of the Red horde, they have not been impatient to come to grips with them in the past, and 
they have little stomach for fighting now.”852  
In the portrayals of SIC-China-trained officers such developments occurred against the 
backdrop of severe economic privation in rural China. They repeatedly underscored the need to 
alleviate the dire economic conditions of the peasant population in China, while noting that the 
land-owning classes opposed land-redistribution proposals and that all previous attempts to re-
allocate wealth and land resources so as to alleviate the extreme rural property.853 According to 
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Nelson Johnson, the deteriorating economic conditions in Chinghai and Shenxi provinces 
provided the primary impetus for the spread of Communist influence in area.854  
  Within this milieu, officers kept abreast of the political propaganda and psychological 
warfare of the Communists, who sought to further rally the Chinese populace to their cause. 
According to F.P. Lockhart (Counselor of the US Embassy in Beijing), this was calculated with a 
view towards “provoking action by the Japanese Army against China.855 Such a development 
would further weaken the Nationalist government (the Kuomintang), paving the way for 
leadership competition at the national level.856  Foreign Service officers in China highlighted the 
corrupt and utilitarian methods of Chiang Kai-shek’s government. Although officers such as 
Vincent, Davies, Davis, Club, Paxton, Ludden, and Ringwalt strove to report objectively, their 
reports highlight a weak, corrupt Nationalist government, rooted in the sandy foundation of 
personal politics. For example, in 1935, Arthur Ringwalt, the American consul at Yunnanfu, 
stressed that Chinese media reports concerning the Communists were unreliable at best.  He 
estimated that Chiang Kai-shek had “approximately 200,000 troops engaged in fruitless attempt 
to deal with 20 to 30,000 Communists . . . apparently his policy has been to weaken the various 
provincial forces who owe only an indirect loyalty to him and at the same time to consolidate his 
own position . . . one cannot escape the impression that Chiang is as interested in playing politics 
as in bandit suppression.”857  
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In this vein Arthur Ringwalt also detailed power struggles between Chiang Kai-shek and 
provincial generals such as Lung Yun, the Chairman of Yunnan province as well as the local 
military commander.858  The key disagreement was troop deployment in the face of the 
Communist threat—whether Lung’s troops or those Chiang Kai-shek would be employed.859 
Commenting on the political composition and orientation of the Communist forces, Ringwalt 
observed that although the Communists in Kiangsi “had at least the moral support and direction 
of the Third International . . . the Chinese Soviet was not necessarily subservient to the Third 
International, as the latter organization was said to have been in favor of the development of a 
strong soviet unit in China, while certain Chinese Communists advocated the encouraging of 
more or less spontaneous movements throughout the country.”860  
SIC-China officers could not always discern between “communist” and “bandit” forces in 
the 1920s and ‘30s. For example in 1935 John Hall Paxton commented that a group of bandits 
claiming to be communists perpetrated the usual acts of looting and burning, but that in addition 
they destroyed land title deeds, contracts, and invoices wherever they could, and “raised the Red 
flag of the Soviets with the crossed sickle and hammer.”861 In 1925, consul Edwin Stanton 
reported a $5million “gift” of 5,000 machine guns from Soviet Russia to Kuomintang 
(Nationalist) general Feng Yu Hsiang, in the hope that Feng would assume leadership of the 
party “in support of its efforts to establish Communism in China.” 862 Foreign Service officers 
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did their best to report on the sources and movement of arms, munitions, and personnel, but 
against the mosaic of shifting political ideologies, rivalries and alliances among Chinese 
partisans and between respective Chinese factions and the Japanese and the Soviet Union in the 
1920s and ‘30s it was often difficult to ascertain whether arms supplied to Chinese generals 
occurred out of ideological or financial motivations.  
Moreover, the structure of the “Communist” party was fluid during much of this period. 
During the 1920s, officers such Ernest Price detailed the growth of the Communist party 
“outside” the Kuomintang alongside the development of “cliques within the 
Kuomintang…composed of members of the Party which are, nevertheless, hostile to the present 
Government, and make up what is known as the Left Wing of the Kuomintang.”863 Somewhat 
closer in outlook to older officers, Price portrayed the CCP as supporting world revolution, 
linked to the Third Internationale.864 
However close the relationship between the CCP and the Third Internationale may have 
been during the former’s infancy, SIC-trained officers followed their divorce closely. In 1928, J. 
V. A. MacMurray’s report to the State Department (Huston was the US consul in Canton at this 
time) incorporated Jay C. Huston’s views on strength of Communism in the district, discounting 
the Communists as a political force and emphasizing the personal as opposed to ideological 
differences among the various factions among and between the Kuomintang and local 
warlords.865  He also reiterated Huston’s belief that the Russians were responsible for the 
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uprising and that it’s failure entrenched local resentment against the Communist—which in turn 
lead to the summary execution of the local Soviet Vice-Consul.866    
Based on the reports of Consul Jay C. Huston, American Minister J.V.A. MacMurray 
highlighted the Communist role in an uprising in Canton in December 1928, noting that it 
marked the end of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Nationalists.867  According to 
MacMurray, “personal motives rather than abstract political principles are the cause of present 
dissensions among those who seek to govern China.”868 According to MacMurray, the uprising 
consisted of “the riff-raff workers of Canton, linked up with certain robber bands from the 
country districts  . . . ,” noting that “things began to look ominous for foreigners because of the 
expressed intention of the communists to deal with them after gaining control of the situation.”869 
Huston had emphasized to MacMurray that this uprising “differed from previous attempts in that 
the movement of December 11th was purely communistic and based upon the belief that the 
workers would rise and take control of the city.”870  
According to MacMurray, “it seemed that in their initial speeches and proclamations the 
agitators promised every member of the proletariat who joined them $20 and rifle, freedom to 
loot, freedom from debt, food, wealth, and a house to live in.”871 MacMurray further noted, “Mr. 
Huston reported that, in spite of these extravagant offers in a city that boasted union membership 
of some 300,000, the Russians were understood to have marshaled only 3,000 of the riff-raff 
workers who, combined with a thousand or more persons belonging to peasant robber bands and 
about an equal number of so-called red troops which were brought over, constituted the ‘red 
                                            
866 Ibid.  
867 J.V.A MacMurray (Peking) to the Secretary of State, January 26, 1928, 893.00P.R. No. 1366, RG 84. 
868 Ibid.  
869 Ibid.  
870 Ibid.  
871 Ibid.  
280	
	
	
guards.’”872 In MacMurray’s portrayal—based on Huston’s reports, “the manner in which the 
communists allowed the reds to burn the city and in many instances to shoot the owners of the 
houses which the latter tried to save, aroused the fierce hatred of the Cantonese against the 
against both the Russians and Communists.”873 Huston’s report  expressed the opinion that the 
episode might be termed one of Moscow’s most ghastly failures in attempting to bring about 
world revolution, the Soviets having failed completely in gauging Chinese psychology and the 
reaction of the so-called oppressed classes to their grandiose attempt.”874 
Although the political composition and orientation as well as sources of support for 
Chinese Communism shifted considerably during the 1920s and ‘30s, American officials were 
alive to these changes and by the 1930s were fully aware that Chinese Communism was a 
distinct entity from its elder Soviet sibling. For example, reports by then-Military Attache Col. 
Joseph Stillwell highlighted its Chinese particularities. General Joseph Stilwell was a graduate of 
the Army Language Officer Program, and shared many affinities with SIC-China-trained Foreign 
Service officers, although his military role conferred slightly different priorities.875 He observed 
that although its agriculture-based economy made industrial communism “as a theory of 
government” ill-suited for China, in fact, “the so-called Reds now operating in China, in open 
rebellion against the Government, can hardly be said to represent pure communism.”876  
Characterizing Communists as outcast, erstwhile allies of the Kuomintang, Stillwell echoed the 
observations of Arthur Ringwalt, asserting, “it seems certain that these communist-bandits are 
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not receiving direction or support from the Third International [sic] and that their methods are 
probably not approved by that body.”877  
 Stilwell further noted that although the Communists had been driven underground in 
1928, they were “busy in those areas neglected by the government where the peasant population 
suffering from local misrule welcomed any form of government which promised some 
amelioration of their lot.” 878 Similar to SIC-China officers, Stilwell highlighted the Communists’ 
guerilla tactics, the reluctance of Nationalist armies to engage the Communists directly, and 
tenuous loyalty of Nationalist troops that often led to mass defections to the Communists in the 
1930s.879 He also observed that the Nationalist armies’ tactics usually consisted of tailing 
Communist forces, often eventually encircling them but leaving open an avenue for retreat, or 
arriving at a threatened city too late to engage the Communists but just in time to loot whatever 
the latter had left behind.880 According to Stilwell, these strategies resulted in the consolidation 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s power, but “the gains were made at great expense to the country and 
certainly cannot justify his failure to score a decisive victory over the Red armies. In fact, these 
gains can only be temporary unless such a victory is soon forthcoming.”881 
 Although the Communists often destroyed the assets of propertied classes, Stilwell noted 
that the “conduct of the Reds toward the common people was better than that of the government 
troops…no Red soldier was permitted to use opium under penalty of death. While in possession 
of a town they were careful to pay for what they took although when forced to evacuate they 
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took what they wanted and burnt the town.”882 Stilwell concluded that “communism has had 
little or no chance to succeed in China, which is still in a stage of agricultural life and family 
industry,” noting that that the farmers in the countryside “have simple and clear notions about 
individual property, a love for the bit of land upon which they live and a strong conviction that 
they should not be deprived of it. A Chinese could only believe in one form of communism, i.e., 
a redistribution of wealth by which he could benefit.”883 He further opined that the communists 
“can hardly be said to represent pure communism” and stressed that “it seems certain that they 
are not receiving any direction or support from the Third Internationale, and that their actions are 
probably not approved by that body.”884 Most importantly, Stilwell asserted, “unless the 
present[Chinese] Government can show some sign of strength by a united front against Japan, it 
will soon fall apart due to its own weakness. Furthermore, Japan is using the Red menace as an 
excuse for her present China program, which includes the prevention of Sovietism in the Far 
East.”885 
 Stilwell’s views need not be recounted in detail overmuch, thank to Barbara Tuchman’s 
thick description of his career in China.886 What is worthy of mention is that in the 1930s, reports 
by SIC-China-trained and/or experienced officers tended to mirror and corroborate his accounts. 
Arthur Ringwalt’s reports from Yunnanfu in particular seem to bear out both Stilwell’s reports of 
Communist offensive and Nationalist defensive tactics, as well as Ballantine’s intimation of 
large numbers of troops behind Japanese lines in Manchuria.  
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While scholars should be cautious in reading too much into slight differences of 
emphasis, it is likewise worthy to note that that older-generation officers such as Charles Gauss 
and Nelson T. Johnson tended to be more skeptical of Communist successes, and sparser in their 
praise. Viewed alongside portrayals of the Nationalist regime it does seem that those of younger 
Foreign Service officers in China depicted the Communists favorably. While Foreign Service 
officers in general took a dim view of Communism per se, and held even lower opinions of 
Americans who worked to promote Communism in China, older officers tended to be slightly 
more strident. For example, in May 1936, Chinese municipal authorities in Shanghai accused an 
American citizen, Mr. Max Granich, of being a representative of the Third Internationale.887 
When Granich complained to the US Consul General, he “was informed orally that the Consulate 
General declined to intervene in the matter.888 Consul General Charles E. Gauss stated,  
 
“I felt that the Consulate General should give no official support or countenance in the 
activities in which he is engaged. He is publishing and disseminating a political magazine 
of a highly radical propaganda character, likely to incite the student and radical element 
to agitation, and perhaps disorders, inimical to peace and good order and to the good 
relations between the United States and China, and other countries.”889 
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Gauss further relayed that he would reject Granich’s application to register his company as an 
American entity in Shanghai (and thereby eligible for extraterritorial protection) on the grounds 
that in his application Granich had failed to honestly detail the intended activities of his 
publishing company.890   
 Foreign Service officers were occasionally asked to monitor and report on the movements 
and activities of American scholars in China. For example, Charles Gauss responded to a State 
Department request to report on the activities of a Yale scholar, George Alexander Kennedy and 
his wife during their visit to China in June 1936.891 According to Gauss, Kennedy had been 
awarded a three-year research grant by the Rockefeller Foundation via the Institute of Pacific 
Relations to “experiment with intensive methods of giving a reading knowledge of the Chinese 
language to American scholars.”892 Gauss’s report cited Shanghai police authorities as observing, 
“though Mr. Kennedy is suspected of radical tendencies, inquiries show that during his present 
sojourn in China he has not been concerned in any sort of subversive activities.”893 
Although by the 1930s the reporting focus of American officers had shifted towards political and 
military crises, interest in trade was by no means entirely a dead letter. Foreign Service officers 
in China kept a watchful eye on the economic situation as well. American Minister Nelson T. 
Johnson in 1935 wrote to Consul Arthur Ringwalt to request that the latter investigate in his 
district “whether monopolistic rights have been or are being granted to Japanese which constitute 
a violation of the Open Door policy,” while bearing in mind that Americans might not be “likely 
or willing to incur the same degree of expenditure of effort and money or to assume 
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responsibilities to the same degree as the Japanese.”894 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
American officers continued to observe and report on economic conditions in their districts, 
underscoring both opportunities for investment of American capital and threats to Open Door 
principles. However, in the majority of investment opportunities (when investment was 
requested by Chinese provincial officials in particular), they often recommended against such 
ventures, referring to the lack of security of the investments and insufficient Chinese 
collateral.895 Economic opportunities increasingly concentrated in Japanese hands by default. For 
example, Arthur Ringwalt noted that, despite a resurgence in “anti-Japanese feeling” in 
Yunnanfu, China in 1935, Japanese imports into the province more than quintupled in value from 
1934 to 1935, to more than 67,000 yen.896 Ringwalt observed that operations by Chinese 
Communist and Japanese severely restricted Chiang Kai-shek’s ability to extend Nationalist 
government control throughout the country, 897 while redounding to greater power for the 
Japanese and increased influence for the Communists.  
American officers understood that the structure of the Nationalist government posed an 
even more serious obstacle to addressing such challenges. Commenting on the nature of Chiang 
Kai-shek’s government, Ringwalt observed that the character of Chiang’s government was 
highly personal, reliant on subordinates’ loyalty to him, rather than on competence and ability. 
According to Ringwalt, while visiting Yunnanfu in 1936, Chiang bestowed titular favors on the 
military governor a General Lung—who local officials and students charged with 
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maladministration—even to the point of nominally adopting the general’s son as his own. On 
receiving a petition charging the general with favoritism and corruption, Chiang turned over the 
petition to Lung, who arrested the petition’s organizers and executed several of them.898 
According to American officers, not only were nominally Nationalist officials such as Lung 
unpopular due to corruption, they were difficult to deal with practically because of their anti-
foreign sentiments. In Yunnanfu for example, Arthur Ringwalt noted that the aforementioned 
Chairman and General, Lung Yun, detested foreigners, bitterly resenting “any suggestion of a 
limitation on his sovereignty.”899 So dogged was his antipathy toward foreigners that he refused 
to meet with any of the foreign officials in the province (including the Japanese) for any 
reason.900 
Although SIC-China-trained officers contributed a large quantity of information to the 
US understanding of Communism in China, SIC-Japan graduates—most often stationed in 
Japanese-dominated or controlled areas such as Mukden, Amoy, and Tsingtao—were sources as 
well. While stationed as Consul General in Mukden, Manchuria, Joseph Ballantine’s 
relationships with local Japanese officials provided him access to secret Japanese assessments of 
Communist and other guerrilla activity in the province, as well as maps indicating their 
approximate dispersal along the Yalu river.901  He noted that contrary to Japanese propaganda 
asserting that the Soviet Union was providing the Communists with weapons, his Japanese 
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contact privately admitted that no evidence of this existed.902 Obtained through cryptically-
related conversation and/or furtively permitted glimpses of Japanese intelligence, such 
information was tinged with the opinions of Japanese officials. For instance, in this 1936 report 
Ballantine noted that “a very reliable American source” had obtained “secret” Japanese maps of 
the disposition of Communist armies in Japanese-controlled Manchuria from “the Japanese 
director of a certain government bureau concerned with bandit suppression.”903  
According to this account, “the Communist groups are reported to carry on propaganda 
which combines anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo teachings with Marxian doctrines.”904 
Ballantine particularly highlighted his observation that despite repeated charges made for public 
consumption by Japanese officials that the Soviet Union is supplying Manchurian insurgents 
with arms, it is significant that in the interview the Director is understood to have categorically 
that there is no proof of weapons coming from the U.S.S.R.”905 Whereas Ballantine further 
emphasized that the number of Communist troops in Manchuria was likely in excess of the 
Japanese official’s estimate of 30,000,906 Nelson T. Johnson expressed skepticism that the armies 
even existed, opining, “it is assumed that if such armies actually exist, they have been skillful in 
avoiding clashes with Japanese military patrols.”907 
 Yet while Johnson and other officers stationed in political centers such as Beijing and 
Shanghai remained skeptical of Communist gains, officers in outlying province were conversely 
wary of inflated, exaggerated, or outright false accounts of Nationalist engagement with 
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Communist forces. For example, in February 1936, Arthur Ringwalt observed that local 
newspaper reports recommended the evacuation of foreign persons in advance of a putative 
Communist thrust into the province, amid “lurid accounts” of Communist captures of various 
minor localities and a heavy Nationalist aerial bombing campaign, while the consul himself 
noted that these accounts were without any factual basis.908 
Even more galling in the portrayals of SIC-trained officers was the apparently increasing 
determination of Chiang’s government to defend Communist-threatened cities to the last man—
of someone else’s army: according to Arthur Ringwalt noted that in 1935, local magistrates were 
“enjoined to defend their district cities to the last man” on pain of execution.909 These were 
hardly idle threats: Ringwalt reported that the magistrate of Suanwei in northeastern Yunnanfu 
was executed by firing squad after hiding with his militia instead of engaging the Communists.910 
Informants were also treated severely. In the city of Suntien (also in northeastern Yunnanfu), the 
attacking Communists bribed a 7-year-old girl with a silver coin to reveal the location of the 
local magistrate, shooting him when he was found. When the new magistrate reported the 
incident to the Provincial government, both the girl and her father were “executed before the 
coffin of the deceased magistrate as a sacrificial offering to his soul.”911  
In addition to witnessing such distressing events, officers had front row seats to observe 
the political corruption that plagued the Nationalist government from top to bottom. When 
General Yen Hsi-shan was about to implement village ownership of land in the district of North 
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Shensi (Shansi Province), Nelson T. Johnson reported to the State Department that Nationalist 
party officials had bribed Yen with $5,000 to postpone the measure.912 According to Johnson 
however, his reports were based on newspaper accounts and conversations with Nationalist party 
and Chinese government officials, whereas those of Ringwalt were based on personal experience 
and conversations with eyewitnesses.913 Consequently, even though officers were far from being 
Communist sympathizers in terms of personal ideological affinities, and although they strove to 
keep their reports free of political and/or ideological commentary, it would hardly come as a 
surprise if such first-hand observers in outlying areas such as Yunnanfu were more inclined to 
view Chinese Communists in a comparatively favorable light vis-à-vis their counterparts in chief 
urban centers such as Beijing, Nanking, and Shanghai. 
For example, in 1936, while noting that the Nationalist government was beginning to 
view anti-Japanese propaganda with increasing concern, Willys R. Peck noted that Chinese 
Finance Minister H. H. Kung forcefully downplayed the ostensible influence of communist 
ideology on the farming and working classes, but stressed that the anti-Japanese rhetoric had 
become significantly persuasive to large numbers of Nationalist troops stationed in the 
provinces.914 It is interesting to note that Peck noted Kung’s assertion that the Chinese traditional 
expectation of filial piety played a role in checking the spread of Communism among the 
peasants in Shansi province by noting that the lot of land proprietors was thankless and 
expensive (in terms of taxes from the government and social obligations to tenants) and that he 
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personally would gladly be unburdened of his land under a communal ownership scheme.915 
Ringwalt’s accounts from the ground do not mention such resistance among the working classes 
but rather from the gentry who typically “lost everything at the hands of the reds.”916 
The Nationalist military forces appear weak in almost every account from American 
officers, whether they were facing Communists or the Japanese. According to Joseph Stilwell in 
March 1936, “if China’s [Nationalist] armed forces are to be judged on the basis of performance, 
it is idle to even speak of resisting Japan. Instead of detailing at most one division of troops to go 
and root out this band of 10,000 poorly armed men, we have the usual grand scheme of rounding 
them up from three sides by a combined movement of six or eight or more divisions, which will 
simply sit down around the occupied area till the Reds decide to go somewhere else…there are 
no leaders in the Chinese army.917 According to Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson, the Chinese 
government in 1936 itself asserted that it had “no fixed policy” regarding the Communists and 
downplayed the number of actually armed rebel troops.918 
The ostensibly inimically hostile relationship between the Nationalist government and the 
Communists was not always clear to American officers. For example, Nelson T. Johnson noted 
in 1936 that the Japanese began to suspect Communist-Nationalist coordination against the 
Japanese in Northwest Shensi.919 Paul R. Josselyn, the Consul-General in Hankow, highlighted 
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reports from the representative of an American company traveling in Shansi that the locals 
believed that the Communists had entered Shansi “by arrangement with Chiang Kai-shek in 
order to give an excuse for Central Government forces to move into that province,” and that 
although it “took fourteen days for Red forces to cross the Yellow River . . . there was no move 
to hinder them in doing so.”920 American officers such as Willys R. Peck noted that Japan 
viewed such possibilities with great alarm and hostility. Peck highlighted the 1933 forthcoming 
visit of a Soviet Ambassador to China as making “this Communist menace much more serious 
than it is now. The Third International was giving constant advice and assistance to Communist 
forces in China.921 Other officers similarly underscored Chiang Kaii-shek’s willingness to 
capitalize on conflicts between rival forces in China in order to bolster his own power.  For 
example, Paul R. Josselyn noted that in September, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces made no 
attempt to assist “Mohammedan” troops in Kansu province—nominally connected to the 
Nationalist government—because “the Central Government is not averse to seeing the 
Mohammedan divisions broken by the Communists, and the military strength and the influence 
of the Mohammedans in the province diminished.”922 
It should be borne in mind that throughout the course of such reporting, the safety of 
American citizens in China (most of whom were missionaries) was the most immediately 
pressing—albeit not sole—concern. Arthur Ringwalt’s report of April 9 noted Communist troop 
movements in detail, highlighting the missionary communities potentially threatened. 
Referencing the 1934 murder of American missionaries John and Betty Stam by Chinese 
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Communists, Willys R. Peck noted that Communist policy towards foreigners appeared to have 
shifted away from kidnapping and killing or holding them for ransom in order to build a more 
favorable image and more effectively confront the Japanese, although this dramatic change did 
not, in Peck’s opinion, seem to have fully gone into effect. Peck also speculated on possible 
Soviet influence on the putative change in policy, musing as to whether the Russians were 
attempting to mobilize Chinese nationalism against Japan.923 
American Foreign Service officers in China were quite cognizant of the alarm with which 
the Japanese viewed Communism in China. However, officers such as Ambassador Nelson T. 
Johnson were remarkably sanguine about the challenge the Communists posed to the prevailing 
order. In a conversation with the Japanese counterpart of Col. Joseph Stilwell (with the latter 
present throughout), Johnson opined that Communism in China was an idea, 
 
“and that ideas were like water: for just as water seeks its level, filling all holes and 
valleys in its rush to find its level, so ideas like communism fill all valleys of discontent 
and holes of defeat in their rush to find their level. This was in obedience to a natural law, 
and if the farmers and students could be given a happier outlook on life I felt that 
communism as such would lose its interest for them.”924 
 
Johnson traced the organization development of the CCP to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, asserting that the 
Soviets  
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“had brought to China the idea inherent in the modern totalitarian state as exemplified by 
the one-party Communist Government in Russia, the one-party Nazi Government in 
Germany, and the one-party Fascist Government in Italy. I remarked that these three 
governments all had one thing in common, namely, that they were governed by one party 
or group which effectively excluded, from participation in the Government or as an 
opposition, all other parties.”925 
 
Johnson emphasized the discrepancy between rural and urban standards of living as 
having stimulated the rise of Communism in China, and that the idea of an industrial proletarian 
movement was out of the question, but that nevertheless the level of agrarian discontent had risen 
to a point at which the CCP could (and did) survive as an indigenous movement.926 Johnson  
further indicated that Chiang Kai-shek disliked the idea of working with the Communists to 
resist the Japanese, preferring to engage in the latter “upon unification of the country,” but was 
increasingly being pressured to do so by the prospect of “a new, and perhaps stronger, opposition 
to his power,” including a challenge from within his own party and government.927 While 
highlighting Col. Stilwell’s report that noted Chiang had “animadverted strongly against the 
Chinese Communists, contending that they were the greatest obstacle to national reconstruction 
and should be ‘eliminated at all costs.’”928 Johnson observed however, that the Chinese 
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Communists were concentrating against the Japanese in such a way as to force Chiang’s hand in 
the matter. 929 
 Officers were alive to changes in Chinese public opinion in the 1930s, particularly those 
shifting in favor towards resistance to Japan. of Willys R. Peck (Consul General in Nanking in 
1933) highlighted that Nationalist leaders were far from unified as to the tone to be adopted vis-
à-vis Japan and that despite bold pronouncements by Chiang Kai-shek, the actual willingness of 
Chinese generals to adopt an aggressively anti-Japanese position was uncertain. Peck 
underscored that Japanese actions in China were forcing Chiang’s hand “as the only alternative 
to becoming a vassal of Japan, and despite awareness that China “could not defeat Japan in 
actual military operations . . . .930 In a confidential dispatch to Nelson Johnson (then American 
Minister in Beijing—the U.S. did not yet have an Ambassador), Peck underscored Chinese 
suspicions that “no matter what Japan obtains from China in the way of territory, Japan will 
always want more, and the only thing which will put a brake on Japan’s ambitions is forcible 
resistance by the Chinese themselves.”931 
 In a conversation with a Mr. Suma, the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, Peck 
starkly related his understanding of the Chinese view, admitting that his first concern was the 
safety of U.S. citizens.932 Peck also highlighted the Secretary’s concerns that under the incoming 
Roosevelt administration the United States might recognize the Soviet Union, but related his 
opinion “that the political systems of the United States and the Soviet Union were so different 
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that it would be rather dangerous to permit the opening of Soviet consulates in America, with 
their numerous attaches who might stir up trouble,” observing that “Mr. Suma seemed to find 
this theory reasonable.”933 Based on the testimony of Chinese Christians detained by the 
Communists, Willys Peck observed that the latter seemed to have “definite objectives” in China 
as of the end of 1936, including the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and resistance to Japan. He 
also attributed significant influence on the Communists to Soviet Russia, and opined that 
Communist pursuit of these stated goals could potentially bring Japan and Russia into conflict in 
China—harking back to his 1916 service as Consul in Tsingtao.934 
 Thus, as the 1930s drew to a close, three overlapping constellations of views concerning 
Chinese Communism: those of the “old” and “young” China officers respectively, and those of 
Japan officers. The views of the latter two groups tended to coincide most often, seeing closer 
links between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists than did their junior China 
colleagues. It was likely this perception that prompted erstwhile American Minister in China 
Nelson T. Johnson write to Stanley K. Hornbeck (Chief of the Far East Division and a person 
friend of Johnson) that “there can be no settlement of these difficulties in Asia without 
participation and approval of Soviet Russia.”935  
Johnson’s personal correspondence also fleshed out his view of the Japanese as bullies in 
Asia, as well as the likelihood of a Japanese-American war if Japanese aggression in China 
continued unchecked.936 However, throughout the 1930s, Johnson also repeatedly underlined his 
belief that Japan could not indefinitely continue its advance ever deeper into China, “in utter 
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disregard of the interests of all the other [Pacific] nations.”937 Yet even while officers such as 
Johnson criticized Japan, they found themselves paralyzed, unable to do anything locally 
substantial to bolster China’s position, even in matters as mundane as policing the International 
Settlement in Shanghai, where the United States maintained military forces alongside those of 
Britain and Japan. According to Willys R. Peck, the American reluctance to cede control of the 
Settlement to China worked to Japan’s benefit, giving de facto control to the Japanese. 938  
During the 1930s, Johnson grew increasingly frustrated with the quickening pace of Japanese 
aggression in China and urged that the United States adopt a clear and unequivocal stance 
against it.939 In keeping with his decades-long commitment to Open Door ideals, Johnson 
explicitly linked this recommendation to Japan’s deepening disregard for international 
agreements, which, in his view, threatened Americans’ ability to freely engage in commerce 
throughout East Asia. According to Johnson, “we should be as brutally about our intentions as 
the other fellow is; it is suicide for us to leave him in any doubt.”940 Hornbeck proved 
unreceptive to such admonitions, noting that “no administration in this country” could be sure 
that such a declaration would be backed by the American people, whereas the Japanese 
government harbored no such concerns.941  
Hornbeck was more sanguine than Johnson about the prospects of avoid a Sino-Japanese 
war in 1936, asserting that the Chinese were “past masters of the art of compromise and it may 
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happen that, although between the Devil and the Deep Sea, they may be able to escape both.”942 
On one crucial point Johnson and Hornbeck were in total agreement: there was little that the 
United States could do to compete with Japan in China, either economically or militarily, without 
a much greater commitment of American resources. Johnson confided to Hornbeck,  
 
“I am more and more convinced that there is little or nothing that we can give to the East 
in the way of services in the future. We charge too much…I have a sneaking idea that it 
costs more to maintain 500 American marines in Peking as a guard to this Embassy than 
it does to maintain the whole Japanese expeditionary force in this same area. On the basis 
of financial comparison, we cannot beat that kind of combination. Something is going to 
have to snap some place. And for us to think for a minute that we can exploit the 
resources of China, either on behalf of ourselves or the Chinese, in competition with the 
Japanese is sheer foolishness.”943 
  
Hornbeck fully concurred with Johnson’s assessment, but underscored the need for the 
United States to “protect by diplomatic means what there remains in China of commercial 
opportunity for the United States and to wait patiently for a day when there may be new 
opportunities presented to the United States for the rendering of services and the supplying of 
goods to China.”944 It is difficult to ascertain from their personal correspondence as to whether 
Johnson entirely shared Hornbeck’s wait-and-see mentality. However, with regard to the 
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likelihood of war between Japan and the United States, American Foreign Service officers in 
Japan were probably less sanguine than either those of Johnson or Hornbeck and were certainly 
more pessimistic than those of the latter. 
 Although they largely concurred with Hornbeck and Johnson on the character of 
Communism in China (and on that subject differed with the junior China officers who observed 
the Communists more directly), from the late 1930s until the actual outbreak of war, Japan-
trained American officers emphasized the imminence of conflict but were deliberately ignored. 
To be sure, this did not necessarily mean that Japan-trained officers advocated more potentially 
controversial compromises than did than China-trained compatriots. According to Joseph 
Ballantine underscored a belief that, even though reaching a “modus vivendi” with the Japanese 
had become a high priority at the State Department, doing so required coaxing unpalatable 
compromises from the Chinese (acquiescing to Japanese supremacy in Manchuria, for example) 
and was practically impossible.945 He also indicated that the Japan-trained officers had warned 
repeatedly that unless such an agreement was reached the Japanese would attack.946 According to 
Ballantine, 
 
“what we should like to have had from the Japanese was a comprehensive agreement that 
would speak for itself as an instrument of peace. Instead the Japanese government was 
disposed to stress its relationship with the Axis, to avoid giving a clear indication of its 
intention to Japan’s relations with China on a basis that would contribute to peace, and to 
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veer away from clear-cut commitments to policies of non-discrimination in international 
commercial intercourse.”947 
 
Rather than their policy-specific warnings, it was the Japan Hands’ admonition that war 
would follow if compromise were not forthcoming that failed to gain traction at the senior levels 
of State Department leadership. In this vein, while Ballantine’s memoirs and oral history do not 
overtly criticize Hornbeck, Dooman’s have been far less charitable. He observed that Hornbeck’s 
memos to the Secretary of State minimized the possibility of war with Japan and that they were 
very influential with Cordell Hull.948 According to Dooman, “[Joseph Grew] and I felt and 
realized, of course, that we were dealing in Washington with a person—I am here referring to 
Stanley Hornbeck—who was on the opposite side of the fence, who was being extremely busy 
negating, as it were, the purpose of our reports from Tokyo.”949 Dooman further emphasized that 
Ambassador Joseph Grew tried to arrange for Dooman to meet with the President in August, 
1940, for Dooman to relate the ambassador’s views, but their State Department superiors 
(Dooman probably meant Hornbeck, but this is unclear) prevented this from happening.950 For 
the Japan-trained officers, the writing was on the wall: according to Dooman, “On December 2, 
1941, we sent a telegram to Washington to the effect that no sources of information with regard 
to military or naval movements were any longer available to us, and that Washington was not to 
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count on us for prior information as to any attack that might be made against us or against any of 
our allies.”951 
 At this point, any ostensible Open Door imperialism in China was truly dead, from its 
incipient rhetoric to its unimplemented ideals. American Foreign Service officers in both Japan 
and China had already been behaving as though this were the case for the better part of a decade, 
due to American disinterest in the Open Door, followed by a progression of events that 
undermined perceptions of its stability as well as its actual political viability. Both Japan- and 
China-trained officers were oblivious to the fact that their wartime-necessitated fall from grace in 
behind-the-scenes policy formulation had been pre-determined by the un-heralded death of Open 
Door imperialism. To be sure, these unappreciated middlemen were unaware of their demotion 
and expressed horror at their exclusion from planning for the WWII endgame. For example, 
Joseph Ballantine observed that when President Roosevelt went to Cairo, Willys Peck was sent 
to provide expertise, but was never sent for. According to Ballantine, Peck  
 
“might just as well not have gone. There was no State Department person that had 
anything to do with the Cairo Conference. There was no Far Easter expert at the Teheran 
Conference, and no Far Eastern expert at the Yalta conference. We could have avoided 
many things, put a flea in the President’s ear about certain things that he was completely 
unaware of, if we’d had somebody.”952 
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It was not only Ballantine who was appalled by this. He noted: “like myself, all of my 
closest colleagues, especially Hornbeck and Nelson, were shocked.”953 Stanley Hornbeck was 
made Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in 1944, yet somehow did not see fit to 
recommend reference to the experience of an officer from either the Japan or China legation.954 
Ballantine’s vote of confidence in the State Department-cultivated Far East experts such as the 
“senior China men” (and by implication, himself as one of the “senior Japan men”) is 
unsurprising. Recruited to be footholds for the Open Door, he and his colleagues eventually 
constituted an unintended wellspring of expertise that functioned equally well as the whipping 
post for failed policy. The Japan officers were correct about the impending war with Japan, and 
may well have been correct about use of the atomic bombs being unnecessary (more will be 
outlined about this in the conclusion), whereas the China officers were correct on the 
independent staying power of the Chinese Communists—on which topic Japan officers such as 
Eugene Dooman eventually conceded (Ballantine did not).  
 By the time the Pearl Harbor attack had initiated the dreaded Japanese-American war, the 
Open Door in China had long since been slammed shut by Japanese military and economic 
penetration into China with nary a moan emitted from the putatively imperial Open Door empire. 
To be sure, the utility of Open Door politics as both an economic American rallying cry and 
badge of political correctness would prove resilient in the Cold War conflict that would 
supersede the nuclear heat of Japan’s defeat in WWII. And to be sure, the diplomacy of the Open 
Door—not least the creation of the SIC—had endowed the US with tools with which it could 
further its objectives in Asia. Yet the actual objective of the Open Door—expansion of American 
trade—had been such a miserable failure that its translation from China policy goal to abstract 
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American policy ideal had become a foregone conclusion nearly a decade prior to the onset of 
WWII.  
 The entire intellectual edifice behind the creation of the SIC thus collapsed. But it cannot 
be said to have been a failure in the same way that Open Door imperialism was a failure, because 
its architects had sought from the inception of their efforts to effect lasting change in the 
institutional structure of American foreign relations, not merely within a few failed policies. 
Against that background, the prototype American Foreign Service that first blinked its eyes in 
1902 became a worthy ad hoc antecedent for its modern day progeny. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
FROM CASE STUDIES TO COMPARISONS: LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 
FOR MULTIFARIOUS HISTORIES FROM THE MIDDLE 
 
This dissertation brings the state back into the discussion of economic empire in China 
while avoiding a top-down approach.955 As highlighted in the first and second chapters, the 
establishment of Student Interpreters Corps was facilitated by the imperialist rhetoric that 
scholars such as Williams and McCormick aptly emphasize. Moreover, both the “master 
architects”956 who designed the SIC and its graduates were willing, able, and active promoters of 
trade promotion—the crux of arguments for American economic empire—they were unable to 
overcome the reluctance of American business to pass through the Open Door in China. 
Highlighted elsewhere, the complicated relationship between the SIC and American missionaries 
suggests that “the missionary mind” was an unreliable ally in pursuit of economic empire, even 
as the existing relationship shifted views increasingly in favor of interventionist policies.957  
As highlighted in the final chapter, political crises gradually shifted from trade promotion to 
political damage control, thereby curtailing a stillborn economically imperialist project. This 
dissertation suggests that examination of language-trained middlemen in the American Foreign 
Service reveals not a project of economic imperialism—although it was couched in such 
rhetoric—but rather an enterprise of bureaucratic centralization, envisioned by men “who 
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idealized their country as a centralizing nation-state that would have to plan an active role in the 
world’s affairs.”958 Chapters 1 and 2 buttress the work of scholars such as James Q. Wilson, who 
have argued that a key strategy of executive power (within which the SIC emerged, evolved and 
expanded) is to “curry favor and placate critics.”959 
Internationalists such as Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and Wilbur Carr were 
compelled to build a constituency with the America business public, to whom they advocated the 
establishment of the SIC. Yet while they were successful in that regard, “trade promotion” was 
an insufficiently quantifiable, rather vague tasking that could never become the overarching 
mission of the State Department, let alone the crisis-ridden Far East Division. Most SIC-trained 
officers, never fully comfortable with the front-loaded emphasis on trade expansion, were 
therefore ready to shift from economics to politics at a moments’ notice, the latter being their 
preferred realm anyhow: many of them preferred the role of political pundit to economic enabler, 
whatever the personal cost. 
This dissertation has comprised a first attempt at conducting history from the middle—
history that is neither top-down nor bottom-up—examining the lives and careers of American 
Foreign Service officers trained in the Student Interpreters Corps (SIC). While this examination 
does not claim to provide historiographically earth-shattering revelations, it nevertheless presents 
significant revision to critiques of American Foreign relations by Wisconsin School historians 
such as William Appleman Williams and Thomas J. McCormick by demonstrating that the links 
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between economic imperialist rhetoric failed to translate into actual empire in China.960 These 
issues have already received substantial treatment by historians of Sino-American relations such 
as Michael Hunt, in his examinations of Open Door policies in China.961  
However, treatments such as those of Hunt highlight the amateur character of American 
diplomacy at the turn of the twentieth century and almost entirely overlook the massive first step 
towards professionalization of the American Foreign Service provided by the SIC. This 
examination of language-trained Foreign Service officers—bureaucrats in the middle—adds to 
critiques such as those of Hunt (mentioned above) and Paul Varg, who debunked the myth of the 
China market by examining economic data.962 Yet while economically-focused studies by 
historians such as Varg highlight the disappointing trade figures and those such as Sherman 
Cochran’s examinations of  local business enterprises reveal that such endeavors transcended 
center-periphery and imperial-colonial relationships, they do not deal squarely with the issue of 
business-government relations postulated by Williams and McCormick.963 James Lorence, a 
student of Williams, has attempted to highlight precisely this link in his treatment of the 
American Asiatic Association.964  
Nevertheless, Lorence’s limited examination focuses primarily on the advocacy and 
ambitions of domestic trade organizations and overlooks the state as a crucial but largely 
assumed agent in an equally-presumed nexus of business-government-missionary interests in 
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pursuit of economic empire. Highlighting the connections between the SIC and American 
missionaries, this dissertation indicates that the associations presumed by Appleman, 
McCormick, and Lorence were weaker, more complicated, and far less direct than has often been 
assumed.   
In this way, this dissertation revises existing narratives that examine this period of 
American Foreign Relations. Examining these hitherto unappreciated middlemen of the Student 
Interpreters Corps also paves the way for future studies of the middle. Some of these multifarious 
opportunities have been highlighted obliquely in the foregoing chapters. For example, chapter 
seven has observed that the proponents and creators of the SIC took Great Power diplomatic 
language training programs such as those of Britain and France as examples and sought to 
emulate them—however imperfect and incomplete the imitation may have been. Future work 
should highlight not only the roles that language-trained intermediaries—state and otherwise—
played in international relations but also the ways in which they interacted with one another.  
As observed frequently in this study, the United States was a latecomer to diplomatic 
language training: even Japan had a system of education for future diplomats that included 
language training as early as 1894.965 Chinese language, culture, and politics provided a common 
framework within which foreign consuls and diplomats interacted, and yet while numerous 
volumes have been written that study the international crises with which they dealt, virtually 
none have examined the processes of debate, negotiation, and policy implementation from the 
perspective of these interlocutors between their respective governments, foreign national 
communities, and the Chinese people. 
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Such studies could and should be replicated in a variety of international contexts, paving 
the way for reexamination of old debates by asking new questions and engaging new sources.  
One such avenue involves more comprehensive study of U.S. government language-training 
programs alongside the SIC of the Foreign Service. Athough scholars such as Thomas Watts 
Collier and Roger V. Dingham have examined U.S. Army langauage officers in China and Japan 
respectively, and numerous scholars have studied the China Hands,966 no published work has 
attempted to comprehensively examine the East Asian language training programs of the United 
States government. This dissertation is the first attempt at examining such intermediaries in a 
way that transcends debate over the historiographical controversies surrounding American 
involvemet in World War II. In what ways did military and civilian language training overlap 
and differ? How did differing bureaucratic priorities influence the exercise of these officers’ 
duties? Can, and indeed should they be considered alongside one another? 
In addition, while this dissertation aimed to study the lives and careers of the SIC-trained 
officers comprehensively, another name, pair, or set of names emerged. The research strategy 
evolved to treat these officers as a body, while acknowledging generational and ideological 
differences as much as possible. However, some of these officers deserve greater treatment. 
Whereas Nelson Johnson and Julean Arnold have been the subjects of biographical studies,967 
officers such as Willys Peck and Jay C. Huston have been neglected. Meanwhile, no SIC-Japan 
officers (such as Joseph Ballantine, Eugene Dooman or Erle Dickover) have received such 
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consideration, let alone any of the SIC-Turkey officers (who largely remain outside even this 
dissertation). Future biographical work need not remain constrained by the top-down tendencies 
of the genre: as observed of Christine Philliou’s work below, it is quite feasible to integrate top-
down, bottom-up, and middle-outward perspectives on governance, engagement, language, and 
economy with an individual as an analytical lens. This has already been done for some of the SIC 
language officers, even if the painting has been with alternately too broad or too narrow a lens—
particularly with regards to American perceptions of Chinese Communism. 
While much of the historiography of the “China Hands” is linked to the “Red Scare” 
controversies surrounding the service of offcers such as John Davies, John Service, Edmund 
Clubb, Arthur Ringwalt, and others of their generation, American awareness of Chinese 
Communism did not originate with them. They did suffer for their outspoken views, but for 
nearly a decade before their views became (in)famous, the aforementioned SIC-trained Jay C. 
Huston had studied Communism in China with a passion that verged on obsession.968 While this 
dissertation has striven to add to this labor, more should be done to put the American perception 
of Chinese Communism into its proper social, political, and military contexts. 
Similarly, even while emphasizing American policy towards China, this dissertation has 
endeavored to show that the SIC-Japan officers were instrumental in several regards. For 
example, it was they who first recognized the changes in the wind that shifted emphasis from 
trade expansion to political crisis management. Small in numbers however, in the wake of 
American victory in WWII, they are a group that is relatively easy to overlook. What is more, 
Joseph Ballantine’s excoriation of such China Hands as Service, Davies, and Clubb made it easy 
for historians sympathetic to the latter officers to dismiss the views of the former. In this vein, 
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while historians such as Walter LaFeber969 have made tremendous contributions to the study of 
comparatively recent Japanese-American relations, “history from the middle” offers the prospect 
of revised, more specifically-focused studies of this relationship during the first half of the 
twentieth century.    
Another fruitful field for future study is that of language training and interpreters and 
translators in the Ottoman Empire. Due to the exigencies of WWI and the interruption of 
relations between the Empire and the United States, the language training program of the Student 
Interpreters Corps was curtailed in 1917. SIC Turkey is therefore a relative outlier in this 
dissertation. However, as noted in the preface, interest in the Translation Bureau and Language 
School of the 19th century Ottoman Empire was one of the research interests of this dissertation 
and played no small role in both the author’s life and in the extended timeline for completion of 
the project. Although the results of the research conducted between 2012 and 2014 have been 
relegated beyond the purview of this dissertation, they remain an active focus and will be 
returned to in future presentations and published work.  
One avenue for such labors traverses the path taken by officials in the Ottoman Foreign 
Ministry from appointments as language students to positions of responsibility in Ottoman 
bureaucracy.  As Sezai Balcı (who provided one of the first overviews of the Translation Bureau 
of the Ottoman Empire) notes, there has yet to be a single published monograph dealing with 
translation/interpretation within the Ottoman State,970 which Carter Vaughn Findley has 
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described as “the seedbed of the Tanzimat elite.”971 Balcı’s treatment of translation at the 
Sublime Porte does a great service in describing the evolution of the composition of the 
Translation Bureau, but does not analyze the role of language training in the 19th century 
bureaucracy. Scholars studying Ottoman modernization such as Walter F. Weiker have 
frequently observed that nearly all reform-minded bureaucrats and “Young Ottomans” launched 
their careers in the Translation Office (Tercüme Odası).972 Carter V. Findley has described the 
Translation Office as “not only the prototype for similar offices in other departments but also one 
of the most basic components of the Foreign Ministry and the starting-point of many a famous 
statesman.”973 However this seemingly vital component of Ottoman bureaucracy has been 
largely overlooked by Western historiography. Future endeavors should provide more in-depth 
analyses of 19th century Ottoman language training that undergirded the Ottoman state’s 
approach to Europe during this crisis-filled period.  
One pioneering example of such a study is Christine Philliou’s study of nineteenth 
century of Stephanos Vogorides, an Ottoman Greek of Phanariot heritage.974 Philliou builds on 
the work of Carter Vaughn Findley975 in her study of nineteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy, 
examining through the lens of an Ottoman Greek loyalist. Yet while her treatment does a great 
deal to illuminate a hitherto unexamined aspect of Ottoman bureaucracy during this turbulent 
period, treatment of the Language School and Translation Office—increasingly staffed by 
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Turkish Muslims after the Greek Rebellion of 1821—falls largely outside the scope of her work. 
Greater scrutiny of the means whereby 19th century Ottoman officials were trained to engage 
Europe will shed further light on the dynamic and much-discussed Tanzimat period, as well as 
on the Ottomanist officials who made a final, failed bid for a multi-confessional, multinational 
Empire that was superseded competing nationalist ideologies. 
Similarly in the arena of international relations comparative studies such as those of and 
Karen Barkey and Michael Reynolds have provided overviews of how the Ottoman Empire and 
its neighbors governed, interacted, clashed and ultimately collapsed.976 Scholars such as Barkey 
and Reynolds renew focus on the state as agent, variously emphasizing historical continuity and 
change. However, the roles of diplomatic language training, of the construction of mutual 
perceptions and interactions again escape analytical treatment. 
In a vastly different context yet methodologically similar sphere of inquiry, yet another 
unexploited approach includes examination of interpreters—both Chinese and Western—in the 
business sector. Whereas business histories such as those of Sherman Cochran have mentioned 
the role of linguistic intermediaries in foreign, bi- and multinational enterprises in China in 
passing,977 much more needs to be done in order to highlight the mediums through which these 
enterprises engaged local Chinese markets. As with the examples above, these inquiries can be 
replicated in other contexts not limited to that of China in the early twentieth century.  
These are some of the possibilities for history from the middle. This dissertation has 
sought to lead by example in its examination of the Student Interpreters Corps and the role of its 
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language-trained graduates in the stillborn project of American economic imperialism. The 
opportunities appear inviting, yet challenges remain. Chief among these remains the question, to 
what extent were such “intermediaries” truly, as it were, in the middle? Could it not be argued 
that positionally—particularly among the host country populations among whom they served—
they were actually elites? It is hoped that this dissertation’s emphasis upon the mundane aspects 
of the lives of SIC graduates, the travails of their families, and their complex relationships with 
American businesses and missionaries—all of these details indicate that these officers were not 
policymakers, were not in control of their careers, their lives. They were not at the bottom of the 
socio-economic ladder to be sure. They were (usually) university graduates, they were 
professionals, they were in the middle. It remains for future studies to highlight such middles in 
order to add nuance and depth to the narratives of history from the top-down, and history from 
the bottom up. This dissertation offers revision of revisionist history and seeks to bring a few 
bricks to the edifice of historical knowledge by presenting an example of history from the 
middle. 
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